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1Introduction
The performance of the European states at the UN Commission in Geneva in the last 
two years has again shifted the focus on this enormous country. The 15 European 
states are unable to find a common standpoint with regard to China, not at least 
because of economic interests. The impressive trade figures growing between the 
European Union and China gravely question the seriousness of any commitment to 
human rights on the side o f Europe. Neither is a link established between China’s 
accession to the WTO and the observance of human rights, nor are the impressive 
trade figures, o f  the EU and China used to exert pressure on China. China even seems 
to reverse the position and to apply commercial bribery and threats to Western 
countries in response to criticism o f  its human rights record. If human rights indeed 
„nominally pertain to political co-operation“1 instead o f  to aid or trade, then the 
current de-linking o f human rights from trade with regard to China is nothing to 
complain about. If however human rights should be more than „deploring the critical 
situation“, then a human rights policy should also cover hard issues related to aid and 
trade policies.
The case of China was chosen, on the one hand, because it shows human rights at the 
crossroads between law and politics, as the protection and enforcement o f human 
rights is both a political and a legal problem. As regards the political side, different 
understandings and concepts of human rights exist among the states o f the world. The 
legal dimension o f human rights enforcement exemplifies the structural weakness of 
the international legal system in lack of mechanisms to enforce international law.
i K. Tomasevski, D e ve lop m e n t A id  a n d  H um an  R ig h ts  R e v is ite d , Pinter, London, 1993, p. 73.

2On the other hand, China is a good case to demonstrate the deficiencies and problems 
still connected with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European 
Union. Can it overcome the divergent economic interests o f the Member States or is it 
too weak a procedure? What are the reasons for the European Union's retreat to the 
CFSP alone in order to deal with China instead of applying a comprehensive human 
rights policy? „China is today, by virtue of its size, economic vitality and future 
potential, of crucial importance from the European perspective as the EU seeks to 
expand its economic reach in the global context and to develop an effective Common 
Foreign and Security Policy“.2
This paper is an attempt to trace the development o f the Union’s human rights policy 
towards China and to analyse its significance in relation to the needs of China. It is a 
country in transition, moving from a totalitarian system under one-party rule to a more 
open society, and perhaps eventually to a state where the principles o f pluralist 
democracy and a market economy are adhered to. Integration into the economic, social 
and political life of Western Europe („Wirtschaftliberalismus“3) is considered to 
represent the most appropriate means of ensuring that the events of 1989 will not be 
repeated.
It is the declared objective of the European Union to make its engagement in human 
rights more visible. To this end, coherence and targeting are necessary. According to 
the Commission document „The European Union and the External dimension of 
Human Rights Policy: From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond“, the first exercise o f this 
kind, it is the Union’s obligation to „define and implement a strategy guaranteeing the 
consistency, impact and efficiency o f its activities". The Union is, besides others, 
fulfilling this task by an „in-depth analysis of human rights issues in order to develop a
2 R. Menotti, „European-Chinese Relations in the Nineties“ , in: The In te rn a tio n a l S p e c ta to r, 
No.4, October-December 1995, Vol.XXX, pp. 71-85, p. 72.
3 See M. Brenner, „Kritischer Dialog Oder Konstruktives Engagement?“, in: In te rn a tio n a le  
P o lit ik , No.9, 1997, Vol.52, pp. 7-12.

3range o f instruments tailored to the specific needs and features of the countries and 
regions concerned“.4 Knowing that this is only one small part of the overall strategy to 
become visible, coherent and efficient on the world scene, and finally to reach the 
objective of asserting its identity on the international scene as stated in Art. B o f the 
Treaty of Maastricht (TEU), the paper will nonetheless focus on the tailoring of a 
human rights policy towards China as this gives enough material for discussion.
4 „The European Union and the External dimension of Human Rights Policy: From Rome to 
Maastricht and Beyond“, COM (95) 567 final, p. 2 Is.

4C hapter 1: The European Union as part of the international system of human
rights law
This Chapter starts with describing the international system in which the European 
Union’s human rights engagement takes place by referring to the major international 
human rights treaties and by giving a definition of human rights. It then, after the 
structure of the European Union will have been quickly examined, focuses on the 
CFSP as a framework for human rights protection.
I. The framework of international human rights law
1. The m ajor treaties
International human rights law is closely connected to the UN system, a system that 
evolved after the cruelties o f the second world war. At that time, it was recognized 
that the human rights of the world's population have to be vindicated and protected 
everywhere, not only by the states domestically, what had obviously not succeeded, 
but additionally by the community of states. The major concern of the world 
community after the war was to achieve peace and prevent the reoccurrence of the 
horrors of the war. The individual had, for the first time, become a focus o f the 
international legal system. With the foundation of the United Nations in 1945 and the 
protection of human rights mentioned in the Charter, the human rights movement was 
born, although these human rights provisions were still „scattered, terse, even 
cryptic*'.5 This new emphasis on peace and human rights found elaborated expression 
in a Resolution by the General Assembly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) in 1948 and, in legal form, in the subsequent two Conventions, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Covenant on
5 H. J. Steiner and P. Alston, In te rn a tio n a l H um an  R ig h ts  in  C o n te x t, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1996, p. 118; see the Charter provisions Art. 1 III, 13 I b, 55, 56, 62 II, 68.

5Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which were approved in 1966 and 
entered into force in 1976, which together cover the provisions of the UDHR (except 
the right of property which was too controversial at that time) and form the so-called 
International Bill o f Rights together with the UDHR. Another set of more specific 
human rights conventions emerged over the years: The International Convention on 
the Elimination o f all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 1965), Convention on 
the Elimination o f all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979), the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT, 1984) and the Convention on the rights of the Child (CRC, 1989). 
The participation of states in this international treaty system has become impressive 
despite the fact that the treatment of a State's own citizens was for a long time 
regarded as falling beyond the scope of international scrutiny, as opposed to the 
treatment of strangers.6 More than 3/4 of the world’s states have ratified five of the 
treaties, and fifty percent have even ratified six.7
Last, but not least, one important regional treaty system for the protection o f human 
rights is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 concluded by the Member States o f the Council of 
Europe. In the international context, it can be regarded as one of the most developed 
instruments for ensuring the protection and promotion o f human rights.8 These treaties 
provide the framework for any international action on human rights be it within the
6 R  B. Lillich, International Human Rights. Problems o f  Law, Polity and Practice, Second 
Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1991, p. 5.
7 Report by the Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice, in: J. Crawford 
(ed.), International Law Association, Helsinki Conference 1996, International Law Association, 
London 1996, p,338; for the exact numbers see J. B. Marie, „Instruments Internationales relatifs 
aux Droits de l’Homme: Classification et état des ratifications au 1er Janvier 1997“, in: Revue 
Universelle des Droits de l ’Homme, No. 1-4, 1996, Vol.8, pp. 89-105.
8 N. Dorr, „An Introduction to Human Rights: Developments since 1945“, in: Liz Heffeman (ed.), 
Human Rights. A European Perspective, Round Hall Press, Dublin 1994, pp.1-19, p. 17.
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6respective international fora or by including human rights in the individual policy of 
states (and of the EU). , r ,,
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2. W hat are hum an rights?
The term „human rights“ has two implications.9 The first is that they form the rights 
every human being should have just because one is a human being and potentially able 
to exercise rational choice, seen as the relevant parameter to distinguish human beings 
from, for example, animals. One does not have to earn human rights, they do not 
depend on citizenship (as opposed to fundamental rights), by definition they cannot be 
taken away and, finally, derive from the inherent dignity o f the human person. The 
second is that that they are rights; which means they entitle the human being to claim 
the right from those who deny it and that they give precedence to other political or 
moral matters (human rights as trump card) independently of the country and political 
system in which the person lives.10 Admittedly, the right (the entitlement) might not be 
a legal right (in the sense of being guaranteed in the laws of the country), but it is 
always a human right.11 Human rights have become internationalized through their 
successive codification in international law (see the treaties above) and thus are 
progressively taken out o f the solely control o f the nation states. Nevertheless, their 
protection on the international level is not as easy as that, but provides us with many 
contentious issues.
Where do the rights come from? Some argue, international human rights are natural 
rights which existed before mankind entered into civil society with other human
9 J. Donnelly, R* E. Howard, „Introduction“, in: J. Donnelly, R. E. Howard (eds.), In te rn a tio n a l 
H and b oo k  o f  H um an  R ig h ts , Greenwood Press, New York 1987, pp. 1-28, p. 1.
10 A. Kent, B e tw een  F reed om  a nd  S ub sis tence . C h in a  a nd  H u m a n  R ig h ts , Oxford University Press, 
Hongkong 1993, p. 7 says that every fundamental human right has got three correlative duties: 
to avoid depriving, to protect from deprivation and to aid the deprived.
A. Sen, „Human Rights and Asian Values“, in: The  N ew  R e p u b lic , July 1997, pp. 33-40, p. 39.n
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7beings. As truths o f nature, they are even seen as „rationally self-evident“ belonging to 
the human being. In entitling human beings to exercise their rights, to protect their 
personal sphere and to challenge the established political authority, natural rights -in 
line with liberal thought- were basically concerned with individuals and with their 
negative freedoms.12 Bentham, one of the main protagonists of the legal positivist 
movement, has expressed its discontent with natural rights being declared the basis of 
law by saying that talk of natural rights „is simply nonsense; natural and imprescriptible 
rights (an American phrase), rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts“,13 Asking 
Bentham or other positivists about the concept o f moral rights as a base for human 
rights, this concept does probably merit the same comment of being „nonsense“ .14
If international human rights derive from codified law (and not from natural or moral 
law), does this then mean that by agreeing to the international conventions cited above 
all the problems have been solved and states have agreed actually to grant the rights 
codified, or are there still barriers to the execution of these rights? Liberal ideas are 
said to have influenced the codification of the international human rights treaties. First, 
not only the Declaration of Independence of 4th July 1776, but also the Declaration of 
the Rights o f Man and of the Citizens of 26th August 1789 are seen as predecessors of 
the present human rights' system and they, in their turn, reflect the tradition o f liberal 
thought and natural rights. The innovation after the Second World War was not to 
grant rights to the human being, but to name these rights „human rights“, instead of 
„natural rights“ the idea remaining the same.15 Moreover, by the time of drafting the 
UDHR, the UN membership stood at 56 states and the now developing countries were
12 D. Sidorsky, „Contemporary Reinterpretations of the Concept of Human Rights“, cited in: H. J. 
Steiner, P. Alston (eds.) (note 5), p. 170s.
13 J. Bowring (ed.), The W o rks  o f  J e re m y  B en tham , II, Russel & Russel, New York 1962, p. 501.
H M. Cranston, W h a t a re  H um an  R ig h ts ? , Bodley Head, Oxford 1973, p. 7: „In classifying human 
rights as moral rights it is important to notice something which distinguishes them from other 
kinds of moral rights. This is that they are universal.“
B. Weston, „Human Rights“, cited in: H. J. Steiner, P. Alston (eds.) (note 5), p. 168.15
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8often still colonies or simply not members of the UN. Red China, for example, has only 
been a UN member since 1971, because at that time it was becoming clear that White 
China, the exiled Koumintang regime in Taiwan, would not resume its powers in the 
People’s Republic of China and after the change of US policy it was widely accepted 
that Red China was the legitimate state successor.16 Nevertheless, the drafters of the 
UDHR took different views about culture and society into account and did not believe 
in individualism and its protection as the only valid way of governing society.17 The 
codification in a time and in surroundings of liberalism does not forcibly mean that 
other traditions, religions, cultures and societies were disregarded, nor that these 
traditions could not display elements o f liberal thought. Another drawback is that 
codified human rights, as contained in the treaties, might well be comprehensive, but 
are not comprehensively signed and ratified by all countries of the world. Thus in 
stating human rights to be the codified rights of the international community, states can 
escape obligations by not adhering to the treaties. Consequently, the obligations must 
exist in other forms as well, be it customary law or general principles o f law (Art. 38 of 
the Statute of the ICJ).
Which rights are human rights? In the natural law tradition of the predecessors of the 
international human rights movement, the natural rights included in the Declaration of 
Independence o f 4th July 1776 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizens of 26th August 1789 were civil and political rights. After the Second World 
War, economic, social and cultural rights were included in that list by the UDHR, 
followed by a „third generation“ o f rights launched by the recognition of the right to
16 U. Fastenrath, in: B. Simma (ed.), The  C h a rte r o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s , A Commentaiy, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1994, Art. 3, No.8.
17 See, for example, American Anthropological Association, „Statement on Human Rights“, cited 
in: H. J. Steiner, P. Alston (eds.) (note 5), p. 198; The UDHR is neither a purely liberal 
document, nor can it be attributed to a single other tradition.
SM ?r h pl'ff
9development by the UN Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986.18 
Perceptions of which rights to protect differ from one country to another, so that 
whilst Third World countries traditionally emphasize economic and social rights, 
Western countries stress civil and political rights (see also below, China’s position, 
Chapter 2).
A great deal o f  this different respect of human rights is due to the fact that „rights“ and 
„politics“ are very close in this area of international law. Are human rights rights or 
political concepts? The rights discourse claims to explain and resolve social and other 
conflict by solely referring to the norm and applying it. The right itself is the basis of all 
interpretation. But the high level o f abstraction, especially in the field of human rights 
(„inhuman“, „degrading“, „equal protection“, right to health“), makes rights concepts 
so elastic that they can mean different things to different people.19 It would be 
misleading to believe that rights can be concretized without opening them to other 
disciplines such as social theory or political philosophy, and thereby they have to be 
„politicized“.20 International human rights law is law, because it consists of mutually 
agreed norms o f the state community to institutionalize state behaviour towards its 
citizens, and because it can be enforced by sanctions.21 The inherent contradiction
18 Ch. Loh, „The Vienna Process and the Importance o f Universal Standards in Asia“, in: M. C. 
Davis (ed.), H um an  R ig h ts  a nd  C h in e se  Va lues, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong 1995, 
pp. 145-167, p. 152.
19 K. Klare, „Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction“, cited in: H. J. Steiner, P. Alston (eds.) 
(note 5), p. 178s.
20 For a very strong view of the political nature of human rights see M. Koskenniemi, „The Politics 
of International Law“, cited in: H. J. Steiner, P. Alston (eds.) (note 5), p. 5Oss; Whilst talking 
about the increasing politicization of human rights in  the UN, Lillich still submits that „Human 
Rights cannot, nor is it desirable that they should, be divorced from politics“, R. B. Lillich (note 
6), p. 12; see also M. Koskenniemi, „International Law Aspects of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy“, in: M. Koskenniemi (ed.), In te rn a tio n a l L a w  A sp ec ts  o f  th e  E u ro p e a n  U n io n , 
Kluwer 1998, pp. 27-44.
21 The law is a  set of rules formally adopted by an (...) authority, and backed up by coercive 
sanctions, with the functions of institutionalizing and standardizing the social behaviors of 
individuals, organizations and governments, Chenguang, W., „Introduction: An Emerging Legal 
System“, in: Chenguang, W., Xianchu, Z. (ed.), In tro d u c tio n  to  C h inese  L aw , Sweet & Maxwell, 
Hong Kong et al. 1997, pp. 1-30, p. 3.
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between the law o f human rights being dealt with and constructed by states (who send 
their political representatives along), but focusing on the restraint of governments can 
only be resolved through international co-operation and through the strengthening of 
institutions. The need for law to be open to politics and the intent o f many 
governments to move away from the legal framework, because it impacts upon their 
political system and prescribes them how they have to treat their citizens, is a serious 
threat to the compliance with human right standards.22 2345
Are not duties as important as rights? Last, but not least, the question of „What are 
human rights“ cannot be answered without taking a quick look to the (corresponding) 
concept of duty which recently has found international expression in a draft document 
on an Universal Declaration on Human Responsibilities.23 245One provision of the UDHR 
also deals with duties and that is Art. 29, but it was not reproduced in any Convention, 
because the field o f duties was left to regulation by states. In other cultures different 
fundamental words dominate the legal sphere. In Jewish law, for example, „an 
entitlement without an obligation is a sad, almost pathetic thing“.24 25In Chinese society, 
duties are set up for every level o f society and often regarded as more important than 
pursuing individual rights.
To sum up, human rights are entitlements of international law whose normative 
content involves the protection of the human dignity inherent in every human being all 
over the world, but whose implementation depends to a great extent on politics and 
state will to give life to the treaty provisions.
22 L. Henkin, „International Law: Politics, Values and Functions“, cited in: H. J. Steiner, P. Alston 
(eds.) (note 5), p. 350s.
23 High level expert group meeting convened by the InterAction Council Noordwijk Forum, chaired 
by H. Schmidt, 20-22 April 1997, Vienna.
24 R. Cover, „Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social order“, cited in: H. J. Steiner, P. 
Alston (eds.) (note 5), p. 182.
25 M. Ng, „Are Rights Culture-bound?*, in: M. C. Davis (ed.) (note 18), pp.59-71, p.63s. She takes 
the prescription o f duties in  order to show that there also was a kind of concept o f right in 
Confucian thought
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II. Who is the European Union in the international context?
1. Peculiarities of the treaty structure
The Union is founded on the European Communities, the Common Foreign and 
Security policy (CFSP) and the Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA).26 The European Union is a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe (Art. A .2) and represents the „ultimate objective 
of the European integration",27 which, since Maastricht, has been widened from the 
economic to a political dimension by, amongst other things, the introduction of the 
CFSP and the JHA. In the early days after Maastricht there was much enthusiasm for 
the legal personality of the Union as declared by some authors.28 A favourable 
interpretation o f the CFSP treaty provisions supported this assumption. First, other 
than in the European Political Cooperation (EPC), it is no longer the „treaty members" 
(Art. 30 I EEA), but „The Union and its Member States" which shall define and 
implement the policy (Art. J.l I TEU).29 Second, Art. J .l. IV claims that the Member 
States „shall support the Union’s external security policy actively" and Art. J.4. IV 
talks about the policy of the „Union". Third, in Art. J.5 the assumption that there is a 
single EU-actor is made even more convincing by the statement that the Presidency 
shall represent the „Union", and not the Member States. Moreover, Art. 0  mentions 
accession „to the Union" and it has been submitted that, as new members could only 
adhere to a legal entity, the Union had become a legal personality through the implicit
26 The pillar construction is commonly used to describe this phenomenon.
27 P. S. R. F. Mathijsen, A  G u id e  to  E u ro p e a n  U n ion  L a w , 6th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 
1995, p. 5.
see G. Ress, Editorial, in: J u ris tis c h e  S chu lu ng , No. 12, 1992, Vol.32, p. 985; G. Ress, 
„Democratic decision making in the European Union and the role of the European Parliament“, 
in: D. Curtin, T. Heukels (eds.), In s titu tio n a l D yn am ic s  o f  E u ro p e a n  In te g ra tio n . E ssays  in  
H o n o u r o f  H . G. Sche rm e rs , Vol.II, Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1994, pp. 153-176, p. 156; contrary 
opinion see references B. Simma/Ch. Vedder, in: E. Grabitz (ed.), K o m m e n ta r z u r  
E u ro p a e isc h e n  U n io n , Art. 210, No. 6.
W ith Amsterdam, Art, 11 (CV) TEU names only the Union as addressee of the provision.29
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will of its founding states. In the end, however, the common opinion still is that the 
European Union does not enjoy legal personality, notwithstanding the references in the 
treaty.30 In order to bestow an organization with legal personality, it has either to be 
explicitely stated somewhere in the treaty or must be deductable from other treaty 
provisions. Both is mostly denied with regard to the European Union. Even after the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference and with the Treaty o f  Amsterdam, the incertitude 
as to the status and role o f the European Union has not been solved.31 The allegedly 
missing legal personality has as a consequence that in the case of the conclusion of an 
international agreement in the fields o f the CFSP, the Union can only act through its 
Member States which perform the necessary acts.32 To sum up, in terms o f legal 
personality the Union does not exist in the international context, but has remained a 
form o f integrated co-operation among states (the correct formula should be: „the
30 see H. Lecheier, „Der Rechtscharakter der ‘Europäischen Union’“, in: Jörn Ipsen, Hans-Werner 
Rengeling, Jörg M. Mössner, Albrecht Weber, V e rfa ssun g s rec h t im  W ande l, Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, Köln 1995, pp. 383-393; M. Pechstein, „Rechtssubjektivität filr die Europäische 
Union?*, in: E u ro p a re c h t, N o .2 ,1996, Vol. 31, pp. 137-144.
31 No explicit reference to the international legal personality appears in the Treaty, see T. Dodd; R. 
Ware; A, Weston, The E u ro p e an  C o m m u n itie s  (A m endm ent) B il l :  Im p le m e n tin g  the  A m s te rd am  
T re a ty , Research Paper No.97/112, International Affairs and Defence Section, Hous of 
Commons Library, 5.11.1997, p.57; the widespread implicit allusions which could also be 
interpreted as done above, have nonetheless no legal meaning, because the Member States 
expressed their common consent not to bestow the Union with legal personality, even though it 
was a matter o f concern in the run-up to the Intergovernmental Conference 1996. The main 
argument against a legal personality of the EU was that then the legal personality of the EC 
would have to end and this was at the moment neither desirable nor feasible. Moreover, the EU 
would have to be given a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion o f international 
agreements, A. A  Dashwood, „Position Paper“, in: A  A  Dashwood (ed.), R e v ie w in g  M a a s tr ic h t, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 1996, p.220s.
The discussion, however, has not finished yet. More and more sholars seem to support the idea 
of an international legal personality for the Union. The author is currently involved in an 
analysis and interpretation o f the Union's structure in the context of her Phd
32 A rt 24 of the Consolidated Version (CV) of the TEU introduces a limited treaty-making power 
of the EU in the field of the CFSP, and Art. 38 does the same for the JHA. But neither accords 
legal personality as such to the EU, because the power to conclude agreements is restricted to a 
very limited purpose („when it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or 
international organizations in implementation of this title“) and it is moreover clarified that this 
treaty-making power does not „imply any transfer o f competence from the Member States to the 
Union“ (Declaration 4 of the Amsterdam Treaty), T. Dodd; R, Ware; A  Weston, see above, p. 
57s.
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Member States acting within the framework of the Union“, and not „the Union acts“33 345) 
based on the three pillars, the last two being intergovernmental.
The EC, on the other hand, as an international organization, is a subject o f public 
international law endowed with legal personality by its Member States; this is 
documented in Art. 210 TEC and confirmed by Art. 113, 229-231, 238 TEC giving 
international competences to conclude agreements with third states.34 35In using its 
external competences, the EC has become member of two international treaties - the 
GATT and the FAO33 35-, party to several international conferences (and their respective 
concluding documents) and to several international agreements between it and third 
states (trade and co-operation agreements). For third states this split o f competences is 
very confusing given that in international fora the Presidency speaks on behalf of the 
Union, but when it comes to the negotiation of an agreement, the counterpart might be 
the Commission representing the EC36 or a Foreign Minister representing a Member
33 But the Council agreed to issue political statements on behalf o f the Union, Decision o f the 
Council, 93/591/EU, EG, EGKS, Euratom, 8.11.93; G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. 
Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.), K o m m e n ta r zum  E U /E G  V e rtra g , Art. J.5, No.3; 
Another indication for the possible legal personality o f the Union.
34 B. Simma/Ch. Vedder, in: E. Grabitz (ed.) (note 28 ), Art. 210, Nr. 2; Also Art. 130y I, 130m II, 
130r IV, 126-129, 129c, 73c TEC; Moreover the ERTA jurisdiction of the ECJ accords implicit 
external competences to the EC whenever there is an  internal competence and whenever the EC 
cannot use this internal competence without having recourse to external competences as well.
35 European Commission, G e n e ra l R e p o rt on  the a c tiv it ie s  o f  th e  E u rop ean  U n io n  1996 , 
Luxembourg, Office for official publications of the EC 1997, p. 291, pt. 746, the Community has 
been a full member of FAO since 1991.
36 Or the Council, if  the c on c lu s io n  o f the agreement is concerned, art. 228 TEC. Adding up to the 
confusion, the EC also is represented in  many different ways ranging from a  common delegation 
of EC and MS, to separate delegations of the MS and the EC, where the EC is either represented 
only by the Commission or by the Commission and the Presidency (bicephalous) or by the 
Commission, the Presidency and the MS (multicephalous), Ch. Vedder, in: E. Grabitz (ed.) (note 
28), Art. 228, No.29. In practice, it appears, the Community and the Union are represented both 
by the Troika as this comprises the different modes of representation, although the 
Commission’s role is more limited in  the Troika (CFSP) than in  a Community delegation.
IF
t
uState (in the case of a mixed agreement or as long as it is within Member States’ 
competence).37
2. Implications of the treaty structure for human rights38
International human rights are a part of a comprehensive foreign policy.39 In applying 
the discussion o f the nature of the Union to human rights matters, several aspects of 
the Union’s engagement therein, which cannot be found in a nation state, have to be 
distinguished: first, the Union’s presence in human rights is more than the CFSP. It is 
the EC40 and the EU engagement in international human rights’ protection through 
either first pillar (Art. 113, 130uss, 238, 229-231 TEC) or second pillar (CFSP) 
measures, according to which different procedures apply. Second, the instruments of 
the CFSP aim, eventually, at forming a European identity in human rights (Art. B 
TEU) by giving more political weight to the Union. But, a contradiction arises from 
the missing legal personality of the European Union: how can the Union possibly assert
31 A. A. Dashwood, Position Paper, in: A. A. Dashwood (ed.) (note 31), p. 220.
38 To clarify the complicated issue, I am  using the term „Union“ when referring to both the EC and 
the EU’s foreign policy together, and the term „Eli“ when referring to the CFSP alone.
39 At least in the „liberal“ tradition that seeks to include moral issues in foreign policy as opposed 
to (neo-) realists; See for this important discussion S. Burchill, „Realism and Neo-realism“, in: 
S. Burchill, A. Linklater (eds.), T h e o rie s  o f  In te rn a tio n a l R e la tio n s , Macmillan Press, 
Houndsmill 1996, pp.67-92; S. Burchill, „Liberal Internationalism“, in: ibid., pp.28-66, p.29, the 
moral aspirations of states are thwarted by the absence of a hierarchy in the international system. 
Thus the anarchical nature generates a system of power politics; R. B. Lillich, F. C. Newman, 
„The Carter Administration’s Human Rights Initiatives“, in: R. B. Lillich, F. C. Newman (eds.), 
In te rn a tio n a l H u m a n  R ig h ts : P ro b le m s  o f  L aw  and  P o lic y , Little, Brown and Company, Boston 
et al. 1979, pp.824-871, p.826 the times of Kissinger, p.828 when and if  human rights are 
supported depends on the coincidence with national interests and a analysis o f the (low) political 
costs; A.-M. Slaughter Burley, „International Law and International Relations Theory: A  Dual 
Agenda“, in: A J IL , No.2, 1993, Vol.87, pp.205-239, p.207s; B. Soetendorp, „The Evolution of 
the EC/EU as a  Single Foreign Policy Actor“, in: Walter Carlsnaes, Steve Smith (eds.), 
E u ro p e an  F o re ig n  P o lic y . The  E C  a n d  C hang ing  P e rsp e c tiv e s  in  E u ro p e , Sage, London 1994, 
pp. 103-119, p.105; K. Waltz, T h e o ry  o f  In te rn a tio n a l P o litic s , McGraw Hill, New York 1979.
40 Trade policy is also foreign policy, P. Alston, „International Trade as an Instrument of Positive 
Human Rights Policy“, in: H um an  R ig h ts  Q u a rte rly , No.2, 1982, Vol.4, pp. 155-183, p. 156.
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its „identity“ (Article B TEU)41 on the international scene if it does not even exist in 
public international law? The „international scene“ refers to all relations of the Union 
with third states and international organizations, and these relations are conducted 
within the foreign policy o f the Union. The „new“ foreign policy (CFSP) supplements 
the EC (Art. A III TEU) which implies that the EC remains the principal entity of the 
Union, but that two new policy areas have been given to the Union to become 
operational at the international level.42 The answer to the contradiction is that the - 
legally non-existent- Union has been accorded the means to assert its political 
appearance in the global arena by the introduction of the CFSP in the TEU. And third, 
the Union is obliged by Art. C II to ensure the consistency of all human rights policies 
under the first (aid and trade, second generation conditionality) and the second pillar 
(CFSP) and their necessary co-ordination, as well as of Member States* human rights 
policies. Any further discussion o f the Union's human rights policy has to take this 
split o f competences in human rights between the EC, the EU and the Member States 
into account and to clarify that the human rights policy within the framework of the 
CFSP is (at least legally43) distinct from that of the EC (although both are part o f the 
Union), and o f course distinct from the un-coordinated policies of the Member States.
The Union is a presence on the international scene, differing from state actors by its 
complicated composition and decision-making process. The aim of the present paper is 
to look more closely at the CFSP mechanism and its implications for an effective 
human rights policy for the Union by investigating upon the use of CFSP instruments
41 The EU’s objective of asserting its identity (Ait. B) „is of particular interest since it provides for 
joint action towards third countries, when until now the Member States have had a  strong 
tendency to act individually in that area“, P. S. R. F. Mathijsen (note 27), p. 6.
42 P. S. R. F. Mathijsen (note 27), p. 394s: Art. A TEU stresses the fact that the CFSP is the foreign 
policy of the E U  and not o f the EC by stating that the Union is founded on the European 
Communities, supp lem en ted  (emphasis added) by the policies and forms of co-operation 
established by this Treaty.
43 In practice, the same persons act, i.e. the Ministers in the Council of Ministers. But procedures 
and rights o f the single organs are different according to which pillar is concerned. This is 
especially true for the Commission, the Parliament and the Court (see below).
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in general and particularly towards China. If an international actor decides to make 
human rights an essential element o f  its foreign policy and assumes the international 
obligation in that field, it, according to Jack Donnelly44, has to take certain steps: first, 
it must select a particular set o f rights to pursue, secondly, it needs to explore the legal 
and moral implications of an intervention in a third state on humanitarian grounds and 
lastly, the concern of human rights has to be included in the broader foreign policy 
goals the international actor wants to follow.
The next section will discuss the evolution of an active human rights policy within the 
Union having these three issues in mind.
IIL The CFSP
1. The CFSP as a mechanism to conduct foreign policy
a. The scope of the CFSP
Foreign policy could be defined as „governmental activity which is concerned with 
relationships between the state and other actors, particularly states, in the international 
system“.43 Hazel Smith,46 applies this definition to the foreign policy of the EC as 
being: European Community activity which is concerned with relationships between 
the European Community and other actors, particularly states, in the international 
system. EC foreign policy has two strands: EPC and external relations. For the EU that 
means that the foreign policy is based on the Community policy and the CFSP
44 J. Donnelly, R. E. Howard, „Introduction“, in: J. Donnelly, R. E. Howard (eds.) (note 9),
pp. 1-28, p. 11.
45 B. White, „Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches“, in: M. Clarke and B. White 
(eds.), U n d e rs ta nd in g  F o re ig n  P o lic y : T he  F o re ig n  P o lic y  S ys tem s A p p roa ch , Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot 1989, p. 1.
H. Smith, E u ro p e a n  U n io n  F o re ig n  P o lic y  and  C e n tra l A m e ric a , Macmillan Press, London, 
1995, p. 19.
46
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concerned with all sorts of relations to third states and international organizations. This 
of course is a very broad definition of foreign policy that includes the aid and trade 
policies o f the Community. On the other hand, one could define foreign policy along 
the lines of (mainly) diplomatic instruments and security issues alone. It then would 
only be applicable to the CFSP.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy covers all aspects of a Foreign and Security 
Policy. The decisive innovation compared with the EPC, apart from the strengthening 
o f the decision-making process and the introduction o f new instruments, is that military 
security aspects (a common defence policy and a common defence) are no longer 
excluded from a common foreign and security policy.47 There were several reasons for 
enhancing the competences o f the EU in foreign policy. For example the realization 
that the growing economic integration o f the Community (culminating in EMU) has to 
be counterbalanced by a larger presence in the political sphere; the aim of playing a 
major role in the East-European area as a regional power; and the break-up o f the 
Soviet-Union which changed former defence and geo-political strategies.48 As regards 
the Union structure, the CFSP nominally extends to all fields of foreign policy, thus 
including aid and trade (see Art. J. 1 I which talks about „all areas“). In practice, the 
CFSP must not extend to the acquis communautaire as stated by Art. M TEU, which
47 E. Regelsberger, „EPZ und GASP - attraktiver Verbund mit Schlupfloechem“, in: E. 
Regelsberger (ed.), D ie  G em e insam e A u ssen - und  S ic h e rh e its p o litik  d e r E u rop ae isc hen  U n io n , 
1993, pp. 179-192, p. 190 this ends the artificial separation between political, economic and 
military aspects of European security; M. Jopp, „Die außen- und sicherheitspolitischc Identiät 
Europas mit der Perspektive einer gemeinsamen Verteidigungspolitik“, in: R. Hrbek (ed.), D ie  
R e fo rm  d e r E U , Nomos, Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 331-343, p. 331 talks about „soft security“ to 
describe the foreign policy o f the EPC; European Foreign policy has made an evolution from 
classical diplomacy over crisis management, political and economic aspects of security to 
military security, „Part IV EC External Relations and the CFSP“, Topics for discussion, in: A.A. 
Dashwood (ed.) (note 31), p. 15.
48 P. de Schoutheete de Tervarent, L ’introduction d ’une Politique Extérieure et de Sécurité 
commune. Motivations et Résultats, in: J. Monar (ed.), The  M a a s tr ic h t T re a ty  on  E u ro p e a n  
U n io n , European Interuniversity Press, Brussels 1993, pp. 129-132, p. 130; P. Willaert, C. 
Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des lieux“, in: A. 
Mattera (ed.), L a  C on fè rence  in te rg o u ve m e m e n ta le  s u r l ’U n io n  eu rop éenne : rép o n d re  a u x  d é fis  
d u X X Ie m e  s iè c le . Clément Juglar, Paris 1996, pp. 253-314, p. 253,
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represents a barrier to excessive use of CFSP instruments in the field o f Community 
law.49 In comparison to the foreign policy conducted at EC level through aid, trade and 
association, the CFSP concerns (or should concern) mainly security and diplomatic 
components o f a comprehensive foreign policy.
A common human rights policy is to be integrated in the overall foreign policy 
according to one o f the five objectives of the CFSP in Art. J. 1 .IITEU which mentions 
respect for human rights and consolidation o f democratic principles.50 This objective is 
also common to the Community's external activities as stated in Art. 130 u TEC.51
b. The decision-making process
It has been seen above that the Union does not exist legally, but that one can perceive 
its foreign policy, and that the CFSP is the operational means of the EU in acting 
internationally.
Decision-making and implementation o f this policy takes place in the Council, which is 
the major organ of the CFSP.52 It, for example, has been accorded the power to take 
the „decisions necessary for defining and implementing“ the CFSP and the task of 
„ensuring the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union“ (Art. J.8 II 
TEU). This, naturally, applies to human rights as an objective of the CFSP (Art. J. 1 II 
TEU). Decisions are taken by unanimity, except in some cases foreseen by the treaty 
(Art. J.8 II TEU, and with the Amsterdam Treaty in implementation of common
49 Again, note in  this respect the work of the author on her Phd.
so E, Bonino, „La réforme de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: aspects insitutionels“,
in: A. Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 237-242, p. 238 deplores that there is no hierachy between the 
different objectives.
51 P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des 
lieux“, in: A. Mattera (ed.), ibid., pp. 253-314, p. 261.
51 I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett, The  E x te rn a l R e la tio n s  o f  th e  E u ro p e an  C o m m u n itie s , 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996, p. 420s.
Pf,(.
19
strategies, Art. 23 II (CV) TEU, see below Chapter 4). The work of the Council is 
prepared by the political committee installed under Art. J.8 V TEU and distinct from 
the COREPER under Art. 151 TEC. The task of the political committee is to „monitor 
the international situation in the areas covered by common foreign and security policy 
(including human rights) and contribute to the definition o f policies by delivering 
opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative" (Art. J.8 
V TEU). As regards the detailed work, it is done in working groups consisting of 
Member States* representatives presenting their results to the political committee.33 
With Amsterdam, a new committee, the ‘Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit*, has 
been Created to improve the efficiency and coherence of the CFSP.53 4 56It acts under the 
responsibility o f the High Representative and, as its name suggests, prepares policy 
alternatives for the Council and aims at improving quick reaction to specific 
situations.35
The Commission, in its turn, plays only a very subordinate role in the CFSP: excluded 
from any kind of decision-making, implementation and action, it has only to be fully 
associated with the work (Art. J.9 TEU) and enjoys a shared right of initiative (Art. J.8 
III TEU) which has hardly been used so far.36 As regards the European Parliament, its 
role is described in Art. J.7 TEU and is also very limited, not extending far beyond 
consultation.37 This is especially deplorable because the European Parliament is the 5346
53 ibid., p .422.
54 Declaration No.6 of the Amsterdam Treaty.
55 T. Dodd; R  Ware; A  Weston (note 31), p. 30s; European Policy Centre, „Legal Analysis“, 
M a k in g  Sense o f  th e  A m s te rd am  T re a ty , European Policy Centre, Brussels 1997, p. 113.
56 M. Fouwels, „The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Human Rights“, 
in: N Q H R , No.3, 1997, Vol.15, pp. 291-324, p. 315; I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett (note 52), 
p. 422; P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état 
des lieux44, in: A. Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 268 mention some of the cases.
I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett (note 52), p. 422.57
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body which has put the most emphasis on a clearly defined human rights policy.58 In 
the end, the EU acts basically through the Council o f ministers.
The European Council (Art. D TEU) is not a formal organ o f the Union (see Art. E 
TEU), but in charge of providing the Union with guidelines and principles for action 
on the highest political level. Foreign policy considerations play an important role on 
the agenda of every European Council summit.59 With Amsterdam, the European 
Council is also responsible for the decision and implementation o f common strategies. 
It can be seen that there is no special organ dealing exclusively with human rights, but 
all organs have to include the five objectives of the CFSP in their work. As to the 
institutional arrangements in the field of human rights see Chapter 4 below.
c. Representation
Naturally, an organization (or a framework) cannot appear in an assembly or conduct a 
political dialogue and speak for itself, but has to be given „a voice“.60 The form of 
representation o f the EU has been heavily criticized because it lacks continuity.61 The 
EU is officially represented by the Presidency of the Council (Art. J.5 I TEU) for the 
timeframe of 6 months, but can be assisted by the former and following Member State 
holding the Presidency (Troika, Art.J.5 III). Finally, the Commission has to be fully 
associated with the tasks of the Presidency. These tasks are the implementation of 
common measures, and the expression o f „the position o f the Union in international
58 A  Clapham, H um an  R ig h ts  a n d  th e  E u ro p e a n  C o m m u n itie s :  A  C r itic a l O ve rv iew , Nomos, 
Baden-Baden 1991, p. 14.
59 I, Macleod, I. D. Hemy, S. Hyett (note 52), p. 420.
60 According to the Neo-realist school, the stability o f the EU-presence is dependent on the 
convergence of Member States’ positions. If there are no common views, than the EU cannot 
exist, W. Wessels, „Von der EPZ zur GASP*, in: E. Regelsberger (ed.) (note 47), pp. 9-31, 
p. 19. It then, o f course, cannot be represented by the Presidency.
61 K. de Gucht, „The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): Is there Room for New 
Perspectives in  the Aftermath of Maastricht?*, in: S tu d ia  D ip lo m a tic a , Brussels, No. 2, 1997, 
Vol. 50, p. 49-83, p. 67.
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organizations and international conferences“ (Art. J.5. II THU). The status o f an 
„associate“ gives the Commission only a limited role in the field of the foreign policy, 
in contrast to its important role in first pillar action.62 While the big advantage of the 
troika system could be to give extra weight to standpoints and share the burden of 
responsibility especially for smaller states,63 the disadvantage is the frequent change in 
composition and the different handling o f issues from one Member State to another. 
Should the associated countries, waiting for membership, already be included in the 
current representation process or formulation o f common standpoints, then the 
possibility of an understandable representation of the EU becomes even more remote.64 
The Amsterdam Treaty has dealt with all proposals made to improve the situation, 
which included the establishment o f a High Official, elected for a longer period of time 
and representing the Union in foreign policy matters. This solution was especially 
favoured by France which wanted one high representative on the top o f the CFSP, 
„Mr. or Mrs. Europe“. Agreement was finally found to elevate the office of the 
Secretary General of the Council to a High Representative (Article 18 and 26 (CV) 
TEU), but not to create a completely new office within the CFSP. The Troika system 
has been kept, but its composition has been changed. It now consists of the Presidency, 
the High Representative and the Commission, Art. 18 (CV) EUV. The following 
country having the Presidency shall assist „if need be“.
As to the scope o f the representation, it covers all matters falling within the common 
foreign and security policy, Art. J.5 TEU, and thus formally does not include first pillar 
issues. In practice, a distinction between political and economic questions in 
international fora and elsewhere can hardly be drawn. These issues are often
62 I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett (note 52), p. 419
63 ibid., p. 419.
64 E. Regelsberger, „Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik“, in: Werner Weidenfeld, W. 
Wessels (eds.), Jah rb uch  d e r E u ro p a e isc h en  In te g ra tio n , 1994/5, Institut für Europäische 
Politik, Europa Union, Bonn 1995, pp. 219-228, p. 227.
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interdependent.65 The problem is that the scope o f action (first or second pillar) is 
different, though the objective might be the same: human rights. Thus, the question of 
how the representation of the Union in human rights is conducted without doing harm 
to Community competences or Community representation rules has to look at the 
areas where the Community is present in an international fora due to its own 
competences independent of the Member States and o f the EU. In these areas, 
Community rules should apply.66 Within the CFSP, the representation is politically 
limited to areas that have been determined as being of general interest according to 
Art. J.2 I TEU.67
2. The CFSP instruments
The EU has several instruments at its disposal to conduct a foreign policy and to 
promote the respect of human rights and democratic principles in third countries: 
Information and consultation (Art. J.2.1 TEU), common positions (Art. J.2 II TEU), 
and joint actions (Art. J.3 TEU). The latter two were introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty and did not exist in the EPC.68 Furthermore, there are the classical diplomatic 
instruments such as démarches and declarations69, the possibility commonly to support
65 For the General Assembly see K.-D. Stadler, „Die EG/EPZ in der UN-Generalversammlung - 
Meinungsfuehrerschaft im Werden“, in: E. Regelsberger (ed.) (note 47), pp. 107-126, p. 111.
66 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), 
Art. J.5, No.3.
67 ibid., A rt J.5, No.3.
68 There was a form of concerted cooperation and common standpoints in the EPC as well, but it 
did not have the same impact and importance as under the CFSP, P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, 
„Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des lieux“, in: A  Matterà (ed,) (note 
48), pp. 253-314, p. 274; European Commission, G e n e ra l R e p o rt on the a c tiv it ie s  o f  the  
E u rop ean  U n io n  1994 , Luxembourg, Office for official publications of the EC 1995, p. 261, pt. 
746.
69 A démarche is an  official communication made to the competent authority of a receiving state 
with the general aim of protecting or promoting an interest o f  the sending State. The basic 
purpose can be to communicate a given position or to lodge a protest, H.-P. Kaul, Démarche, in: 
Rudolf Bernhard (ed.), E n c yc lo p e d ia  o f  P u b lic  In te rn a tio n a l L a w , V oli, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam 1992, p. 998; A declaration is a  means by which States and other subjects of public
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or reject proposals in international organizations, and political dialogue.* 70 The use of 
first pillar instruments to conduct a decision of the second pillar has been given legal 
grounds by bringing economic sanctions within the CFSP (Art. 228a TEC).
Common positions can be used to give more weight to the consultation and 
information under Art. J.2.I TEU and to express the political position o f the Union. 
Their function is to facilitate „systematic co-operation“ (Art. J. 1 .III TEU, also new 
since Maastricht) between the Member States, who „shall ensure that their national 
policies conform to the common position“ (Art. J.2 II TEU). On the other hand, joint 
actions do not only explain policy objectives, but include the necessary steps to 
implement them.71 Despite this reasonable distinction in theory, a clear cut description 
as to when to use which instrument is lacking in the treaty and has led to the 
sometimes incoherent use of either o f the two.72 In the Amsterdam Treaty, for the first 
time, some guidelines have been introduced to help the Council decide which 
instrument is appropriate. Under Article 14 I (CV) TEU, a joint action will „address 
specific situations where operational action is deemed to be required. They shall lay 
down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary 
their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.“ A common position, under 
Article 15 (CV) TEU, will define „the approach of the Union to a particular matter of 
a geographical or thematic nature". The Amsterdam Treaty has not only clarified the
international law express their will, their intent or their opinion when acting in the field of 
international relations. Its content can be any statement whatsoever, C.-A. Fleischhauer, 
„Declaration“, in: R. Bernhard (ed.), E n c yc lo p e d ia  o f  P u b lic  In te rn a tio n a l L a w , Vol.I, North- 
Holland, Amsterdam 1992, p. 971s;
The difference between them is difficult to discern; M. Fouwels sees the declaration as being a 
bit more flexible in its use dealing with positive as well as negative statements to specific or 
general issues (note 56), p. 298.
70 M. Dembinski, „Langer Anlauf, kurzer Sprung. Die Aussenpolitik der Europäischen Union nach 
der Reform von Amsterdam“, HSFK Report 7/1997, Oktober 1997, p. 29, the political dialogue 
already formed an  important part of the EPC and also an area where the EPC acted with 
considerable success, as opposed to crisis management
71 A. A. Dashwood, Position Paper, in: A  A. Dashwood (ed.) (note 31), p. 217.
M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 300.72
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use of instruments, but also added new ones. Art. 12 (CV) TEU lists the means to be 
used to conduct a foreign policy and they now include „common strategies“, besides 
„defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security 
policy“, „strengthening existing systematic co-operation“, Jo in t action“ and „common 
standpoints“. The common strategy is to be decided on by the European Council under 
Art. 13 (CV) TEU in the case of the Member States having important interests in 
common. The European Council also defines the objective, means and duration of the 
common strategies, which could, for example, address a particular country or region or 
even set out a broad policy issue.73 *75
The instruments in the field o f the CFSP since the EPC through to Amsterdam are 
mainly diplomatic in nature, with the exception of the power to enact sanctions (by 
using Community competence, Art, 228 a TEC) and to commit joint actions. 
Subsequently, a classification o f the different instruments in a rising scale regarding 
their response to violations will be taken.74 75The CFSP does not have the means usually 
described by the term „conditionality“73 *75at its disposal, nor does the human rights 
policy under the CFSP promote human rights by means of positive initiatives such as 
the sponsoring o f NGOs, increase of aid, granting o f preferential treatment, a domain
73 T, Dodd; R. Ware; A  Weston (note 31), p. 26.
7A It cannot be denied that reaction to human rights violations is highly aibitrarily: little, geo- 
politically unimportant states do often have to confront harsher action than others, ibid., p. 321. 
The following attempt to classify the CFSP instruments should help to provide a workable basis 
for the EU. It does not solve, however, the lack of coherent criteria as to w hen  to cut off or 
withhold aid and w hen  to suspend a trade agreement or the GSP in response to a violation of 
human rights.
75 In the sense of negative conditionality which uses aid and trade instruments to enforce respect 
for human rights after violations have taken place. „Punitive Conditionality“, K. Tomasevski 
(note 1), p. 41, 44. There is, o f course, also the idea of „positive conditionality“, which is based 
on a preventive approach and the belief that the (positive) linkage of human rights to aid and 
trade can incite a government to respect these values and support efforts of the civil society to 
liberalize the country; G. A. Lopez, D. Cortright, „Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global 
Relations“, in: G. A. Lopez, D. Cortright (eds.), E c on om ic  S a n c tio n s . P anacea  o r  P e a c e b u ild in g  
in  a  P o s t-C o ld  W a r W o rld ? , Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, pp. 3-16, p. 4 talking about 
‘positive sanctions’; O. von Cranenburgh, „Development Cooperation and Human Rights: 
Linkage Policies in the Netherlands“, in: H um an  R ig h ts  in  D e v e lo p in g  C o u n trie s  Y ea rb ook , 
1995, pp. 29-55, p. 45.
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traditionally linked to development co-operation and trade. Nevertheless, a contrast 
can be drawn between more positive and more negative instruments and their use: t
ti'
{ A*
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Positive - Joint action supporting human rights initiatives or the democratic 
transition process (for example the dispatch o f election observers, albeit 
closely related to first pillar measures in development co-operation).
- common position stressing positive developments with regard to 
human rights and democratic principles (press release) and the 
expression of this position in international fora.
- Support of a Resolution in an international organization considering 
favourably the human rights situation in a given country, rejecting a 
criticizing Resolution.
- An autonomous declaration (often confidential) emphasizing positive 
developments in a given country.
- use o f political dialogue to address an issue o f common concern.
- A declaration or démarche condemning the human rights situation or 
the democratic process in a given country.
- Support for a criticizing Resolution at an international fora.
- Issuing a common position on a matter or region of common concern 
as far as human rights and democratic development are concerned.
- Deferment of meetings
- Withdraw the political dialogue and the diplomatic relations bilaterally
Negative - Deciding upon joint action to respond to violations of human rights in 
a third country, including the use of sanctions under the TEC (Art. 
228a).74
76 A similar list can be found in respect to development cooperation in  the Implementation Report 
of the 28 November Resolution, COM (94) 42 final.
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Except the last three examples, which are closely interrelated with the „pressure“ taken 
from the first pillar instruments, the means under the CFSP may well be negative, but 
still aim at maintaining the contact with the given country as long as possible. Only if 
there is a mutual exchange of views, is the machinery of the CFSP able to function and 
develop its advantages as compared to first pillar instruments. The reason is, of course, 
that the CFSP relies on the means o f diplomacy, typical foreign policy tools. The 
distinction between first and second pillar instruments is of an artificial nature because 
in any nation state, responses to human rights violations have the full range of 
reactions at their disposal and do not have to divide between „first and second pillar“. 
This distinction, which was kept by the Amsterdam Treaty, is taken as an opportunity 
to examine the effectiveness o f „diplomatic“ (CFSP) tools in the field of human rights 
as opposed to aid and trade.
IV. Internal legal foundations of the European Union’s human rights 
engagement
1. W ithin the Union
The Court of Justice with its famous judgments Stauder, Nold and Hauer has paved 
the way for the internal dimension and respect of human rights and has elaborated their 
meaning and role in the absence of an EC catalogue of human rights.7 8 Even though its
77 Aff. 29/69, ECR 1969, p.419; aff. 4/73, ECR 1974, p.491; aff. 44/79, ECR 1979, p. 3727,
78 As regards the terminology, the Court o f Justice has elaborated its jurisdiction using the term 
„fundamental rights“. According to F. Emmert, E u ro p a re c h t, Beck, München 1996, p. 296 
fundamental rights (Grundrechte) comprise human rights (Menschenrechte) and citizens’ rights 
(Bürgerrechte). The Court often uses „fundamental rights“ as an equivalent for „human rights“ . 
The main difference between the terms is, to my mind, a  technical one. Fundamental Rights are 
used in  the context of (national) constitutions, show effects toward all state authorities and can 
be connected with the citizenship of a state, whereas human rights apply to everybody without 
regard to nationality, sex, race and are exercised in the international context. As regards the 
content, „both type of rights“ are to a large extent identical;
The missing human rights catalogue has been commented by the EP, see P. Mengozzi, E u ro p e a n  
C om m un ity  L aw . F ro m  C om m on M a rk e t to  E u ro p e an  U n io n , Graham & Trotham, London 1992, 
p. 192;
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jurisdiction has gained a stable footing and represents a basis for reference, the central 
weakness o f the missing catalogue of rights or membership in a human rights treaty, 
has not been overcome so far. This is, as is well-known, due to the controversial 
decision of the ECJ about the competence o f the Community in the field o f human 
rights.* 79 Maastricht not only introduced the CFSP, but for the first time also 
approached the issue o f human rights and widened the scope of the Treaty: Art. F II 
TEU finally confirms the Court’s jurisdiction and formulates the duty for the Union to 
respect fundamental rights when acting internally (or externally). The aim is to protect 
the citizens from an ever increasing public power, not bound by a human rights 
catalogue, but, in the case of the EC, bestowed with legislative power, pre-empting the 
national legislation and imposing duties directly upon the citizens (supranationality).80 
Not only the EC, but also the EU81 is bound by Art. F II TEU to respect fundamental 
rights within the Union whilst using its competences deriving either from the CFSP or 
from the provisions o f the JHA providing for increased co-ordination in the field of 
justice and home affairs.82Despite the indubitable innovation and improvement, Art. F 
II TEU has brought to the fore83 the fact is that the EC is still not bound by a provision 
of the TEC (Art. F II figures among the General Provisions o f the TEU) to respect
The ECJ had already developed human rights as ‘general principles o f Community law’ before 
Maastricht and Amsterdam continued the hum an rights protection in  the EU, J.V, Louis, ,,Le 
Traité d ’Amsterdam. Une occasion perdue?“, in: R evue du M a rc h é  U n iq u e  E u rop éen , 2, 1997, 
pp. 5-18, p. 8s.
79 see opinion 2/94, ECR 1996,1-1759, par.36; case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council, ECR 1996, 1- 
6177.
80 Aff. 26/62 du 5.2.63 Van Gend en Loos; Afif. 6/64 du 15.7.64 Costa Enel.
81 At first sight, Art F II TEU does not seem to include the CFSP as it speaks of „general principles 
of C om m un ity  law“ (emphasis added), but it figures within the general provisions and has 
therefore to be applied to all three pillars. See, G. Gaja, "The Protection of Human Rights under 
the Maastricht Treaty, in: D. Curtin, T. Heukels (eds.) (note 83), pp. 549-560, p. 559.
82 Although the CFSP provisions will hardly conflict with fundamental interests of the EU citizens, 
because their major concern are third states.
83 G. Gaja, "The Protection o f Human Rights under the Maastricht Treaty“, in: D. Curtin, T. 
Heukels (eds.) In s titu t io n a l D yn am ic s  o f  E u ro p e a n  In te g ra tio n . E ssa ys  in  H o n o u r o f  H . G . 
S c he m e rs , Vol.II, NijhofF, Dordrecht 1994, pp. 549-560, p. 549.
rV
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human rights when acting.84 856Another weak point was that the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
did not extend to Art. F IITEU  (Art. L TEU)85 86, although this did not hinder the Court 
from examining the consistency of Community acts with human rights law. It did so in 
applying the „infringement o f this Treaty or of any rule o f law relating to its 
application“ -rule in Art. 173 TEC to the general principles o f Community law, which,
A /
in their turn, include human rights. The Treaty of Amsterdam changes this situation 
for the better in integrating Art. F II TEU in the Court’s jurisdiction, and thus filling 
the aforementioned lacuna. Notwithstanding the new treaty provision, it remains to be 
seen how the Union will respond to the internal challenges to its human rights policy in 
the next millennium,84 567 and how the question of the missing legal base for human rights 
legislation will be solved.
2. External action
However, Art. F II TEU does not clearly state whether the Union should also promote 
human rights in its relations with third states. In view of the ECJ opinion on accession 
to the European Convention on human rights, Art. F II TEU may be relevant for the 
external dimension as well.88
84 The only provision o f the T E C  dealing with human rights protection, A rt 130 u, is only 
referring to the promotion of international respect of human rights in  th ird  countries, Hilf, in: E. 
Grabitz (ed.) (note 28), A rt F EUV, Nr.40 ss; E. Brok, „Die europäische Verfassung und die 
Regiemngskonferenz 1996“, in: Jean-Denis Mouton, Torsten Stein (eds.), Vers une nouvelle 
Constitution pour 1’Union européenne? La Conférence intergouvemementale de 1996, p. 19.
85 G. Gaja, "The Protection of Human Rights under the Maastricht Treaty“, in: D. Curtin, T. 
Heukels (eds.) (note 83), pp. 549-560, p. 553 regards the omission in Art. L TEU to be the 
„result of inadequate drafting“.
86 F. Emmert (note 78), p. 249.
87 i.e. asylum, minorities, citizenship, economic and social rights, racism, religious freedom, 
gender equality, see European Parliament Report on Human Rights within the Union, discussed 
by J. van der Klaauw in: N Q H R , N o .2 ,1997, p. 204ss.
88 ECJ opinion 2/94, 1996, ECR 1-1759, the ECJ does not distinguish between the internal and 
external dimension.
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a. Evolution
Before Maastricht, there was no clear treaty-mandate for the EC to promote human 
rights in the outside world. Nevertheless, it has been including foreign policy aspects in 
the framework o f its external relations given that external commerce as well as any 
kind of co-operation with third States is not „neutral“ towards, but includes foreign 
policy considerations, i.e. in areas such as association agreements, development aid 
and trade.89 Several major statements affirm this approach.90 Art. 130 u No.2 TEU, 
introduced with Maastricht, finally includes foreign policy aspects in policy- 
formulation and first pillar instruments and obliges the Community to contribute with 
its development policy to the general objective o f  developing and consolidating 
democracy and the rule of law, and to that of promoting respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in third countries.91 In order to arrive at a global appreciation o f 
human rights within the aid programmes, the Commission has recently proposed a 
Council regulation on human rights92 However, these are limited competences in
89 The third Lomé Convention, 8.12.1984, included for the first time a reference to human rights in 
the Preamble and in  Article 4, which, though, remained very vague in nature. Only with the 
Fourth Lomé Convention in 1989, the human rights protection was set on firm footing in article 
5 in linking development and the promotion of human rights, D. J. Marantis, „Human Rights, 
Democracy, and Development: The European Community Model“, in: Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, Spring 1994, Vol. 7, pp. 1-32, p. 6ss; See also COM (95) 216.
90 Statement on hum an rights, adopted on 21 July 1986, meeting in  the framework of European 
Political Cooperation and of the Council, Bulletin EC, No.7/8, 1986, Vol. 19, pt. 2.4.4., p. 100; 
Declaration on hum an rights, European Council, Bulletin EC, No.6, 1991, Vol.24, Annex V, p. 
17s; Resolution o f the Council and o f the Member States meeting in the Council on human 
rights, democracy and development, Bulletin EC, No. 11, 1991, Vol.24, pp. 122s; For the early 
days o f human rights policy see, K. Arts, „European Community development cooperation, 
human rights, democracy and good governance: at odds ar at ease with each other?*, in: Ginther 
et al. (eds.), S u s ta in a b le  D e ve lop m e n t a n d  G o od  G ove rnance , Nijhoff, Dordrecht et al. 1995, p. 
260.
91 In a recent case o f the ECJ lodged by Portugal and supported by Greece, Art. 130 u TEC was 
questioned as a  sufficient legal base for the human rights clause in  the cooperation agreement 
with India. Instead, it was submitted by Portugal, the agreement would have to have been based 
on Art. 235 TEC. The Court ruled against this complaint and stated that A rt 130 u  TEC 
provides the legal base and that the agreement can be concluded without recourse to A rt 235, 
Case C-268/94 o f 3.12.96.
92 Proposal for a  council regulation concerning the development and the consolidation o f 
democracy and the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, 
submitted by the Commission on 24 July 1997, COM (97) 357 final, SYN 97/0191; see also J. 
van der Klaauw, „Human Rights News“, in: NQHR, No.4, 1997, p. 510s; Council Legal Service
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particular fields; a comprehensive EC foreign policy competence is lacking due to 
Member States' reluctance to submit power to the supranational Community in this 
field* 93 945
The European Political Cooperation created in 1970 supplied the first legal framework 
to conduct a genuine common foreign policy, but remained purely intergovernmental94 95
Human rights considerations already played a role in the EPC as can be seen from the 
numerous statements in international fora on behalf of the Member States and from the 
preparatory reports o f the political committee to the Council Concrete action with 
regard to specific countries, however, was more limited and could often not surpass 
the reluctance of the Member States to find a common approach* 93 945
b. The M aastricht Treaty
The Maastricht Treaty, with the creation of the Union, has provided the EU with an 
internal legal base, Art. J. 1 II TEU, for the promotion of human rights in third states 
(and Art. 130 u TEC for the EC). The article states that development and 
consolidation o f democracy and the rule o f law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms should be pursued as one of the objectives o f the CFSP. Thus, 
together with Art. F II TEU, the Maastricht Treaty has added a human rights
Document, unpublished paper.; A. Rosas, B. Biandtner, „Human Rights and the External 
Relations of the European Community: A n Analysis of Doctrine and Practice“, EJIL, to be 
published in 1998, pp. 1-23, p. 15s.
93 The EPC remained purely intergovernmental and completely distinct o f the EC apart from the 
SEA as a common legal framework. The proposal at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference to 
include the CFSP in the Community law was rejected unanimously, „Part IV EC External 
Relations and the CFSF4, Topics for discussion, in: A A  Dashwood (ed.) (note 31), p. 218.
94 I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett (note 52), p. 411.
95 M. Zwambom, „Human rights Promotion And Protection Through The External Relations O f 
The European Community And The Twelve“, in: N Q H R , N o .l, 1989, Vol.9, pp. 11-27, p. 23ss.
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dimension to the EU policies96 and provided the necessary treaty base for co-ordinated 
promotion o f human rights.97
The EC and the EU engagement taken together results in the Union’s engagement in 
human rights, but the focus of this work will be on the EU in the framework of the 
CFSP in order to then be able to give an overview of the achievements of the CFSP for 
the complete picture of human rights in the European Union.
V. How the European Union justifies its engagement in hum an rights
This part is not going to investigate the possible legal or moral basis in international 
law for the Union’s, Member States’ or the EC’s human rights engagement as 
proposed by Jack Donnelly98, but will instead discuss how the Union justifies and 
relates its engagement in human rights to the international context.
Despite its legal personality, the EC has not become a signatory o f any human rights 
treaty because the necessary competence has not been bestowed on it.99 However, all 
o f its Member States are parties to the relevant international and regional 
agreements.100 The same applies for the Union as a whole: Not being a member of any 
human rights treaty, because o f its lack o f legal personality, it still represents the
96 Commission in its Communication „ The European Union and the External Dimension of 
Human Rights Policy**, COM (95) 567. It furthermore reminds us that the introduction of Art. F  
II was a fundamental change as regards the protection of human rights, because for the first time 
in EC history a reference to human rights appeared in the basic provisions of the treaty and not 
only in the preamble as with the SEA. Art. 130 u TEC and Art. J .l. IIT E U  are in line with this 
new evolution.
97 The activities include action within the UN-frame work and regional organizations, as well as 
autonomous action. It has to be remembered, though, that no explicit legal base exists for a 
g e n e ra l human rights policy of the Union, nor a specific legal base for pursuing human rights in 
the field of trade.
QO t tsec note 44*
99 ECJ opinion 2/94, 1996, E C R 1-1759, para. 36.
100 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, UNHDR, 
the two Covenants on civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights, CERD, 
CEDAW, CAT, CRC, see Chapter 1.
¡
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Member States and their obligations from international treaties to promote human 
rights. Thus, the Union is not prevented from an engagement in human rights (in 
international fora or autonomous), just because it is not a signatory of the relevant 
human rights’ treaties.101
Traditionally, the EC has justified its engagement in international human rights with the 
idea of a confederation of independent states all determined to „preserve and 
strengthen peace and liberty*' (Preamble TEC) in the world.102 The Commission’s 
Communication on the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy103 considers the 
Union’s activities to fall „within the general framework constituted by the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, complemented by the 
International Pacts on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural 
rights“ and regional instruments.104 Problems arise with regard to states not party to a 
treaty, and to bilateral action outside the UN-framework. Such target states often 
invoke the principle o f non-interference to oppose action in the field o f human 
rights.105 The Communication in this respect stresses the „relativity of the principle o f 
non-interference“ whose content was highlighted by the European Council in June 
1991 when it said that „ the different ways of expressing concern about violations o f 
rights, as well as requests designed to secure those rights cannot be considered as
101 This is debatable, because even if  the Community or even Union had legal personality, it does 
not forcibly entail that third states recongnize the right o f the Community or Union to act in  
favour o f human rights. This is a  strong argument backed by the fact that no International 
Organization can be a  ‘bom* subject o f international law, but is only created by its Member 
States.
102 K. Dicke, M en sc h en re c h te  u nd  e u rop ä isc he  In te g ra tio n , Engel, Kehl 1986, p. 202s.
103 COM (95) 567 final, p. 9.
104 For actions within multilateral fora, the d ro it de re g a rd  provides a justification of cusomaiy law, 
P.-H. Im bert,„L’apparente simplicité des droits de l’homme. Réflexions sur les différents aspects 
de l’universalité des droits de l ’homme“, in: R evue  U n iv e rs e lle  des D ro its  de L ’H om m e, 1989, 
V o ll .p p . 19-29, p. 21, 22.
105 For an interesting discussion as to possible legal bases see P. van Dijk, „ A common Standard of 
Achievement. About Universal Validity and Uniform Interpretation o f International Human 
Rights Norms“, in: N Q H R , No. 2, 1995, Vol.13, pp. 105-121.
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interference in the internal affairs of a State, and constitute an important and legitimate 
part of (their) dialogue with third countries“.
What can be said here, is that the EC as a subject of public international law is as much 
entitled to promote these allegedly universal values as are the states; its legal 
personality endows it with the capacity to exercise rights in international relations.106 *108
As regards the EU, it would seem contradictory if it acted on its own (by means of the 
CFSP) in a different way as the Member States act in their bilateral relations to other 
states, as it embodies the co-operation o f the Member States. To conclude, the Union 
is allowed to express its views on human rights in third states internationally and to 
back them up with respective action in the same way as the Member States.
VI. The approach of the European Union in human rights
The Community in its „aid and trade“ human rights policies has, since it became aware 
of the impact of human rights observance in the third countries to its external policies 
in the 1990s, generally followed a positive approach aiming at the creation o f 
surroundings conducive to human rights. This attitude was alluded in the June 
European Council Declaration107 108and expressed in the November 28 Resolution of the 
Council.10* The latter states that „the Community and its Member States will give high 
priority to a positive approach that stimulates respect for human rights and encourages 
democracy“. Such a positive approach can be implemented through active support for 106*8
106 Proposal for Council Regulation COM (97) 357 final, p. 22; R. Frid, „ The Relations between the 
EC and International Organizations. Legal Theory and Practice“, Kluwer, The Hague et al. 
1995, p. 10; ICJ Advisory Opinion on „Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations“, 1949, ICJ Reports 174, p. 179.
101 Bulletin EC, Vol. 24, No.6, 1991, pp. 17-18, at p ara .ll it states that the Community and its 
Member States „actively promote“ human rights, but does not explain what that implies.
108 Resolution o f the Council and o f the Member States meeting in the Council on Human Rights, 
Democracy and Development of 28 November 1991, Bulletin EC, N o .ll, 1991, Vol. 24, 
pp. 122s.

useful initiatives furthering this end (election monitoring, strengthening of the judiciary, 
support for NGOs) and through an open and constructive dialogue. Its emphasis is put 
on creating an environment conducive to the respect for human rights, supported by 
an increase o f aid to countries respecting these values.109 Negative measures, in short 
all forms o f sanctions110 (second generation conditionality111), are seen only as the last 
resort and are only considered appropriate responses in the „event of grave and 
persistent human rights violations or serious interruptions of the democratic 
process“.112 If sanctions are nevertheless applied, the Community seeks not to penalize 
the population and attempts to continue humanitarian and emergency aid in spite of the 
sanctions imposed.113 The official position o f the Community appears again in the 
Commission document COM (95) 567, „The European Union and the External 
Dimension o f Human Rights Policy“. On page 10 the Commission identifies the areas 
o f activity which „correspond to a positive, practical and constructive approach based 
on the concepts of exchange, sharing and encouragement“.
In a narrow sense, the ‘content’ o f the positive approach in human rights, i.e. positive 
initiatives in aid and trade (accompanied by constructive dialogue), applies merely to 
the Community. Only in some exceptional cases, as for example election-observers, are 
positive EC-measures applied with the form er consent o f the Council in the framework
109 ibid., p. 122.
110 From behind-the-scenes approaches or public statements to the suspension of all forms of 
cooperation.
111 First generation conditionality means economic conditions attached to development cooperation 
and was initiated by the IMF in the 1980s as a  form of enhanced crisis management which was 
necessary to get the exploding debts and balance of payments problems in the developing 
countries under control, O. Stokke, „Foreign Aid: What now?“, in: O. Stokke (ed.), F o re ig n  A id  
to w a rd  th e  y e a r 2 0 0 0 , Frank Cass, London 1996, pp. 16-130, p. 94s.
112 Resolution of the Council and the Member States (note 108), p.122, unfortunately the Resolution 
stops here and does not define when such a grave and persistent human rights violation occurs or 
when the democratic process is seriously interrupted; see also Bull. EC, Vol.26, No.5, 1993, 
Declaration o f the Council in preparation for Vienna, 
pt. 1.3.41.
113 Report on the implementation of measures intended to promote observance of human rights and 
democratic principles, COM (95) 191 final, p. 25,
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of the CFSP (joint action or common position).114 *Such measures can be financed from 
the Community budget, although decided in the CFSP.us In a wider sense, positive 
measures are also to be found in the CFSP including all those instruments which 
appear in the rising-scale as set out in the list above (Chapter 1, III 2): in particular 
certain joint actions and common positions, some declarations and démarches and 
positive resolutions in international fora.* 116 Additionally, the political dialogue 
conducted with third countries not only covers co-operation agreements between the 
EC and third states, where there are specific organs to deal with the interpretation of 
the convention and arising problems, but is often conducted by the Troika117 on EU 
side (see for example China). The positive approach regards negative measures, as a 
last resort and they, if necessary, can be applied by the EC or by the Union (depending 
on what instruments are used).118 All in all, the positive approach is reflected in both 
EC and EU human rights policy. This is also expressed in the Commission’s 
communication (95) 567 which is concerned with the Union’s human rights policy, Le.
11 see Report From The Commission on the implementation of measures intended to promote 
observance of human rights and democratic principles (for 1995), COM (96) 672 final, p. 7.
1,5 The implementation reports of the „European initiative for democracy and the protection o f 
human rights“ (Chapter B7-7 of the Community budget), SEC (92) 1915 final, COM (95) 191, 
COM (96) 672, give an  interesting overview o f the use of the financial tools to promote human 
rights. The initiative was set up in  order to achieve the Treaty objectives of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as stated in Art. F II, J .l.II TEU and Art. 130 u TEC;
As to the budget, Art. J .l  l.II TEU states that administrative expenditure shall be charged to the 
budget of the European Communities. The same applies for operational expenditure if  the 
Council unanimously so decides and entails the budgetary procedure laid down in the EC treaty. 
Lastly, operational expenditure can also be charged to the Member States.
116 This position is confirmed by the Memorandum to the European Parliament on the Activities of 
the European Union in  the Field o f Human Rights, 1995, 19.6.1996, p. 13 by stating that the 
„focus must be on prevention rather than ju st reaction“.
117 Presidency o f the Council, former and future Country to hold the Presidency. See above Chapter 
2, representation.
118 Behind-the-scenes approaches and confidential statements, as well as statements in international 
fora, are classical tools of the EPC, and now the CFSP. The suspension of aid or trade 
agreements, on the other hand, belongs to the sphere of the EC, see below under instruments.

37
including the CFSP.119 Unfortunately, the emphasis is still on Community measures and 
their effective implementation. Only rarely, is recourse made to the instruments of the 
CFSP and no guidelines for the CFSP are set up,120 the reason presumably being the 
limited role o f the Commission in this EU policy.
To sum up it can be said that the CFSP functions as a mechanism to conduct a foreign 
policy which has a human rights policy as one o f its objectives. The instruments to 
promote positively both sets o f human rights, which enable the EU to participate in 
international human rights debates by autonomous action or within international fora, 
have been described above. In general, it can be stated that the EU follows a positive 
approach with its instruments as far as human rights are concerned. The Union not 
only uses the CFSP to assert its identity, but is also an aim in itself concerning the 
progressive co-ordination in the field o f human rights (Art. C IITEU ).
119 P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des 
lieux“, in: A. Matterà (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 267 talk about „communications mixtes“ to 
explain the practice o f the Commission to issue Communications that cover more than one 
pillar.
120 The actual Memorandum to the European Parliament on the Activities of the European Union in 
the Field of Human Rights, 1995, 19.6.1996, p. 13 talks about the ,Tinetuning“ of the Union’s 
strategy towards the promotion o f human rights and that the Commission’s Communication 
COM (95) 567 final will serve as an  important factor of reference; J. van der Klaauw, 
„Commission Communication on the Union’s External Dimension o f Human Rights Policy“, 
Human Rights News, in: N Q H R , N o.l, 1996, Voi. 14, p. 76 submits that the Communication is 
laudable in as much it gives an overview o f the Commission’s efforts to promote human rights. 
He deplores that the chapter dealing with the strategy for a more consistent and transparent 
policy remains rather vague and general. Common criteria for a coherent policy are not 
elaborated.
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Chapter 2: A view to China
The present chapter first investigates the EU’s approach to China and then explores 
the latter’s perception o f human rights from Confucian days to current socialist China. 
This second discussion focuses on the implications o f the thus described Chinese 
position for the protection of human rights in the world. China provides an interesting 
playing field for an examination o f the current problems posed by an intergovernmental 
human rights policy based on respect of „universal“ values.
I. The Official EU position towards China
1. The Asia strategy
„The Union needs as a matter of urgency to strengthen its economic presence in Asia 
in order to maintain its leading role in the world economy.(...) Matters relating to good 
governance, including human rights, should also play an important role in the Union’s 
relations with Asian countries“ (emphasis added).121
To talk about Asia in general is an „over-simplification“ as the 26 countries and three 
regions (East, South-East, South122) of Asia have very different political, cultural, 
social and economic backgrounds. To a certain extent, though, industrialization is 
assimilating the existing differences which justifies the common treatment in a single 
communication.123 The Commission’s Communication relies basically on two areas of 
action: The new political approach and the EU’s new trade & co-operation strategy 
towards Asia. The former is based on the political dialogue with Asia about arms
121 „Towards a New Asia Strategy**, COM (94) 314 final, p. Is.
122 East: Korea (ROK), China, Taiwan, Hong Kong (SAR), Macao, Mongolia, North Korea; South- 
East: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, 
Burma; South: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan, Afghanistan, 
COM (94) 314 final Annex III.
„Towards a New Asia Strategy“, COM (94) 314 final, p. 3.123
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control and non-proliferation, human rights and drugs and takes account o f Asia’s 
growing role in world politics; the latter pays respect to the increasing economic 
power of the Asian countries and the enormous market for European goods behind it. 
Due to the fact that the Asian development (necessarily) takes place far away from 
Europe and at its own pace and according to its own structures, the EU has to take the 
different cultural, economic, social and political backgrounds into account when 
formulating its strategy. These differences include the divergent perceptions of 
universal values such as international human rights. As regards the different countries 
of Asia, it „will be necessary (...) to prioritize both in terms of countries and in terms of 
sectors, and to apply different instruments to countries that are at different levels of 
development“ ;124 China is especially mentioned in this Communication in connection 
with the European participation in the reform of its previously centrally managed 
economy, the integration of China into the world trading system, and the already 
established political dialogue.
2. Towards a „Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations“
The term „constructive engagement“ is used to describe the policy of diplomatic, 
commercial and cultural contacts with the target country.125 The Commission 
Communication on a „Long-term Strategy for China-European Relations“, COM (95) 
279 final recommends to the Union, not least in view of the economic profile of the 
EU in China, that it rely on constructive engagement in its political relations with 
China.126 The long term relationship seems to be guided by the idea that integrating 
China in the world economy through increasing contacts is likely to be more effective
124 ibid., p. 18,23.
123 The Economist, „How America sees China. Friend or FoeT, 25.10.97, p. 24.
126 This Communication has been approved by the Council on 4.12.95, Bull. EU, No. 12, 1995, Vol. 
28, p. 153s.
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in achieving the liberalization of the market and the political system than constant 
pressure in human rights and democratization matters.127 Only if a society is based on 
free flow of trade, investment, people and ideas, can human rights develop and be 
understood, which makes the opening up o f China a very important issue in the 
bilateral relations.128 The participation of China in the international community should 
be enhanced and used to engage China in a political dialogue covering issues such as 
non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, but also exchange of views on 
human rights.129 Quiet diplomacy and not public condemnation is advocated given that 
highly visible actions are seen as counterproductive because they might provoke 
negative reactions in the target country and, as a result, reduce the possibilities of 
outside influence.130 The action the ECU is ready to take, according to the 
Commission, spreads over three levels: (1) the „support o f potential efforts in China to 
open up and liberalize all areas o f Chinese life**, with a view to strengthening civil 
society and the rule o f law, (2) the raising of „issues o f human rights in the bilateral 
dialogue“ and finally (3) the „engagement of the international community in the 
dialogue through multilateral fora“.131 None o f the intended measures is of a negative 
nature in the sense o f conditionality, but only in the sense of possibly using the bilateral
127 R. Menotti (note 2), p. 74-79; ibid., p. 77, According to the functionalist view, increasing 
economic contacts will further the political situation. „Spill-over“ effect.
128 „A Long Term Policy for China-EU Relations“, COM (95) 279 final, p. 5.
129 A bilateral political dialogue has been set up to this end in 1994, covering regular meetings 
between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the EU ambassadors in Beijing and between the EU 
Presidency’s Foreign Minister and the Chinese Ambassador in  the EU Presidency capital and ad 
hoc meetings of the Foreign Ministers. The already ongoing meetings between the EU Troika 
and China at ministerial level as well as between the Commission and China will continue after 
1994. On top of that, a  bilateral dialogue designed to tackle issues o f human rights has also 
recently been launched at China’s suggestion, COM (95) 279 final, p. 4.
130 R. Menotti (note 2), p. 79.
131 „A Long Term Policy for China-EU Relations“, COM (95) 279 final, p. 5.
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dialogue or an international debate to criticize China’s human rights performance or to 
exert pressure on Chinese authorities to liberalize.132
The notion o f „constructive engagement“ can be subsumed under the positive 
approach of the Union with some differentiations. The positive approach consists of a 
constructive dialogue and initiatives to promote human rights in the given countiy 
(help in conducting elections, democratic assistance, promotion o f the rule o f law, 
protection o f minorities, awareness raising, civic education and so on), as well as an 
increase in aid if the human rights record o f the country is improving. „Constructive 
engagement“ towards China also focuses on a constructive dialogue and may include 
practical action, meaning the use of financial tools to promote human rights with an 
emphasis on support o f the legal and judicial system in China.133 Till now, the two are 
comparable. What makes the difference is that negative measures are excluded from 
„constructive engagement“ and that it is by definition accompanied by increased 
contacts in trade and in international (economic) fora in order to achieve China’s 
opening up. The creation of a web of cultural and economic contacts is seen as the 
panacea (and excuse?, see below Chapter 4) to change China from the bottom up. In 
sum, the „constructive engagement“ of the Union towards China is a weaker form of 
human rights engagement, as it only has had limited recourse to the quite successful 
positive measures under the first pillar, does not apply negative measures and 
ultimately relies on political change through China’s integration in economic, 
commercial and political frameworks, and through dialogue.
132 As „exertion of pressure“ is how J. van der Klaauw interprets the first level of action, „Human 
Rights News“, in: N Q H R , No. 3,1995, Vol.13, p. 380.
133 „A Long Term Policy for China-EU Relations“, COM (95) 279 final, p. 6; J. van der Klaauw, 
„EU Human Rights Policy in Practice: the Recent Cases of Rwanda, China and Turkey“, Human 
Rights News, in: N Q H R , No. 3,1995, Vol.13, p. 380.
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3. C u rre n t developm en ts
Without going into the details of the tabling of a resolution at Geneva at this stage, it 
has to be mentioned that the EU decided upon a new approach in EU-China human 
rights policy in 1998.134 135Instead of supporting a resolution in Geneva it is going to rely 
on bilateral dialogue alone. In doing so it refused the possibility o f strengthening the 
dialogue within the multilateral framework of UN meetings as proposed by the third 
level of action in the Communication. The EU claimed that the motion at Geneva was 
no longer warranted because of the recent progress in the country.133 For the first time, 
however, concrete human rights related action in the field of first pillar measures is not 
only considered necessary, but also decided. Financial and technical co-operation is 
stepped up and the intended co-operation programme covers both the EU and Chinese 
priorities, because it consists of initiatives to strengthen the rule of law, civil and 
political rights (local governance), as well as the promotion of economic and social 
rights (poverty alleviation, with emphasis on women, disabled, aged or children).134 536
The decision to take the new approach137 was followed by a new Commission’s 
Communication on the „Building (of) a Comprehensive Partnership with China“ 138 It 
was issued in the broader context of the death of Deng Xiaoping more than a year ago 
and the hand-over o f the British colony o f Hong Kong without any major problems.
134 Xinhua News Agency, 23.2.98, ,,eu agrees on human rights move over china“; SZ, 23.2.96, 
„EU aendert China-Politik“, p.6, European Report No.2300, 18,3.98, p. V-7, European Report 
No.2294, 25.2.98, p. V -l.
135 European Report No. 2294,25.2.98, p. V -l.
136 Background note on China and Human Rights, February 1998, unpublished paper, p. 2.
137 It was based on the outcome of several meetings within the Ministerial dialogue on human rights 
which took place on 23724.10.97 in Luxembourg, and on 172. 12.97 in Beijing. The third 
meeting is scheduled for the 23724.2.98 in  Beijing, Background note on China and Human 
Rights, February 1998, unpublished paper, p. 2;
Western diplomats admitted that China’s move to allow access to a prison in the context of the 
third meeting was mainly motivated by the desire to escape scrutiny at Geneva, European Report 
No. 2294, 25.2.98, p. V-2.
COM (98) 181 final, 25.3.98; European Report No. 2301,21.3.98, p. V-3.138

Moreover, the visit o f Jian Zemin to the US in October last year139 represents a 
„ground-breaking“140 step for further co-operation of East and West. The paper 
mentions several developments that have influenced the EU to renew its partnership 
with China:141 One, the Communist Party has engaged in „an ambitious economic and 
social reform agenda“ for the next five years building upon the achievements o f the 
Deng-reforms. Two, China has acted in an increasingly responsible and mature manner 
in international affairs and promoted peace and stability in the region through its 
foreign policy. Three, the Asian financial crisis underscores the need for further reform 
and liberalization in China and serves as a warning signal for the Chinese authorities 
not to commit the same errors as some of their Asian neighbours have done. Finally, 
on top of that, the EU itself is changing and the communication says the prospect of 
the single currency and enlargement eastwards, and the new policy instruments of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam have equipped the EU „with new means to assert itself on the 
world stage“. The new strategy is based on five pillars, which are the following: 
engaging China further, through an upgraded political dialogue, in the international 
community;142 supporting China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of 
law and the respect for human rights;143 integrating China further in the world 
economy by bringing it closer into the world trading system and by supporting the
139 International Herald Tribune, 25726.10.97 „Beijing Maneuvers to Defuse Rights Issue Ahead of 
Jiang’s US Visit“; International Herald Tribune, 29.10.97 „Clouds Over Jiangs Visit“, „Business 
Leads Diplomacy in Relations With Beijing“, p .l ;  SZ, 29.10.97 „Verbissene Demonstration der 
Partnerschaft“, SZ, 29.10.97, „Ritterschlag fuer einen Bittsteller“; SZ, 31.10.97 „Die zweite 
chinesische Offensive“ .
140 European Report No. 2301, 21.3.98, p. V-3.
141 COM (98) 181 final, http://europa.eu.int/en/dg01/chincom.htm, p. 3.
142 The „upgraded“ EU-China bilateral dialogue, for example summit meetings and greater 
involvement of China in regional and multilateral intitiatives o f global interest, complements the 
already established political dialogue (broader dialogue and experts dialogue).
143 Despite serious shortcomings in human rights, the focus is on dialogue and not on confrontation. 
Thus the human rights dialogue and new cooperation programmes are seen as the right 
approach.

44
process of economic and social reform underway in the country;144 making Europe’s 
funding go further,145 and finally raising the EU’s profile in China.146 Human rights 
issues can be addressed in the broader political dialogue and, of course, in the specific 
dialogue on human rights. Moreover, positive human rights and democracy promotion 
should take place in the framework of the intended co-operation programmes.
So far, the co-operation programme has only been agreed upon and has not been 
implemented. Thus, the bilateral political dialogue is the only measure the EU 
envisaged towards China in 1998. Negative measures are not considered appropriate in 
the context of EU-China human rights relations. If a look at the list of measures in 
Chapter 1 III 2 is taken, it is realized that the range applicable to China is to be found 
in the middle of it (silent diplomacy). It covers confidential and public declarations and 
démarches, be they negative or positive, and political dialogue, as well as action in 
international fora with the exception of 1998 (if it is merely an exception !?).
144 T h e  a ss is ta n c e  fo r  C h in a  to  b eco m e a  g lo b a l e c o n o m ic  p la y e r  sh o u ld  b e  a ch ie v ed  th ro u g h  a 
c o m b in a tio n  o f  tr a d e  d isc u ss io n s  a n d  ta rg e te d  c o o p e ra t io n  in itia tiv e s . T h e  m o s t p re s s in g  is su e  is  
C h in a ’s a c cess io n  to  th e  W T O . C h in a ’s m a r k e t  e c o n o m y  s ta tu s  h a s  b e e n  re c o g n iz e d  b y  th e  E U  
recen tly , In te rn a t io n a l  H e ra ld  T rib u n e , 2 8 .4 .9 8 , ttE U  O v e rtu re  to  C h in a  a n d  R u ss ia “ , th e  T ra d e  
M in is te rs  o f  th e  E U  a g re e d  o n  2 7 .4 .9 8  to  re m o v e  C h in a  a s  w e ll a s  R u s s ia  fro m  th e  lis t o f  
n o n m a rk e t co u n tr ie s .
145 T h e  c u rre n t lev e l o f  fu n d s  is  c o n s id e re d  su ff ic ie n t, b u t  th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  a n d  c o o p e ra tio n  w ith  
o th e r  d o n o rs  sh o u ld  b e  im p ro v ed .
146 T o  th is  en d  th e  C o m m iss io n  cou ld  se t u p  a  p re s s  a n d  in fo rm a tio n  se rv ic e  in  B e ijin g , e x p a n d  th e  
p ro g ra m m e  fo r  C h in e s e  \ i s i to r s  to  E u ro p e  a n d  im p ro v e  c u ltu ra l  e x c h a n g e  p ro g ra m m e s .

IL Chinese position in human rights
The Chinese Government regards demands for human rights as „impact(ing) on the 
very survival o f its political regime“, criticizing the one party system in China and 
denying China’s own and specific values and forms of governance.147 Moreover, the 
linking of trade or aid to the observation of human rights and democratic principles and 
any other measure to promote human rights in China is clearly seen as an interference 
in internal affairs. This official position is expressed in the „White Paper“ of 1991 and 
its successor o f  1995.148 Additionally, China is eager to stress that human rights 
standards depend heavily on a country’s current economic and social situation.149
1. How did China come to adopt such a human rights policy? 
a. Confucianism in China
The aim of this short overview is neither to contribute to the numerous elaborations on 
Confucianism, nor to offer a new interpretation of it, but simply to highlight some 
central elements of this value system so prevalent in China, in order to be able to 
discuss human rights issues in contemporary China with a deeper background.
The Emperor Wuti (156-87 B.C) of the Han Dynasty proclaimed Confucianism to be 
the main and only ideology in China out of hundred different schools, which was 
maintained by the subsequent dynasties to the extent that Mencius (372-289 B.C) was
147 M in g  W an , „ H u m a n  r ig h ts  a n d  S in o -U S  re la tio n s : p o lic ies  a n d  c h a n g in g  re a lit ie s“ , in : The 
Pacific Review, N o .2 , 1 9 9 7 , V o l.1 0 , p p . 2 3 7 -2 5 5 , p . 247 .
148 In fo rm a tio n  O ffice  o f  th e  S ta te  C o u n c il o f  th e  P e o p le ’s R ep u b lic  o f  C h in a ,  H u m a n  R ig h ts  in  
C h in a , 1991, p p .8 3 -8 4 , f ro m  now  o n  „ W h ite  p a p e r“ ; In fo rm a tio n  O ffic e  o f  th e  S ta te  C o u n c il, 
„ T h e  P ro g re ss  o f  H u m a n  R ig h ts  in  C h in a “ , a s  a n  u p d a te  to  the  W h ite  p a p e r ,  2 7 .1 2 .9 5 .
149 S ta te m e n t b y  M r. W . M in , M in is te r  o f  th e  C h in e s e  D e le g a tio n  a t th e  T h i r d  C o m m itte e  o f  th e  
5 1 s t S ess io n  o f  th e  G e n e ra l A ssem b ly  o n  Item  1 1 0 (a ), 14 .11 .96 , p re s s  re le a se , p . 1 in  th e  co n tex t 
o f  th e  p e rio d  o f  s tu d y  b e fo re  a d h e rin g  to  a  h u m a n  r ig h ts  co n v en tio n .
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also included as the second sage.150 The Confucian ideological background, which has 
no metaphysical foundation and does not worry about the world beyond,151 has been 
influential in China for 2000 years and is still to be found in contemporary China even 
if there was no official return to Confucianism after the republican period.152 1534The 
primary source for Confucianism are the Analects, with the guiding principle o f 
benevolence.
The principle o f  benevolence requires to love all men. In order to fulfil Confucian 
spirit, one had to be reverent, respectful, full of fraternal submission and uprightness, 
and filial, but not lacking in personal dignity. Without these attributes a person will 
never be full of loving spirit (benevolent) and it was everybody’s duty to promote this 
benevolence in the world.153 154But, in loving all men, social status has always to be 
maintained.154 15Tao is the immutable order of cosmic and social harmony (the orders of 
society were just a special application of the world order) and this harmony must not 
be disturbed by any „orgiastic or ecstatic“ element. The individual was required to 
adapt to the given world instead o f wanting to change it.135 This concept o f harmony 
acquired a very important place in Confucian ideology and provided the basis of
150 C o n fu c ia n  w a s  a  p h ilo so p h e r  w h o  l iv e d  f ro m  5 5 1 -4 7 9  B .C , Z h e n g  Y u n , „ L ’a p p ro c h e  C h in o ise  
d es D ro its  d e  L ’H o m m e “ , in :  A . L a p e y re , F . d e  T in g u y , K . V a s a k  (ed s .), Les Dimensions 
Universelles des Droits de L ’Homme, B ru y la n t , B ru x e lle s  1990, p p . 2 6 5 -2 7 4 , p . 2 6 7 s .
151 C .K . Y a n g , „ In tro d u c tio n “ , in :  H . H . G e r th  (ed . a n d  tr a n s la te r ) ,  M. Weber, The Religion o f  
China, T h e  F re e  P re ss , L o n d o n  1 9 6 4 , p p .x ii i-x L iii ,  p .x x ix  s; M . W e b e r , The Religion o f China, 
H . H . G e rth  (e d . a n d  tr a n s la te r ) ,  T h e  F re e  P re ss , L o n d o n  1 9 6 4 , p . 144: th e  C h in e se  la n g u a g e  
d o es  n o t  e v e n  h a v e  a  sp e c ia l w o rd  f o r  re l ig io n ; D e sp ite  i t s  s e c u la r  o r ie n ta t io n , C o n fu c ia n ism , in  
1 9 0 6 , w a s  e le v a te d  to  th e  s ta te - r e l ig io n , O . W eg g e l, „ A s ie n  im  J a h r e  2 0 5 0 . V e rsu c h  e in e r  
v ir tu e l le n  U m ris sb e s tim m u n g “ , in : China Aktuell, Ja n u a r  1989, V o l. X X V II , p p . 4 2 -6 8 , p . 4 5 .
152 Z h e n g  Y u n , „L’approche C h in o is e  d e s  D ro its  d e  L ’H o m m e “ , in :  A . L ap ey re , F . d e  T in g u y , K . 
V a sa k  (ed s .) (n o te  1 50), p p . 2 6 5 -2 7 4 , p . 2 6 9 .
153 D . G a n g jia n , S . G a n g , „ R e la t in g  H u m a n  R ig h ts  to  C h in e se  C u ltu re . T h e  F o u r  P a th s  o f  th e  
C o n fu c ia n  A n a le c ts  a n d  th e  F o u r  P r in c ip le s  o f  a  N ew  T h e o ry  o f  B e n e v o le n c e “ , in :  M . C . D a v is  
(e d .)  (n o te  1 8 ), p p . 3 5 -5 6 , p . 3 8 , 41.
154 L. H a in ia n , „ H u m a n  R ig h ts  P e rs p e c tiv e s  in  D iv e rs if ie d  C u ltu re s“ , in :  P . R . B a e h r , F . v a n  H o o f, 
L . N a n le i,  T . Z h e n g h u a  (e d s .) , Human Rights: Chinese and Dutch Perspectives, N ijh o ff , T h e  
H a g u e  1996, p p . 17*24, p. 19.
155 C .K . Y an g , „ In tro d u c tio n “ , in : H . H . G e r th  (ed . an d  tr a n s la te r )  (n o te  1 5 1 ), p p .x ii i-x L iii , p . x x ix  
s; M . W eb er, The Religion o f  China, H . H . G e r th  (ed . a n d  t r a n s la te r )  ib id ., p. 153.
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tolerance in the spirit of the Analects. The emphasis on social harmony is one reason 
for the modem orientation o f Chinese leaders away from the individual and towards 
harmony of the community. Confucianism had a strong authoritarian component as the 
proclaimed social harmony was based on a hierarchical ordering of individuals and 
groups156 and on discipline. In line with the demand for order and discipline, conflict 
avoidance plays a great role in Confucian societies and there is accordingly almost an 
„obsession“ to negotiate in various forms in Asian societies.157
The concept o f morality was also based on tolerance and founded on a strict class 
distinction between „little man“ and „princely man“. The moral code, fit for the 
princely man, is o f a very high standard and obliges him to fulfil his duties towards the 
community and for the welfare of the little man. In such a concept, there is no need for 
rights, as the princely man has his own privileges and the little man is sufficiently 
protected by the princely man.158 The powers of the ruling class are not restricted by 
law as in Western countries, but by moral codes, according to the principle „do not do 
unto others what you would not like others to do unto you“.159 As a consequence of 
the concern with elite politics in Confucian thought, western democracy is not a typical 
feature o f China, but somewhat alien to  it.160
Another general principle o f Confucian ethics was justice which had a higher position 
than written law, but which was subordinate to the ethic o f kindness. To seek justice 
was to respect kindness and to esteem benevolence, which, as a consequence, made
156 J. D . S ey m o u r, „ C h in a “, in :  J . D o n n e lly , R . E . H o w ard  (e d s .)  (n o te  9 ) , p p . 7 5 -9 8 , p . 7 5 ; A  S e n  
(n o te  11), p . 3 4 .
157 0 .  W e g g e l (n o te  151), p. 4 7 .
158 M . N g , „ A re  R ig h ts  C u ltu re -b o u n d ?“ , in :  M . C . D av is  (e d .)  (n o te  18), p p . 5 9 -7 1 , p . 6 6 .
159 D. G a n g jia n , S. G ang , „ R e la t in g  H u m a n  R ig h ts  to  C h in e se  C u ltu re . T h e  F o u r  P a th s  o f  th e  
C o n fu c ia n  A n a le c ts  an d  th e  F o u r  P r in c ip le s  o f  a  N ew  T h e o ry  o f  B e n e v o le n c e “ , in : M . C . D a v is  
(ed .) (n o te  1 8 ), p p . 35 -56 , p . 4 0 .
160 ib id ., p . 50 , M a r x is m  a lso  p ro c la im s  t h a t  th e  ru l in g  c la s s  a n d  th e  ru le d  re m a in  tw o  id e n tit ie s  a n d  
d oes n o t a g re e  w ith  th e  a n c ie n t G re e k  id e a s  o f  d e m o c ra c y  in  c ity -s ta te s .
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justice more important than interests. This did not mean, though, that interests were 
absent from Confucian thought, they simply had to respect the principle of propriety 
and righteousness.161
The term „human rights“ does not appear in the Analects, and was linguistically and 
historically absent in ancient China.162 It was not a major concern of Confucian as he 
was basically concerned with adaptation (duty) of the human being to the social order 
of the world and of the society.163 This lacuna, however, can be questioned to the 
extent that features of modem human rights ideology164 are nevertheless to be found in 
his value system, an enterprise that will be undertaken in Chapter 4 o f this paper.
b. Traditional China
The body o f  law in traditional China consisted in one big code containing all the 
different types o f norms influenced by Confucianism and feudal ethical rules - „Taking 
moral means as the primary, and legal means as the secondary“, i.e. legal rules were 
taken to enforce moral standards.165 These standards, in their turn, were part of ,,li“, 
the norms o f conduct, tacitly agreed upon in society, based on Confucian thought (see 
above). The stability of the traditional law system in China was fortified by Confucian 
ideas and supported the maintenance of the feudal regime based on the unequal status 
of persons.166
161 ib id ., p . 4 5 s .
162 M . N g , „ A re  R ig h ts  C u ltu re -b o u n d ? * , in :  M . C. D a v is  (e d .)  (n o te  18 ), p p . 5 9 -7 1 , p . 6 5 , 6 6 ss .
10  F u n a b a s h i , Y .;  O k se n b e rg , M .; W e is s , H ., China a u f dem Weg zur Grossmacht. Konsequenzen 
einer interdependenten Welt. E in  B e r ic h t a n  d ie  T r i la te ra le  K o m m iss io n , A rb e itsp a p ie re  z u r  
I n te rn a t io n a le n  P o litik  8 7 , E u ro p a  U n io n  V erlag , B o n n  1 9 9 4 , p. 8 5 , th e  te r m  h u m a n  r ig h t  (re n  
q u a n )  w a s  o n ly  in tro d u c e d  in  C h in e s e  la n g u a g e  i n  th e  1 9 th  c e n tu ry ; K  K e n t (n o te  10), p . 4 9 .
164 F . ex. h u m a n  d ig n ity , re s p e c t  o f  th e  p e rso n a lity , ra t io n a lity , h u m a n i ty .
165 C h e n g u a n g , W ., „ In tro d u c tio n : A n  E m e rg in g  L e g a l S y stem “ , in :  C h e n g u a n g , W ., X ia n c h u , Z . 
(ed s .)  (n o te  2 1 ) , p p . 1 -3 0 , p . 5 , 7 .
166 ib id ., p .3 s s ;  L . H a in ia n , „ H u m a n  R ig h ts  P e rsp e c tiv e s  in  D iv e rs if ie d  C u ltu re s“ , in : P . R . B a e h r , F. 
v a n  H o o f, L . N a n le i, T . Z h e n g h u a  (e d s .)  (n o te  1 5 4 ), pp . 1 7 -2 4 , p .  19,
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The greater importance o f social status over legal rules implies that the rule o f law did 
not exist to protect the single member of society. Rather, the concern of the (written) 
law was to protect government powers and social interests instead of the rights of 
individuals. The principle which governed society, was the ‘rule of man’ („everything 
the ruler says is right“), excluding any form of democratic system, but promoting the 
totalitarian, almost despotic167, regime.168 In practice, in the feudal history o f China, 
arbitrary action o f the feudal ruler was often the rule, leaving little room for liberties 
for the people.169 In theory, the (Confucian) moral code applied also to the ruler and 
was meant to limit his powers (see above, princely man). The Mandate o f heaven 
obliged the ruler to advance the welfare of the country’s citizens170 and the Confiician 
idea was that because the rulers wanted the best for their people, you had to be 
obedient and fulfil your duty. It is not the right place to discuss these characteristics of 
feudal China in any depth, thus the (incomplete) conclusion drawn here is that despite 
moral codes obliging the ruler, the ‘rule o f man’ often prevailed over these rules in the 
time of the dynasties.
c. Socialism
The last dynasty (Qing Dynasty from 1644 - 1911) marked the end o f feudal rule in 
China and the beginning o f the republican period which lasted till 1949 when the PRC 
was founded. Its first 7 years can be described as the transition from „New Democracy
167 A . K e n t (n o te  10), p . 31 .
168 C h e n g u a n g , W ., „ In tro d u c tio n : A n  E m e rg in g  L e g a l S y stem “ , in :  C h e n g u a n g , W ., X ia n c h u , Z. 
(e d s .)  (n o te  2 1 ), pp . 1 -30 , p. 5.
169 L . R e n d o n g , Theorie und Praxis der Menschenrechte. Eine Betrachtung aus chinesicher Sicht, 
K o n ra d -A d e n a u e r-S tif tu n g , A rb e itsp a p ie re , M e n s c h e n re c h te  in  O stas ien , J u n i 1 9 9 3 , S a n k t 
A u g u s tin , p p . 3 5 -5 0 , p. 4 8 .
170 J . F . C o p p e r , „ D e fin in g  H u m a n  R ig h ts  in  th e  P e o p le ’s  R e p u b lic  o f  C h in a“ , in : W u , Y u a n - l i ;  M ., 
F ra n z ; C o p p e r , J . F .; L ee , T a - lin g ; C h a n g , M a r ia  H s ia ;  G re g o r , A J a m e s  (ed s .), Human Rights in 
the People‘s  Republic o f  China, W e s tv ie w  P re ss , B o u ld e r  a n d  L o n d o n  1988, p p . 9 -1 7 , p . 9.
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Revolution“ to „Socialist Revolution“ whose purpose it was to establish a socialist 
system. This system required, in the economic field, public ownership and central 
economy, in the political sphere, the democratic dictatorship o f the proletariat and the 
supremacy o f the Party, and, finally, in the ideological realm, the influence of Marxist 
theory.171
According to Guo Luoji172 the Chinese (the party and the Government’s) human rights 
perception in modem times has evolved in three steps. Accompanying the China 
Communist Party’s (CCP) rise to power was the general attitude that human rights as 
proclaimed in the French enlightenment were an essential part of a lively citizenry. 
That also meant that the early conceptions of human rights in China were basically 
adapted from the West. Emphasis on human rights was used as a way of enhancing 
opposition to the one-party power of the Nationalist government and its striking 
disregard of human rights.173 Once in power, these arguments were abandoned and a 
strict anti-human rights regime took hold, going hand-in-hand with significant human 
rights infringements. As soon as a claim for human rights endangered the Party’s 
position and its power, such movements were suppressed violently. In the second 
phase, starting after the cruel Cultural Revolution and in parallel with the first opening 
up to the West in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, political leaders proclaimed human rights to 
be different in China174 and the Western concept of human rights being in violation of
171 C h e n g u a n g , W ., „ In tro d u c tio n : A n  E m e rg in g  L e g a l S y stem “ , in :  C h e n g u a n g , W ., X ia n c h u , Z. 
(e d s .)  (n o te  2 1 ) , p p . 1-30 , p . 9s.
172 t,A  H u m a n  R ig h ts  C rit iq u e  o f  th e  C h in e s e  L eg a l S y stem “, in :  Harvard Human Rights Journal, 
S p r in g  19 9 6 , V o l.9 , pp . 1 -14 .
173 A  K e n t (n o te  10), p . 4 0 , th e  K u o m in ta n g  h a d  c o m e  to  p o w e r  i n  1928 w h e n  th e  u n ite d  th e  
c o u n try  a f te r  lo n g  f ig h ts  b e tw e e n  d if fe re n t  w a rlo rd s . T h e y  e s ta b lis h e d  a  c e n tr a l  g o v e rn m e n t in  
N a n k in g  a n d  fo llo w ed  a  s t r ic t  r e g im e  o f  p o li tic a l „ tu te la g e “ .
174 „ W h a t a re  h u m a n  rig h ts ?  F ir s t ,  h o w  m a n y  p e o p le ’s  h u m a n  r ig h ts ?  Is  i t  th e  h u m a n  r ig h ts  o f  th e  
m in o rity , o r  th e  h u m a n  r ig h ts  o f  th e  m a jo rity , th e  h u m a n  r ig h ts  o f  th e  e n tire  n a tio n ?  W h a t  th e  
W e s t  c a lls  „ h u m a n  r ig h ts “  a n d  th e  h u m a n  r ig h ts  w e  a re  ta lk in g  a b o u t a re  tw o  se p a ra te  th in g s . 
W e  h a v e  d if fe re n t c o n c e p tio n s .“ , D e n g  X ia o p in g , G ao  z ic h a n  jie j i  z iy o u h u a  j i u s h i  zo u  
z ib e n z h u y i d a o lu  (P u rsu in g  B o u rg e o is  L ib e ra lism  is  th e  S a m e  a s  T a k in g  th e  C a p ita lis t  R o a d ) , in : 
3 D e n g  X ia o p in g  W e n x u a n  (S e le c te d  W o rk s  o f  D e n g  X ia o p in g ) ,  R e n m m in  C h u b a n s h e  1993 , 
p . 123, 125.
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the „Four Cardinal Principles“ governing Chinese life.173 Human rights appeals were 
seen as slogans of the bourgeoisie and not taken as being applicable to Chinese 
society.175 76 Instead, a socialist conception of human rights emerged, which can be 
characterized as follows: in contrast to the Western capitalist states, where only the 
rich part of the population enjoys human rights and the poor citizens are not protected 
by the system made by the rich, in socialist states the ruling classes represent their 
people and know what is the best for them.177 A short look at the Chinese state178 
seems necessary in order to understand the implications of this socialist approach. 
China is governed by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in which the Communist 
Party is the permanent ruling party. According to Art. 2 of the Constitution „All 
powers in the PRC belong to the people. The NPC and the local People’s Congresses 
at various levels are the organs through which the people exercise state power.“ The 
Congresses are constituted through democratic vote (Art. 4 of the Constitution). In 
China, legislative, executive and judicial functions are not separated, but derive from 
the NPC which means that it combines several state functions. The separation of 
powers is often regarded as „a capitalist element“ and therefore denied.179 The worker 
owes the state complete obedience, because the state is doing its best for the
175 T h e y  a re : so c ia lism , p e o p le ’s d e m o c ra tic  d ic ta to rsh ip , le a d e rsh ip  o f  th e  C o m m u n is t P a r ty  a n d  
M a rx is t ,  L e n in is t  a n d  M a o  Z e d o n g  th o u g h t , D e n g  X ia o p in g , „ J ia n c h i s ix ia n g  j ib e n  y u a n z e “ 
(P e rse v e r in g  in  th e  F o u r C a rd in a l P r in c ip le s ) , in : Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan 1975-1982 (Selected 
Works o f  Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982), R e n m in  c h u b a n sh e  198 3 , p . 144 , 150s, 159s.
176 G . L u o ji, „ A  H u m a n  R ig h ts  C r it iq u e  o f  th e  C h in ese  L e g a l S y s te m “ , in : Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, S p r in g  1996 , V o l.9 , pp . 1 -1 4 , p . 3.
177 L . R e n d o n g  (n o te  169), p . 4 4 s.
178 A rt. 1 o f  th e  C o n s ti tu t io n  s ta te s : C h in a  is  a  „ so c ia lis t s ta te  u n d e r  th e  p e o p le ’s d e m o c ra tic  
d ic ta to r s h ip  le d  b y  th e  w o rk in g  c la s s  a n d  b a se d  o n  th e  a ll ia n c e  o f  w o rk e rs  a n d  p e a sa n ts " , A . P. 
B la u s te in , G . H . F la n z  (e d .) , Constitutions o f  the countries o f  the world, O c e a n a , N e w  Y o rk  
199 2 , p .K I s s ;  T h e  C o m m u n is t P a r ty , i n  i t s  tu rn , is  th e  „ v a n g u a rd  o f  th e  C h in e se  w o rk in g  c la s s“ 
a s  q u o te d  in  th e  f ir s t  s e n te n c e  o f  i t s  G e n e ra l P ro g ra m m e , Z . G u o b in , „ C o n s titu tio n a l L a w " , in : 
C h e n g u a n g , W .; X ia n c h u , Z . (ed s .) (n o te  2 1 ), pp . 3 1 -7 4 , p . 3 6 , J. F . C o p p er, „ H u m a n  R ig h ts  a n d  
th e  C h in e se  P o litic a l S y stem ", in : W u , Y u a n -li ;  M ., F ra n z ; C o p p e r , J, F .; L ee , T a - lin g ; C h a n g , 
M a r ia  H s ia ; G re g o r, A .Ja m e s  (e d s .)  (n o te  170), p p . 5 6 -7 6 , p . 5 9  l is ts  c o n tra d ic tio n s  a b o u t  th e  
fo rm a l a s s e r t io n  th a t  th e  N P C  c o n tro ls  th e  P a rty  a n d  th e  re a l i t ie s .
179 Z . G u o b in , „ C o n s titu tio n a l L aw " , in :  C h e n g u a n g , W .; X ia n c h u , Z . (ed s .) (n o te  2 1 ), p p . 3 1 -7 4 , 
p. 3 7 ,4 3 .

individuals and knows what behaviour concords with the rules and interests of society 
which are of paramount importance. The Loyalty to the state implies that duties prevail 
over rights in case o f conflict.180 There are no natural or human rights in the sense that 
they exist irrespective of the state in which a person lives. Rather, human rights are 
determined by the socialist state in which the transformation o f the society through the 
establishment o f common means o f production has led to a different position for the 
individual.181 In this system, almost everybody, except some class-enemies, can enjoy 
their rights. But, in any case has the economic, social and cultural situation o f the 
country to be taken into account, because it forms the objective condition for the 
accomplishment o f human rights, implemented by the ruling classes.182 Among these 
economic and social orientation, the right to life or to subsistence is the most 
fundamental right and has to be guaranteed first. It is regularly claimed by the Chinese 
government that feeding 1.2 billion people is already difficult enough and that the 
major achievements in this respect should be taken into account by the world 
community.183 For example, the family policy o f a given country has to be seen in 
relation to the right to subsistence. In order to guarantee their people an enjoyable life 
in accordance with the economic situation and the speed o f development, sensitive 
family planing is necessary. This is the corollary to the Western countries promoting 
big families in order to increase economic power.184 The next argument brought 
forward is that stability of the country is the paramount objective o f any policy, 
because an instable China would end in chaos and anarchy where human rights will
180 A . K e n t (n o te  10), p . 46 .
181 ib id ., p . 11, 3 0 s , th e  tr a d it io n a l  C o n fu c ia n  co n cep ts  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  h av e  re in fo rc e d  M a r x is t  
id e a s  a b o u t th e  p re v a le n c e  o f  so c ie ty  o v e r  th e  in d iv id u a l.
182 L . R e n d o n g  (n o te  169), p . 4 4 s .
183 W h ite  p a p e r , n o te  148, p . 7 ;  In s t i tu te  o f  C u rre n t C h in a  S tu d ie s , In s titu te  o f  C u rre n t C h in a
S tu d ie s , „ C C P  S e ts  Its  O w n  S ta n d a rd s  o f  H u m a n  R ig h ts“ , In s id e  C h in a  M a in la n d , N o .3 , M a rc h  
1 9 9 5 , V o l.1 7 , T a ip e i, T a iw a n  R .O .C ., p . 24 .
G . L u o ji (n o te  1 76), p . 46 .184
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never be accomplished. Only after stability has been attained, through, besides others, 
the guarantee o f the right to life to the people, then it is possible talk about human 
rights.183 After the events o f the Tiananmen Square in June 1989 (third phase), the 
assertion of a different approach in human rights was taken to justify the Chinese 
action by saying that it protected the right to subsistence o f the Chinese people. The 
„dissident players“ demonstrating for democracy do (of course) not merit this right; 
even less so if the the nation's right to subsistence is endangered.185 86 In order to 
counter effectively the international criticism, the Chinese government additionally 
declared and condemned human rights’ concerns by third states as intolerable 
interference in the internal affairs o f China and as infringing upon its sovereignty,187 
which is a consequence o f the assertion that the state alone knows what is the best for 
its citizens. The state’s sovereignty is one o f the highest goods and has to be 
internationally respected, as stated in the UN Charter in Art. 2 (7). The principle of 
state sovereignty extends to two pillars: One is the internal dimension which means 
that states have the ultimate control over their citizens and their territory, and two, 
externally, that every State is regarded equal with respect to every other state.188
These are the historical roots of the modem Chinese understanding of human rights. 
How do these different conceptions live on in the current debate and conflict with the 
modem ideology of human rights as promoted by the international system?
185 In s ti tu te  o f  C u r re n t  C h in a  S tu d ie s , , ,C C P  S e ts  I ts  O w n  S ta n d a rd s  o f  H u m a n  R ig h ts“ , In s id e  
C h in a  M a in la n d , N o .3 , M a r c h  1 9 9 5 , V o l.1 7 , T a ip e i , T a iw a n  R .O .C ., p . 2 4 ; T h e  p ro b le m  o f  
in s ta b ili ty  o f  C h in a  sh o u ld , h o w e v e r , n o t  b e  u n d e re s tim a te d . B y  su p p o rtin g  a n ti-g o v e rn m e n t 
d e m o c ra tic  fo rc e s  th e  ta rg e t c o u n try  m ig h t  tu r n  in to  c o m p le te  tu rm o il. A n  a t t i tu d e  th a t  h a s  b e e n  
fa v o u re d  b y  th e  U S  in  so m e  in s ta n c e s ,  D . K . M au zy , „ T h e  h u m a n  r ig h ts  a n d  „ A s ia n  v a lu e s “  
d e b a te  in  S o u th e a s t A sia : try in g  to  c la r ify  th e  k ey  is su e s“ , in :  The Pacific Review, N o .2 , 199 7 , 
V o l.1 0 , p p . 2 1 0 -2 3 6 , p . 2 1 4 . I t  is  s u b m it te d  th a t  n o n e  o f  th e  W e s te rn  c o u n tr ie s  w o u ld  th e n  b e  
re a d y  to  re s to re  o rd e r  a n d  p e a c e  in  C h in a  o r  a n y  o th e r  c o u n try .
186 G . L u o ji (n o te  1 76), p . 6.
187 F o r  th is  n e w  m o v e m e n t to w a rd s  c u ltu ra l  r e la tiv ism  see a ls o  A  F. B ay efsk y , „ C u ltu ra l  
S o v e re ig n ty , R e la tiv ism , a n d  In te rn a t io n a l  H u m a n  R ig h ts : N e w  E x c u se s  fo r O ld  S tra te g ie s“ , in : 
Ratio Juris, N o . l ,  1996, V o l. 9 , p p . 4 2 -5 9 , p . 43.
188 K . M ills , „ R e c o n s tru c tin g  S o v e re ig n ty : A  H u m a n  R ig h ts  P e rs p e c tiv e “ , in : NQHR, N o .3 , 1997 , 
V o l. 15, pp . 2 6 7 -2 9 0 , p . 2 6 9 .
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2. Implications of the current Chinese Government’s position in human rights
a. Universality versus relativity 
aa. The state of affairs
The idea o f human rights is based on the concept of universality which underlies all 
international human rights documents and represents the foundation of an international 
engagement in human rights vis-a-vis target states. Universality means that the rights 
should be enjoyed by all „without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status“ (Art. 2 of the UDHR). The Asian countries, on the other hand, rely on 
cultural relativist claims which submit, with variations, that the international norms are 
not o f universal validity and that there is no uniform interpretation of them. Human 
rights can differ from one state to another depending on a state’s values and cultural 
and religious tradition.1*9 The cause o f all disagreement about human rights and their 
nature is not that the community o f states cannot find a common interpretation, but 
that the concept of human rights addresses the individual, but, on the same time, 
impacts on the political system of the state. The distribution o f power and its limits, as 
well as the relations from state to society are directly affected by human rights law.189 90 
Additionally, the character of international human rights law displays the paradox that 
the initial actors are still states, even if individuals are empowered by the laws. Without 
the consent of the nation state as to the ratification of the treaty or as to supervision by 
the Treaty body, the citizen cannot invoke the norms in front of the international
189 A  u se fu l o v e rv ie w  o f  th e  l i te r a tu re  c a n  b e  fo u n d  in  A  D . R e n te ln ,  International Human Rights:
Universalism versus Relativism, S a g e , N e w b u ry  P a rk  1990 .
D. K. Mauzy (note 185), p. 210.190
I
authority. If international human rights norms are not transformed into national law, 
then the individual cannot even invoke them before national courts.191
bb. Are there Asian values?
According to the above mentioned cultural relativist, human rights differ from one 
state to another because the value-systems are different. Two different versions of 
relativism can be discerned: one position, the „strong relativist“ position, sees values to 
be so different that there can be no universal rights. Human rights are simply not 
applicable to Asian societies, which have a different perception of the concept and 
nature of human rights. A second position, is the „softer“ version which states that 
human rights are universal by nature, but different value systems influence the 
interpretation and implementation o f human rights in a given country. Human rights 
should be promoted everywhere, but they cannot be fostered in the same way as there 
are objective conditions to be met first. „We also have the right to XYZ, but in a 
different way.“ It lies within the competence o f the state to decide how the human 
dignity is guaranteed in its country. The crucial question for the international lawyer in 
this case is whether the substance o f the right is still maintained.
The question o f values will be dealt with only superficially, as Confucian values were 
already described above and a comprehensive overview would go beyond the scope of 
the paper. Asian and Chinese values are, despite all attempts to find commonalties 
(cross-cultural attempts), different to Western values192 and will not become the same 
in the near future, In the Asian countries, for example, the individual does not enjoy 
the same standing as in Western societies. Individuals have to serve the interests o f the
191 I n  G e rm a n y , th is  tr a n s fo rm a tio n  ta k e s  p la c e  u n d e r  A rt. 59  II  o f  th e  c o n s titu tio n . T h e  re le v a n t
in te rn a t io n a l  a c t  h a s  to  b e  c o n firm e d  a n d  ra t if ie d  b y  th e  P a r l ia m e n t
a t  le a s t  f o r  th e  e d u ca te d  i n  A s ia , D . K . M a u z y  (n o te  1 8 5 ), p . 2 1 7 .192
*****
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community (communitarianism) or often of the state193 and are unable to pursue their 
own aims first and foremost. Personal freedom is not regarded an important value in 
Asian societies.194 The ideal society is one o f moderation and equilibrium. The 
perceived Western, especially American, decay o f society (crime, divorces) is objected 
to and feared.195 Last, but not least, the Asian way is to reach consensus through 
consultation and not confrontation. This value, which is fundamental to Confucian 
thought, concurs perfectly with China’s and other Asian countries’ claims that aid and 
trade should not be linked to human rights, nor conditionality imposed on the third 
world countries,196 nor Asian countries condemned in international fora, but co­
operation be favoured.
cc. Are hum an rights universal?
The attempts to find a basis for the universal respect o f human rights is almost as old 
as the human rights movement itself, but has been subject to challenge from many 
sides.197 Parallel to the legal arguments, therefore, a philosophical discussion as to the 
moral foundation of human rights has developed. Whether such a universal nature is 
drawn from human dignity198, the concept of natural rights and self-evidence, the
193 T h e  s ta te  is  n o t  s e e n  th e  a d v e rs a ry  a g a in s t  w h o m  lib e r tie s  h a v e  to  b e  d e fen d ed , ib id ., p . 2 1 8 ; 
Y a s h  G h a i, „ H u m a n  R ig h ts  a n d  G o v e rn a n c e ; T h e  A s ia  D e b a te “ , in :  Australian Yearbook o f  
International Law, 1994, V o l.1 5 , p p . 1 -3 4 , p . 17.
194 A . S e n  (n o te  11), p . 33.
195 D . K . M a u z y  (n o te  185), p . 2 1 2 ; Y . F u n a b a s h i ,  M . O k se n b e rg , H . W e is s  (n o te  1 6 3 ), p. 83.
196 S ta te m e n t b y  In d o n e s ia n  F o re ig n  M in is te r  A la ta s  a t  V ie n n a , 1 4 .6 .1 9 9 3  a s  c ite d  b y  P. v a n  D ijk  
(n o te  105), p . 105: „ H u m a n  r ig h ts  a r e  v i ta l  a n d  im p o r ta n t b y  a n d  f o r  th e m se lv e s . S o  a re  e ffo r ts  a t  
a c c e le ra te d  n a tio n a l d e v e lo p m en t, e sp e c ia lly  o f  th e  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s . B o th  sh o u ld  b e  
v ig o ro u s ly  p u rs u e d  a n d  p ro m o te d . In d o n e s ia , th e re fo re , c a n n o t  a c c e p t l in k in g  q u e s tio n s  o f  
h u m a n  r ig h ts  to  ec o n o m ic  a n d  d e v e lo p m e n t c o o p e ra t io n , b y  a tta c h in g  h u m a n  r ig h ts  
im p le m e n ta t io n  a s  p o litic a l c o n d it io n a l it ie s  to  su ch  c o o p e ra tio n . S u c h  a  lin k a g e  w il l  o n ly  d e tr a tc t  
f ro m  th e  v a lu e  o f  b o th ,“
197 Y a s h  G h a i (n o te  193), p . 2.
198 J. M a r ita in , The Rights o f  Man, G . B le s , L o n d o n  1 9 4 4 , p. 3 7 : „ T h e  h u m a n  p e rso n  p o sse sse s  
r ig h ts  b e c a u se  o f  th e  v e ry  fa c t th a t  i t  is  a  p e rso n , a  w h o le , m a s te r  o f  i t s e l f  a n d  o f  its  a c ts , a n d  
w h ic h  c o n se q u e n tly  is  n o t m e re ly  a  m e a n s  to  a n  end , b u t  a n  e n d , a n  e n d  w h ic h  m u s t be  t r e a te d  as
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principle of equality, morality or human worth, cultural relativists will always find an 
argument to counter these assumptions as they are all closely related to culture and 
society. From their point o f view human rights are a Western (even hegemonic) 
concept that endangers different political systems, cultures, values and forms of 
governance.* 199 The task for an international lawyer is, in full conscience of the debate 
about the philosophical foundation for the human rights’ movement, to built upon the 
feebleness of the existing legal arguments and develop them further or even develop 
new concepts that can support the notion of universality.
How can human rights’ norms be o f universal validity? This is the case in international 
law if they are part o f the jus cogens. Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
the Treaties defines such a norm as a norm „accepted and recognized by the 
international community o f States as a whole, as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by subsequent norms of general international 
law having the same character.“ Are international human rights norms accepted and 
recognized by the international community as a whole and accepted as norms from 
which no derogation is permitted? Some might be.200 According to Bilahari 
Kausikaan201 this hard core of rights might even be smaller than the West assumed at 
Vienna. One only has to look to China in order to see that much derogation is allowed 
in order to protect the state’s and nation’s interest. All o f a sudden the right to life of 
the citizens does not count any more (Mao’s Great Leap Forward, Tiananmen or 
family planing policy) or the freedom of expression is restricted as soon as the
s u c h . T h e  d ig n i ty  o f  th e  h u m a n  p e r s o n ?  T h e  e x p re s s io n  m e a n s  n o th in g  i f  i t  d o e s  n o t  s ig n ify  
th a t ,  b y  v ir tu e  o f  n a tu ra l la w , th e  h u m a n  p e rso n  h a s  th e  r ig h t  to  b e  re sp ec ted , i s  th e  su b je c t o f  
r ig h ts ,  p o s s e s se s  r ig h ts . T h e s e  a re  th in g s  w h ic h  a re  o w e d  to  m a n  b e c a u se  o f  th e  v e ry  fa c t th a t  h e  
is  a  m a n .“
199 A . S e n  (n o te  11), p . 39 , h e  c o n te n d s  t h a t  th i s  lin k a g e  „ th o u g h  q u ite  a rtif ic ia l, c a n  b e  r e th o r ic a lly  
q u ite  e ffe c tiv e “ .
200 D . K . M a u z y  (n o te  1S5), p . 2 2 6 , s h e  c ite s : o p p o s itio n  to  tra d e  i n  s la v e s , p iracy , g en o c id e , c r im e s  
a g a in s t  h u m a n i ty ,  a n d  ra c ia l  d is c r im in a t io n  a g re e d  u p o n  a t  V ie n n a .
S tra its  T im e s , 5 .7 .1 9 9 3 .201
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„stability“ of the country is endangered. Does this imply that human rights norms 
cannot be universal?
The concept o f obligations erga omnes which includes the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, the prohibition of genocide and the principles and rules concerning the 
basic rights o f the human person, including slavery and racial discrimination202 does not 
lead much further than the notion o f  jus cogens, because only a few („basic“) human 
rights are said to belong to this category by the Court. Nevertheless the Court’s 
judgment can be interpreted in a way that establishes the principle that (all) human 
rights form a separate category o f international law, a category that does not rely on 
reciprocity.203 This would mean that human rights represent a distinct feature of 
international law, their characteristic being that they are universal in nature.204 
Different cultures might more easily accept that human rights acquire a distinct place in 
international law, than that they, as a consequence and a matter of fact, are universal. 
Moreover, dispute is likely to arise about the rights covered by the concept o f the 
obligations erga omnes.
This section is not going to detail further legal arguments for the universal nature205 of 
human rights, nor for the possible right o f states206 to act in defence of human rights in
202 ICJ, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase Judgement, ICJ 
Reports 1970, pp. 3, p. 32.
203 P. van Dijk (note 105), p. 108; R. Bernhardt, „Thoughts on the interpretation of human rights 
treaties“, in: F. Matscher and H.PetzoId (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: The European 
Dimension. Studies in honour o f Gérard J. Wiarda, Heymann, Cologne et al. 1988, pp. 65-71, 
p. 65s with regard to human rights treaties, cited by P. van Dijk, see above, p. 108.
204 „If the norms referred to by the Court do involve universal obligations, then the norms 
themselves should also be of a universal character“, P. van Dijk (note 105), p. 108.
205 For example the „membership to an international constitutional order“ as submitted by P. van 
Dijk, ibid., p. 107, According to him, the mere membership in the international community of 
states has the corollary of binding force of the constitutional law of this community. This higher 
law consists of fundamental norms established within that community without the necessity to 
have agreed to that particular norm; Another possibility would be to rely on the treaties in the 
field of human rights and to take the successive codification of human rights norms as an 
indicator of their universality, with the serious lack of comprehensiveness as regards the number 
of states, see also B. Simma, P. Alston, „The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles“, in: Australian Yearbook of International Law, 1992, Vol.12,
pp. 82-108, p. 87; Finally, the UDHR in its complexity could be taken as customary law or
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a third country, but will turn to the practical discussions that took place at Vienna in
1993. This concords with Jack Donnelly’s view that it is better to refer to the general 
acceptance207 o f human rights as documented in the UDHR, in the world-wide 
ratification of most o f the international human rights agreements, and in the affirmation 
of this acceptance at different conferences,208 instead o f searching for a coherent 
philosophical or legal base. A clear legal or normative base to universality which is 
accepted and supported by all nations will probably never evolve as long as the world 
consists o f different nations living in different political systems and as long as the 
international system is made up o f states with no authority to impose actions or 
legislate.
dd. Vienna - The end of the debate?
The final document o f the Vienna Conference on Human Rights proclaimed that the 
universal nature o f human rights is „beyond question“.209 Did this end the ongoing 
conflict between mostly developing countries, China especially, and the Western world *206789
statement of general principles, both being sources of international law according to Art. 38 of 
the Statue of the ICJ, O. Schachter, „International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course 
in Public International Law“, in: 178 Recueil des cours 21, 1982-V, pp. 333-342, p. 334s 
proposes several kinds of evidence in the context of customary law formation; B. Simma, P. 
Alston, see above, furthermore discuss general principles as sources of human rights law.
206 This discussion is of course closely related the the sources of human rights and the legal 
foundations for universality. Once a universal legal foundation has been found, all states are 
obliged to respect human rights. To what extent third states can deduct a right to act from this 
foundation is, of course, another question. Only if the legal foundation implies a duty „erga 
omnes“, then the obligation of the accused state has the corresponding right of the accusing 
state. Such a justification (erga omnes) could be found in customary law, in the general 
principles or by invoking Art. 55, 56 of the UN-Charter. It is widely accepted that a droit de 
regard exists as regards international fora and that severe human rights violations can be taken 
up in bilateral relations without encroaching upon the domaine reservde.
207 J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
1989, p. 2.
208 see also P. Baehr, „The Universality of Human Rights“, in: P. R. Baehr, F. van Hoof, L. Nanlei, 
T. Zhenghua (eds.) (note 154), pp. 25-43, p. 33.
209 UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23, 12.7.1993, par. 1.
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as to the applicability and interpretation o f human rights? It might not have delivered 
the desired result o f a mutual understanding. What it affirmed, in line with the previous 
Bangkok Declaration210 and its „sister declaration“ of Asian NGOs (Bangkok NGO 
Declaration)211, was the acceptance (in formulation) that the nature of human rights is 
universal. However, the final document of Vienna could not prevent the Bangkok 
Declaration from influencing the wording of paragraph 5 in the sense that national 
particularities have to be taken into account.212 The final document with its paragraphs 
1 and 5, in the first place, seems to be a great achievement in terms of the acceptance 
of the universal nature of human rights. It appears as if the afore-mentioned „strong 
relativist“ has been defeated and left the floor to the „soft“ relativist. But does this 
concession really help if the some parts o f paragraph 5 take away all its force and 
innovation? The reference to national particularities not only gives rise to a different 
interpretation o f universality, but questions the idea of universality as such. While the 
Asian countries affirmed the different circumstances in which rights are being 
respected, they are likely to reduce universality to a mere formal commitment without 
substantive content. This is where interpretation and nature meet: an interpretation 
must never reduce the core o f a human right below a certain limit. This opinion does 
not allege that human rights are the same everywhere and for everybody, but simply
210 Bangkok Declaration, 1993, adopted at the United Nation’s Asia Regional Meeting on Human 
Rights in Bangkok on 29.3.-2.4.93.
211 The Bangkok NGO declaration differs in interesting points from the ASEAN governments 
attitude. It put more emphasis on the universality of human rights, although it still leaves room 
for cultural influences as long as they do not derogate from the universally accepted norms. 
Nevertheless, not all of the Western values are accepted as being applicable to the Asian 
countries. However, not all o f the local NGOs support the Western approach, but criticize it 
heavily as being hegemony, D. K. Mauzy (note 185), p. 222.
212 „All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-related. (...) White the 
significance o f  national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless o f their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms“ 
(emphasis added), UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23,12.7.1993, par. 5.
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that no political, economic and cultural system is allowed to deny them their universal 
nature.213
In the end, Vienna did not succeed in finding a consensus between Western and Asian 
countries on the issue o f universally applicable standards and there was no real 
exchange o f views between the developing and the developed world.214 The 
formulations chosen permit interpretation in either direction. Moreover, cultural 
relativists still claim that universality cannot convince because it relies on 
unchangeable, static rights instead o f accepting that rights can change as a result o f 
evolving values (human rights might be universal in nature, but have to be considered 
with the understanding that „norms and values change over time”, Bangkok 
Declaration).215 What it might have enhanced is a greater acceptance by the third world 
that there are, in general, some universal values, even though their codification might 
have arisen in the West.216
ee. Recent developments in China
China can rightfully be named as one o f the main proponents o f the Bangkok 
Declaration with its rejection of the universal applicability of human rights217 and a
213 P. Alston, „Importance of the Inter-Play between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
Civil and Political Rights", in: H u m a n  R ig h ts  a t the  D aw n  o f  the  21s t C en tu ry , Interregional 
meetings organized by the Council o f Europe in advance of the World Conference on Human 
Rights, 28.-30.1.93, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg 1993, pp. 59-74, p. 66s, he states that 
the non-negotiable nature o f human rights has been established in  international law and despite 
enormous room for debate about the best way o f implementing the objectives, it is to say that 
simply „the objectives themselves are not open to refutation on economic rationalist or other 
grounds".
214 D. K. Mauzy (note 185), p. 226, see also F. van Hoof, „Asian Challenges to the Concept of 
Universality: Afterthoughts on the Vienna Conference on Human Rights", in: P. R. Baehr, F. 
van Hoof, L. Nanlei, T. Zhenghua (eds.) (note 154), pp. 1-16.
215 D. K. Mauzy (note 185), p. 2 2 1 ,226s.
216 W. Bamds, „Asia: progress and problems", in: McColm, R. Bruce (eds.), F re ed om  in  th e  W o rld , 
Freedom House, New York 1992, pp. 29-31, p. 30.
M. Davis, „Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights", in: M. C. Davis (ed.) (note 18), pp. 3-24, 
p. 3.
217
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strong protagonist of cultural relativist claims in general (sovereignty, non­
interference, differing perceptions o f human rights, different value system). However, 
the idea that human rights are o f a universal nature seems to persist and grow in 
official Chinese positions. In November 1996 the Chinese spokesman at the Third 
Committee o f the General Assembly (51st session) praised the achievements of 
international instruments for the protection of human rights.21* China was said to be 
willing to contribute to this process, to be a signatory of 15 international human rights 
conventions, among them four of the main ones (racial discrimination, torture, rights of 
the child, women) and to act in accordance with the Treaty obligations in sending the 
required reports to the respective Treaty body.218 19 Recently, it has even signed the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and announced to 
sign the Covenant on Civil and Political rights.220 Taking these formal standards 
together, China is on its way to a comprehensive human rights commitment, 
international claims can in the future be based on treaty law, and criticism should take 
into account that China has signed more conventions in the field of human rights than 
the US. China’s statement at the Vienna Conference: „Thus one should and cannot 
think the human rights standard and model of certain countries as the only proper ones 
and demand all others to comply with them“, which denied human rights their 
universality,221 seems to have yielded to a „softer version“. The ongoing debate thus 
centers around the „right“ interpretation of human rights222 and no longer questions the
218 Statement by Mr. W. M in (note 149), p. 1.
219 ibid., p. 3s.
220 European report, No.2294,25.2.1998, p. V -l; European report, No.2300, 18.3.1998, p. V-7.
221 F. van Hoof, „Asian Challenges to the Concept of Universality: Afterthoughts on the Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights“, in: P. R. Baehr, F. van Hoof, L. Nanlei, T. Zhenghua (eds.) (note 
154), pp. 1-16, p. 5.
222 D. Ayton-Shenker, „The Challenge o f Human Rights and Cultural Diversity“, United Nations 
background note, http://www.org/rights.dpil627e.htm, p. 3. She sees human rights as a  legal 
minimum standard of protection which is necessary to guarantee human dignity. In no ways does 
this mean that states do not have room for cultural variation.
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objective of universal human rights as such. Nor does China see the concept of human 
rights as „a slogan o f the bourgeoisie“ anymore.223 All in all, a significant improvement 
can be observed even though China still regards outside criticism of its human rights 
record in form o f  resolutions (for example: UN Commission) or bilateral action 
unacceptable. China believes that it is the States parties to the international treaties 
which implement the conventions and not the Treaty bodies224 or other countries. For 
example, in 1997, it reacted very furiously at a resolution of the European Parliament 
that had criticized its worsening human rights record and had urged for the 
maintenance o f  the arms embargo in force since 1989. Such a move is seen as a gross 
interference in China’s internal affairs.225
After having examined the features o f the relativist-universalist debate, states or the 
Union might now refer to the legal positivist Bobbio226 and say that „the substantial 
problem is not so much that of justifying them (human rights) but that o f protecting 
them. It is not a philosophical problem, but a political one.“ For our purposes, human 
rights might be seen „not as a legal, but a political problem“. This is not meant to drive 
us away from the legal framework, but to say that the implementation of the legal 
framework is subject to political forces. It is thus a political decision to have an active 
human rights policy whether or not this always has a firm legal basis in international 
law. This paper will later investigate to what extent the EU turns words into deeds and 
acts on behalf o f human rights (Chapter 3), but will first continue the analysis o f the 
Chinese position.
223 Xia Yong, „Human Rights and Chinese Tradition“, in: P. R. Baehr, F. van Hoof, L. Nanlei, T. 
Zhenghua (eds.) (note 154), pp. 77-90, p. 77.
224 Statement by Mr. W. Min (note 149), p. 2.
225 European Report No. 2233, 19.6.97, p. V-3.
N. Bobbio, „Sul fondamento dei diritti dell’uomo“, in: R e v is ta  in te m a z io n a le  d i f i lo s o f ia  d e l 
d ir i t to ,  1965, pp. 302-309, p. 309.
226
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b. Economic, social and cultural rights
In China, the basic needs of the population as expressed in economic and social rights 
gain priority over the realization o f civil and political rights. For instance, the Chinese 
spokesman stated at Vienna that: „When poverty and lack o f adequate food and 
clothing are commonplace and people’s basic needs are not guaranteed, priority should 
be given to economic development“227 (which is an objective condition for the 
protection of human rights, see above). This Chinese view fits into the broader 
framework o f an Asian conception o f human rights. Governments are „compelled“ by 
mass poverty and absolute deprivation in parts of Asia to focus first and foremost on 
the transformation o f the society in the economic field.228 The Bangkok Declaration 
states that economic and social progress facilitates the growth of democracy and 
human rights.229 In this context, a comparison can be drawn to the strategy o f Deng 
Xiaoping in 1977-1979 in order to lead China out o f its crisis: first came the open-door 
policy; second, economic reform; and third, confirmation o f the power o f the 
Communist Party. Economic reforms were conceived to come first and political 
reforms second,230 if ever. The Marxist view was that the „bourgeois“ civil and 
political rights manifest and lead to social and economic inequality, whereas the „true“
227 At the Vienna Conference in  1993, as cited by P, van Dijk (note 105), p. 118; in its 1994 Report 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs o f the European Parliament deplores that China is still 
equating hum an rights solely with economic and social rights, Report of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Security on relations between the European Union and the People’s Republic 
of China, Rapporteur Miss M aria Adelaide Aglietta, A3-0011/94,7.1.94, p. 11.
228 Ch. Muzaffar, „EU-policy: a perspective from Asia“, in: European Parliament, S um m a ry  re c o rd  
o f  p re s e n ta tio n s  m ade a t the  p u b lic  h e a r in g  on the  H u m a n  R ig h ts  C lause , Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, Sub-committee on Human Rights, Committee on External 
Economic Relations, 1995, pp. 66-75, p. 68; In 1998, China blamed the UN Commission of 
putting too much emphasis on civil and political rights, instead o f economic, social and cultural 
rights and the right to development, M2 PRESSWIRE, 14.4.98, „UN Commission on Human 
Rights continues debate on promotion o f human rights and advisory services“.
229 Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 31, he discusses the arguments of the „supporters o f the market“ and 
backs them with the historical case in the West, where democracy followed the rise o f the 
market. However, there are other solutions equally valid (see Chapter 4).
230 H. Weiss, „Zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Kommunismus. Moeglichkeiten und Grenzen 
chinesischer Reform“, in: In te rn a t io n a le  P o li t ik ,  No.6, 1997, Vol.52, pp. 48-52, p. 49.
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rights derive from state-ownership of the means o f production and their equal 
distribution.231 The possibility o f achieving both at the same time, as prescribed by the 
principle of indivisibility, is not taken into account by Chinese official voices, neither is 
the idea that the two sets o f rights could be mutually reinforcing. In further defending 
their claim, Asian governments often state that civil and political rights are simply not 
applicable to the Asian societies, because Asian values do not protect freedom as much 
as in Western societies, but regard order and discipline as more important.232 Due to 
the different value systems o f Western and Asian countries, agreement over the respect 
and promotion o f civil and political rights is difficult to reach. Thus, the denial o f the 
equal importance of civil and political rights in China is closely related to the debate 
about the universality o f human rights. Finally, the authoritarian system with its 
suppression o f civil and political rights is often taken as an explanation for the 
substantive economic successes in at least South-East Asia.233
c. „Chinese people can enjoy hum an rights“
In response to the 1996 US State Department annual human rights report on China’s 
poor human rights record, Beijing issued a condemnatory response and firmly opposed 
any actions taken on the basis of that report by stating that they would „interfere with 
another country’s internal affairs“ on the pretence of protecting human rights.234 „The 
US... should make greater efforts to improve its domestic human rights conditions,“
231 A. Kent (note 10), p. 11.
232 A. Sen (note 11), p. 33.
233 ibid., p. 33; Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 12s, he sees the second reason for the relevant economic 
success o f some Asian countries in the family networks combined with authoritarian rules; H. 
Weiss (note 230) questions whether the economic successes in China would have been possible 
with a parallel opening of the political sphere and cites Russia's development as an antithesis.
234 Institute o f Current China Studies, „The CCP’s Human Rights Standards“, Inside China 
Mainland, No.5, May 1996, Vol.18, Taipei, Taiwan R.O.C., p. 24.
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the official Xinhua news agency said.235 Shen Guofang, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Spokesmen, explained that external worry was not necessary as the laws and the 
Constitution o f  China fully respect and protect the rights o f the Chinese citizens. He 
even declared that Chinese people are enjoying an unprecedented level of democratic
rights.236
China has had four constitutions, the last one drawn up in 1982 is currently in force. 
All of them reflect the political developments, especially the Constitution drawn up 
during the Cultural Revolution (of 1975) which consisted of only 30 articles and was a 
sharp reflection o f the state of „no law, no heaven“. Even if three years later a new 
constitution was enacted, and the number o f articles doubled, the spirit did not change 
until the current 1982 Constitution.237 This one proclaims the Four General Principles, 
already mentioned in the context o f the Chinese understanding of human rights238, as 
the guiding ideology. The Constitution contains provisions relating to both sets of 
rights. The peoples’ rights as regards political participation and socialist democracy are 
stated in article 12 of the Constitution and people’s duties and rights are further spelled 
out in Chapter 2, articles 33-56 o f the Constitution. They include equality before the 
law, political rights and freedom o f  expression and religious belief, freedom o f the 
person and a number of economic and social rights239, as well as the basic duties o f the 
people (Art. 51-56, as well as Art. 24). What is interesting in the context o f the
235 The Reuter European Community Report, 11.3.96, BC cycle, „China dismisses EU, US human 
rights criticism“: The US report said China had stepped up repression and by year's end „almost 
all public dissent against the central authorities was silenced by intimidation, exile or imposition 
of prison term s or administrative detention.“ The report said China held perhaps thousands of 
political prisoners and still had not provided a hill accounting for all those missing from the 
1989 military crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square. Beijing denies this.
236 Institute o f  Current China Studies, „The CCP’s Human Rights Standards“, Inside China 
Mainland, No.5, May 1996, Vol.18, Taipei, Taiwan R.O.C., p. 24.
237 Z. Guobin, „Constitutional Law“, in: Chenguang, W.; Xianchu, Z .  (eds.) (note 21), pp. 31-74, 
p. 34.
238 see note 175.
239 right to work, to rest, to social help and insurance, the right to get material help from the state, 
the freedom to education in  the fields o f sciences and culture.
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people’s duties is that the Constitution foresees in the preamble that „The people of all 
nationalities, all State organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public 
organizations and all enterprises and institutions in the country must take the 
Constitution as the basic standard of conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the 
dignity of the Constitution and ensure its implementation“ (emphasis added). It implies 
that in interpreting the Constitution, the notion of duty prevails. According to Zhu 
Guobin240 „almost all Chinese constitutional law scholars agree that the 1982 
Constitution is the ‘best* among the four constitutions in PRC history in terms of its 
content and forms“. It has been amended twice in 1988 and 1993 to take account of 
the economic development and opening-up which had touched political fields as well. 
Private economy and the property o f land were subject of the first amendment, 
whereas the second one introduced even bigger changes to the socialist market 
economy.241 Moreover, China has undergone significant changes as regards the 
domestic law in the field of human rights protection. In this regard it has formulated a 
new Prison Law, the Judges Law, the Law of the Protection o f Minors and the Law on 
the protection o f Women’s Rights and interests, and in 1996 amendments to the 
Criminal Law have been accepted. Altogether, it forms a big step forward in the 
promotion and protection o f human rights.242
Judicial organs in China (courts, procuratorates and public security organs) transform 
the citizen’s legal rights into actual rights.243 The public security organs are a branch in 
the administrative system, the other two are created by the people’s congresses. Out of
240 Z. Guobin, „Constitutional Law**, in: Chenguang, W.; Xianchu, Z. (eds.) (note 21), pp. 31-74, 
p. 35.
241 ibid., p. 36, according to him, bigger, radical changes are not possible within the current 
framework.
242 Statement by Mr. W. Min (note 149), p. 3.
243 Han Yanlong, .Legal Protection of Human Rights in China“, in: P. R, Baehr, F. van Hoof, L. 
Nanlei, T. Zhenghua (eds.) (note 154), pp. 91-102, p. 99; Z. Guobin, „Constitutional Law“, in: 
Chenguang, W.; Xianchu, Z. (eds.) (note 21), pp. 31-74, p. 58.
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these two, the courts exercise exclusive state adjudicatory power, whereas the 
procuratorates are responsible for legal supervision on behalf o f the state.244 The court 
system spreads over two instances with the Supreme People’s Court at the top.245 A 
citizen, determined that some of his rights have been violated, can file complaints to 
these organs with the possibility o f appeal. Moreover, the courts have to respect the 
constitutional principles such as equality before the law, independence, open trials, 
presumption o f  innocence.246 China has also made efforts to develop its judicial system 
by promulgating the Administrative Procedure Law o f the PRC in October 1990. 
Besides this formal way o f pursuing one’s rights, there are further non-judicial methods 
of human rights protection.247 According to the official view, Chinese people therefore 
can enjoy their rights (be they human rights in the socialist sense or legal rights o f laws 
and Constitution), but they „simply do not desire to exercise them“.
d. „In China, after all, there are no human rights violations“
This attitude is documented in the 1991 White paper and goes as far as alleging that 
there are no political prisoners in China and that all trials are public.248 Moreover, the 
paper states, the proper treatment o f prisoners is guaranteed by law and respected by 
prison personnel. Shen Guofang, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesmen, not only 
declared that the people are enjoying an unprecedented level of democratic rights, but 
stressed also that China’s political situation is stable, the economy develops steadily,
244 Chenguang, W., „Introduction: An Emerging Legal System“, in: Chenguang, W., Xianchu, Z. 
(eds.) (note 21), pp. 1-30, p. 23.
245 ibid., p. 23.
246 Z. Guobin, „Constitutional Law“, in: Chenguang, W.; Xianchu, Z. (eds.) (note 21), pp. 31-74, 
p. 59.
247 Han Yanlong, „Legal Protection o f Human Rights in  China“, in: P. R. Baehr, F. van Hoof, L.
Nanlei, T. Zhenghua (eds.) (note 154), pp. 91-102, p. 99s.
Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (note 227), p. llss .248
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civil society is formed, the different nationalities living together are progressively 
united and the people are secure.249
Summing up the Chinese arguments, the conclusion could arguably be that China does 
not need any „lecture“ from outside how to treat its own citizens. The socialist system 
in itself provides for an excellent level of protection of the people's rights as the ruling 
class is the working class. The socialist understanding of human rights gives the 
citizens adequate protection and its focus on economic and social rights does not mean 
it does not respect human rights. All in all, the human rights record of China is not bad 
and people do not complain about it. However, in Chapter 4 this conclusion will be 
scrutinized.
249 Institute o f Current China Studies, „The CCP’s Human Rights Standards“, Inside China 
Mainland, No.5, May 1996, Vol.18, Taipei, Taiwan R.O.C., p. 24.
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C hapter 3: Implementation
After the previous analysis o f the EU and China, this Chapter investigates the practice 
of the EU in the CFSP. By looking at the use o f the instruments it implicitely asks the 
question whether the EU has been able to assert its identity on the international scene 
(Art. B TEU) and prepares the discussion o f Chapter 4 as to whether the EU 
effectively transformed its China strategy into practice.250 251While examining the use of 
instruments towards China, much devotion will be given to the performance of the EU 
at the UN Commission in Geneva. As a preliminary question to this analysis, a look 
will be taken at the existing obligations in the CFSP for common action.
I. Existing obligations
I. Obligations for the M ember States to act coherently
The Member States co-operate in a „systematic“ way (Article J.l.III first indent TEU) 
by co-ordinating the preparatory foreign policy process, conforming the national 
policies to the common positions and maintaining them in international fora, Article
J. 2.I, II, III, J.5 IV, J.6 TEU, and they implement common actions, Art. J .l. Ill 
second indent, J.3 No.4, J.5 IV, J.6 TEU. These articles are complemented by the 
general duty o f co-operation in Art. J .l. IV231 and apply to international fora as well as 
to autonomous action. The commitment to common objectives of the foreign policy as 
mentioned in Art. J.l.II TEU, compared with the language of the EPC, displays a 
certain increase in determination. Nevertheless, the general aim o f working together in 
specific fields o f foreign policy remained a political obligation and the areas in which 
joint measures are taken is subject to the political will o f the Member States. As long 2501
250 By tailoring the instruments at hand to this specific country (see introduction).
251 „The Member States support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly 
in a  spirit o f loyalty and mutual solidarity“.
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as there is no common analysis and definition of common interests, it will be difficult to 
fine-tune the different interests o f the Member States and to arrive at a „Union 
interest“.252 25346With Amsterdam, a new ‘Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit’ has 
been created in attaching it to the treaty in a protocol. Its task is to strive for coherence 
and consistency o f CFSP action and to prepare policy options for the Council; it is 
located in the Council Secretariat under the responsibility of the High 
Representative.233
Moving away from the general aim o f working together and defining areas for action, 
the instruments to follow a common line and pursue the thus defined objectives, i.e. 
common positions and joint actions, are not only politically, but also legally binding 
upon the Member States, They are designed to extend beyond mere ‘declarations of 
intent* in contrast to the provisions of the EPC in the framework of the SEA.234 The 
latter were o f a political nature even though they were included in an international 
treaty among states.235 Among the two instruments, joint actions require a higher 
commitment than common positions,236 given that heterogeneous action would 
counteract the aim and credibility o f a joint action completely. This intention was 
expressed by stating that jo in t actions shall commit the Member States in the positions 25346
252 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, „Die Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europaeischen 
Union - Rechtliche Struktur und politischer Prozess“, in: Europarecht, No. 1/2, 1995, Vol.30, pp. 
1-20, p. 7.
253 European Policy Centre, „Legal Analysis“ (note 55), p. 113; T. Dodd; R. Ware; A  Weston (note 
31), p. 30s.
254 P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des 
lieux“, in: A. Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 280, the EPC as a „point de référence“; G. 
Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), Ait. 
J.3, No. 16.
255 The legal nature (Rechtsnatur) of a provision does apparently not determine their legal effect 
(Rechtswirkungen) in public international law. Member States can decide whether, in a treaty, 
they want to enter into legally binding or only politically binding obligations. The rationale 
behind is it that international law has to be interpreted according to the will of the states and is 
thus determined by it.
256 N. Petersen, „The European Union and Foreign and Security Policy“, in: Ole Noergaard, 
Thomas Pedersen, N. Petersen (ed.), The European Community in World Politics, Pinter, 
London 1993, pp. 9-30, p. 20.

they adopt and in the conduct o f their activity“, whereas common positions oblige the 
Member States only to ensure conformity. Because of this vague formulation, it has 
been contested whether common positions imply a legal obligation. Their use and 
treatment has however shown that they are respected by the Member States as legally 
binding.237 If deviations nevertheless occur, Art. J.l.IV  TEU forms the ultimate limit 
for divergent Member States action, but given the lack o f a judicial control by the 
Court o f Justice further discussion as to the binding nature remains purely academic238 
and an introduction of a legal control in form o f a „communitarisation“ o f the CFSP 
was rejected at Maastricht with the establishment of the pillar structure, which was 
affirmed at Amsterdam.259 Thus control o f Member States’ action lies with the Council 
and is o f a political nature only. The divergent interests o f  the Member States often 
prevail and counteract common action what makes the Council’s task a difficult one. 
Additionally, lone action by a Member State is not legally affected by a contrary CFSP 
decision, but remains valid (for example a treaty o f one Member State with a third 
state).260 And finally, legal effects on third persons as foreseen by the Community
257 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D, Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), 
Art. J.2, No.7; I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett (note 52), p. 417, 418 talk about ‘express 
obligation’ and ‘commitment’.
254 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), 
Art. J.2, No.7; In theoretical terms and because of the missing judicial control, the Member 
States could invoke norms of the CFSP in front of the ICJ. A provision similar to Art. 219 TEC 
does not exist in the second pillar, P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère 
et de sécurité commune: état des lieux“, in: A Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 272.
The exclusion of control by the Court is also the explanation that many authors talk about the 
politically binding character of the CFSP provisions, pointing at their distinctiveness from 
Community law. They disregard, however, that a legally binding provision can exist in 
international law just because this will has been expressed in a treaty and judicial control is not 
derisive. As an example see P. de Schoutheete de Tervarent, L’introduction d’une Politique 
Extérieure et de Sécurité commune. Motivations et Résultats, in: J. Monar (ed.) (note 48), 
pp. 129-132, p. 131 who talks about the political obligation.
259 For the intergovernmental conference, A  A Dashwood, „Position Paper“, in: A A. Dashwood 
(ed.) (note 31), p. 218; T. Dodd; R. Ware; A Weston (note 31), p. 24. The pillar structure has 
remained unchanged.
260 I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett (note 52), p. 417; P.-Ch. Mueller-Graff, „EPZ/GASP im 
System der Europaeischen Union - Kohaerenzgebot aus rechtlicher Sicht“, in: E. Regelsberger 
(ed.) (note 47), pp. 53*68, p. 67s;

instruments (directives and regulations, Art. 189 TEC)* 261 and the principle of the pre­
eminence of the Community legal order do not apply in the field of the CFSP. In sum, 
the CFSP is an intergovernmental procedure which remains in the field o f traditional 
international law. It also has not become -yet- a third variant between community law 
and international law called „union law“.262
Despite the trend of the Member States to diverge, the force o f ‘ideas* should not be 
underestimated. Away from the (legal) discussion about the degree of obligation, 
commitments o f an international treaty, be they legal or political, are open to other 
influences, including moral ones. The human rights idea, for example, whilst not 
always prevailing, can give impetus to the process and have a uniting force among the 
different political perceptions of the Member States.263 Moreover, the political 
commitment o f the Member States raises the threshold for lone effort in the field o f the 
foreign policy.264
Legal effect, in its turn, can be divided into two parts which are the binding effect of the 
members of the community and, second, the legal effect as to the invalidity of later contrary acts. 
It has to be remembered that the place of international law in the hierachy of norms is below 
Constitutional national law, and sometimes even below or on the same level with state law.
261 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D, Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), 
Vorb. zu Art. J.l.-J.ll, No.25,
262 ibid., Vorb. zu Art. J.l.-J.ll, No.24.
263 see H. Wallace, „Politics and Policy in the EU: The Challenge of Governance“, in: Wallace, H.; 
Wallace, W. (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1996, pp. 3-36, p. 12s interplay of ideas, interests and institutions, p. 13 „where ideas and 
interests (we insist on both) are broadly congruent, that is to say shared across and within the 
member states, or complementary, that is mutually compatible and mutually reinforcing, there is 
a propensity to adopt collective policies and for the transnational arena to be accepted as the 
preferred form of governance“; p. 22 „ideas have played a very important part in defining the 
grounds for cooperation and for sustaining cooperation even when the direct consequences may 
be uncomfortable“; Funabashi, Y.; Oksenberg, M; Weiss, H. (note 163), p. 6 they discuss the 
common interests of the Member States with regard to China. Among their six categories figure 
human rights as included in the UDHR.
264 p Mueller-Graff, „EPZ/GASP im System der Europaeischen Union - Kohaerenzgebot aus 
rechtlicher Sicht“, in: E. Regelsberger (ed.) (note 47), pp. 53-68, p. 68.

74
2. Union obligation
The co-ordination of external policies is necessary due to the split of competences 
between the EC, the EU and the Member States in foreign policy. In order to reach a 
coherent external face of the Union, it can not be tolerated that the three actors 
express different, even contrary views. The answer to this problem is that the Union 
has been obliged in the Treaty to assure the consistency of all its external activities in 
the field of foreign policy as stated in Art. C II TEU.265 2678Art. C II TEU places the 
responsibility for this co-ordinating aim of the Union jointly on the Council and the 
Commission,. thus the Member States are (by this article) not obliged to act 
unilaterally.266 2678The Council is additionally in charge of ensuring the coherence o f the 
CFSP with Member States policies as stated in Art. J.8.II TEU, which confirms its role 
in assuring coherence in the CFSP besides being the decision-making organ.267 268
Already one year before the Treaty of Maastricht, agreement was found as to three 
institutional points which relate to the aim of coherence: one is that the distinction 
between the EPC Council meeting and the EC General Affairs Council meeting was no 
longer to be maintained, but one joint meeting was to be held instead. Even though the 
method of preparation remained different (COREPER, Art. 151 TEC and Political 
Committee, Art. J.8.V TEU), the agenda covered both EPC/CFSP and Community 
matters. Secondly, the EPC secretariat was merged with the Council secretariat and 
thirdly, it was already agreed that the Commission should have a non-exclusive right of 
initiative in the fields of the EPC.26*
265 With Amsterdam also reinforced by the wording (the Commission and the Council) „shall 
cooperate to this end“; Hilf/Pache, in: E. Grabitz (ed.) (note 28), Art. C, Nr. 13.
266 ibid., Art. C, Nr. 15
267 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), 
Art. J.8, No. 9.
268 S. J. Nuttall, „The Foreign and Security Policy Provisions of the Maastricht Treaty: Their 
Potential for the Future“, in: J. Monar (ed.) (note 48), pp. 133-138, p. 134.
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The Maastricht Treaty then clarified the hierarchy between the COREPER and the 
political committee in affirming the precedence o f the COREPER over the political 
committee as regards the preparation o f the work of the Council (Art. J.8.V TEU).269 
The exact division of labour between the different institutions has been elaborated in a 
Council decision according to declaration No.28 of the Maastricht Treaty final 
document in 1993.270 With regard to the two committees, it determined that the 
preparation o f  political issues would still take place in the political committee, but that 
its recommendations would not go directly to the Council, but to the COREPER first. 
The COREPER, though, has made limited use of its parallely established right to 
amend the proposals of the political committee.271 Secondly, Maastricht also brought 
another clarification: first pillar measures, especially trade measures, should support 
initiatives taken in the framework o f CFSP and back them up with the necessary 
coercion.272
Thus, the Member States and the Union are legally bound by the treaty to ensure the 
coherence o f the whole range o f the external activities o f the Union. The Member 
States have to ensure that their national foreign policies, which continue to co-exist 
with the common policy,273 conform with common action in the field o f the CFSP, and 
the Commission and the Council are jointly obliged to ensure the consistency o f the 
external face o f the Union as a whole (Art. C II TEU).
269 P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des 
lieux“, in: A. Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 265.
270 Council doc. 9252/1/93,27.10.93.
271 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: R  v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), 
Art. J.8, No. 15.
272 Hilf/Pache, in: E. Grabitz (ed.) (note 28), Art. B, Nr. 10; I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett (note 
52), p. 416; see Art. 228a TEC.
P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des 
lieux“, in: A  Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 274.
273
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II. The use of the instruments
The CFSP instruments can either be used autonomously by the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in response to an international human rights issue or in connection with the 
deliberations o f  an international organization. A general problem linked with foreign 
policy and its assessment, is that a great deal happens „in private“ and does not appear 
on the official listings. Thus, for example, in 1996, the proportion of public 
condemnation in the field o f human rights to the number o f total condemnation was 
only 23 %.274
1. EU „action“
a. The use in general
The instruments at the disposal o f the European Union since Maastricht have already 
been mentioned above: declarations and démarches, political dialogue, common 
positions and joint actions. Despite the new range of tools, the European Union has 
relied mainly on classic instruments -declarations and démarches- in the human rights 
field. For example, between November 1993 and October 1995, the European Union 
issued 89 (1993/94) and 60 (1994/5) declarations.275 The number fell to 35 in 1996276 
without a considerable increase in joint actions or common positions. As concerns the 
content, the declarations addressed mostly the current situation in particular countries, 
but some also dealt with general issues on the observance o f human rights. Most 
condemned the human rights situation in the addressed country, whereas only a few
274 European Commission (note 35), p. 27, p t  40.
275 Memorandum to the European Parliament on the Activities of the European Union in the Field
of Human Rights, 1994, 17.1.1995, p,5; Memorandum to the European Parliament on the 
Activities o f the European Union in the Field of Human Rights 1995,19.6.1996, p. 5.
276 Fouwels (note 56), p.298; Memorandum to the European Parliament on the Activities o f  the
European Union in the Field of Human Rights 1996, issued 1997, p. 5.
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praised a positive development.277 In contrast to the declarations, the number of 
démarches increased between November 1993 and October 1996 from 50 to 83 to 96 
in twelve month periods. Their intent is mostly to condemn violations in specific cases 
or sometimes to prevent them.278 They are usually carried out by the Presidency’s 
ambassador abroad279 and are directed to the competent authority in the receiving 
state.280
The European Union, however, has not relied solely on the classic instruments, but 
also had recourse to the new instruments introduced with Maastricht to promote and 
safeguard human rights. Their use is also easier to determine as they are all made 
public, although it is difficult to view their content as dealing with „human rights" 
exclusively. Eight common positions, adopted on the basis o f Article J.2 TEU, were 
issued by the European Union between November 1993 and October 1996, which had 
human rights either as their primary or secondary objective out of 24 in total.281 
Examples are the objectives and priorities of the European Union towards Rwanda and 
also towards the Ukraine, the dispatch of human rights observers to Burundi and 
human rights and the transition to democracy in Nigeria.282 From November 1996 till 
July 1997 the EU issued common positions on Cuba, Iraq and the city of Mostar which 
had a human rights component283 and in 1998 one on Afghanistan, one involving
277 ibid., p. 298.
278 ibid., p. 298; Memorandum to the European Parliament on the Activities of the European Union 
in the Field of Human Rights, 1995, 19.6.1996, p. 5, talks of 70 démarches in 1995.
279 M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 297.
280 see note 69, a  declaration is used as a  means to express the opinion and intention towards third 
states officially and is directly issued by the EU.
281 see Common Foreign and Security policy, in: European Commission, R e p e rto ire  de la  
le g is la tio n  e n  v ig e u rt 31eme édition, Journal officiel de la Communauté, Luxembourg 1997, 
p. 1171ss.
282 CFSP 94/697; CFSP 94/779; CFSP 95/091 ; CFSP 95/515, Common Foreign and Security policy 
(note 281).
283 CFSP 96/697 democratic transition process; CFSP 96/741 in the context of the „oil-for-food“ 
resolution; CFSP 97/193, Common Foreign and Security policy (note 281).
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restrictive measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, finally, one 
concerning Rwanda.284 As already mentioned, common positions do not aim first and 
foremost at changing the political situation in the third country, but want to co­
ordinate the Member States’ foreign policies and align them to the common objective 
(Art. J.2 II TEU) which implies that the internal repercussions of such an instrument 
are higher than the impact in the addressed country.285
As regards common action in the field o f human rights, between November 1993 and 
October 1996 the European Union adopted seven joint actions under Article J.3. TEU 
(out of 17) which included human rights aspects. Among them were election observers 
to Russia, support for the transition towards a democratic and multi-racial South 
Africa and support for the electoral process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.286 From 
November 1996 some other joint actions have been decided such as support for the 
democratic transition process in Zaire, a special envoy for the Middle East peace 
process and an assistance programme to support the Palestinian Authority in its efforts 
to counter terrorism.287 All of these actions were taken unanimously; none o f them 
made recourse to the possibility under Article J.3. II TEU.288 The new instruments 
have so far been used little in the field o f human rights, but nevertheless their initial 
application can be seen as a good start.
284 CFSP 98/006; CFSP 98/045; CFSP 98/047, http://wwwarc.iue/it/iue/elpb2?nd=&cp=&d... 
ghts&txqual=+phrase+all+words+&mmode=and
283 M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 300.
286 CFSp 93/603. CFSp 93/678; CFSP 96/406, ibid., p. 300.
287 CFSP 96/656; CFSP 96/676; CFSP 97/289, Common Foreign and Security policy (note 281).
288 P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des 
lieux“, in: A. Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 270; The European Parliament regrets the 
limited use o f joint actions and also requests the Council to make more use of qualified majority 
voting, EP doc A4-133/97, Report on improving the impact o f joint actions, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, Rapporteur Enrique B. Crespo, p. 6.
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Another frequently used instrument o f the EU foreign policy is political dialogue.289 
The Presidency, often in the form o f  the Troika, conducts several high-level political 
meetings with third countries and regional groupings. Political dialogue can encourage 
mutual trust and create an environment suitable to address topics of common interest. 
One important condition of the success o f such dialogue is that it should be initiated as 
soon as possible, that the authorities do not wait until human rights violations have 
occurred, and that care is also taken that there is an efficient foliow-up.290 The extent 
to which human rights’ and democratization issues are effectively dealt with on these 
occasions is unfortunately impossible to assess, but it seems rather limited as regards 
Latin ' America (San José dialogue and Rio group), Asia, the NTS and the 
Mediterranean countries. The Lomé countries, due to the established institutions, and 
the CEEs, because o f the common interests of accession, might be a rare exception. In 
general, the advantages of political dialogue lie in the long-term, its disadvantages in 
the difficulty to provide an effective short-term response to systematic human rights 
violations or interruptions o f the democratic process.
b. China as a target of the CFSP instruments
In the context o f the EU’s engagement in human rights, China assumed its own status. 
It is dealt with by the proclaimed * constructive engagement’ and cannot (one hopes) be 
taken as the norm because, firstly, all forms of negative measures (from critique to 
sanctions) are excluded from the EU ’s strategy, and secondly, the case of China is too
289 The political dialogue is one of the classical instruments o f diplomacy (declarations, démarches, 
high-level visits and meetings, offering of good offices and sending of mediators) which were 
used in the EPC, P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité 
commune: état des lieux“, in: A  M atterà (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 290s.
290 Interview with Dr. E. Simmonds, Dossier Human rights, democracy and development, in: The  
C o u rie r , 128, 1991, pp. 52-55, p. 53.
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strong an example o f economic interests squeezing human rights and allocating them 
their place after stability and trade.
aa. The instrum ents used
The steps taken to scrutinize and criticize China have remained solely in the field of 
diplomatic measures, no recourse having been made to the new instruments o f the 
CFSP. The EU issued eight human rights-related démarches and only two declarations 
between November 1993 and October 1996.291 One reason surely is that the impact of 
a common position or a joint action with regard to the human rights situation is much 
bigger and more visible than the one o f a (confidential) declaration or démarche and 
that this result is not desired towards China, Secondly, China, as has been 
demonstrated, is still a defender o f cultural relativist claims and therefore keen on 
arguing in favour o f an untouchable domain o f state sovereignty. Thirdly, the first 
guidelines issued by the European Council in 1992 do not define Asia as an area 
suitable for joint actions292 which shows the reluctance towards that area to speak out 
on human rights.
bb. Political dialogue
An area in which the EU has been particularly active is the installment and execution of 
a regular dialogue at expert and ministerial level as has already been pointed out in 
Chapter 2. The first meeting o f the experts dialogue on human rights was held in 
Brussels in January 1995 and the subsequent meeting in January 1996 in Beijing. The
291 M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 319.
292 They mention Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, and the 
Mediterranean, European Council Lisbon meeting, 26./27.6.1992, B ull EC, No,6, 1992, Vol.25, 
pp. 7-24, p. 20s.
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broader political dialogue has been maintained in parallel since 1994.293 2945In 1996, the 
expert dialogue was interrupted by the Chinese side after the EU tabled a resolution 
criticizing China at Geneva (UN Commission) so that the scheduled October 1996 
meeting did not take place, but dialogue was resumed in September 1997.294 295Alongside 
these meetings, the joint committee meeting within the framework of the Cooperation 
Agreement has also taken place, but the main topics of discussion were economic in 
nature.293 2945Besides that, the Community conducts a regional dialogue with ASEAN, 
covering discussions on human rights and democratic principles 296 It seems as if this 
dialogue forms the only active policy towards China in 1998 due to the recent decision 
of the Foreign Ministers not to table a resolution on China this year at Geneva. The 
right way to deal with China is certainly not easily found and divergent approaches 
clash. The overall question is whether to engage or disengage („Eindaemmen oder 
Einbinden“) China and experts fight with activists on that issue (see Chapter 4).297
2. The EU and international organizations
The second axis of EU engagement in human rights lies within the deliberations and 
actions of international organizations. In this case, initiatives are on a firmer footing as 
regards the justification in international law (droit de regard298) and these multilateral 
measures have also the important advantage of a „shield effect“ for the single states. 
The European countries are generally said to favour this kind of operation to bilateral
293 Memorandum to the European Parliament on the Activities o f the European Union in the Field 
of Human Rights, 1995,19.6.1996, p. 8.
294 European Report No.2294, 25.2.98, p.V-1; Background note on China and Human Rights, 
February 1998, unpublished paper, p. 1.
295 For October 1993-November 1994, General Secretariat of the Council, Schedule  o f  A c tio n  o f  th e  
E u ro p e a n  U n io n  on  H um an  R ig h ts , 18.11.94, unpublished paper.
296 see COM (98) 40 final, p. 17; For the activists critique of ASEM 2, see Agence France Presse, 
4.4.98, „Activists blast Asia-Europe Summit for playing down hum an rights“.
297 The Economist, „How America sees China. Friend or Foe?“, 25.10.97, p. 23-30.
P.-H. Imbert (note 104), p. 21,22.298
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action.299 The theoretical framework o f such an engagement will now be discussed in 
order then to turn to the special case o f China and assess the initiatives taken in one 
very important forum, the UN Commission on Human Rights, which convenes on a 
yearly basis in Geneva, in Spring (3.),
According to the Commission’s Communication COM (95) 567 final, the Union in the 
field of human rights effectively participates in the deliberations o f the leading 
international organizations. It maintains special relationships to the Council of Europe, 
the UN and the OSCE. The contribution of the European Union to the work of these 
fora includes „working on the regulatory output o f these international bodies and 
extending the relevant instruments, tightening up prevention and safeguard 
mechanisms, defining priorities and implementing specific projects“.300 As regards the 
CFSP, the instruments at hand to achieve this purpose are declarations (informal or 
formal as a common position) made on behalf o f the European Union, the common 
rejection or support of a resolution and its explanation. Within the UN system, the 
European Union has, for example, actively participated in the most recent important
299 Human Rights Watch Asia, „Chinese Diplomacy, Western Hypocrisy and the UN Human Rights 
Commission“, Report, No. 3 (C), M arch 1997, Vol. 9, p. 1.
300 COM (95) 567 final, p. 7;
In this context, some clarification as to the treaty structure is again needed. The „special 
relationships“ are set up by the Commission by invoking Art. 229-231 TEC for all 
administrative relations below observer status of the Community. For active participation in  the 
deliberations of these organizations, external competence of the Community (art. 228 TEC 
together with the relevant norm) is needed. In using this competence, the Community has 
become an observer in most of the relevant international organizations, which does not 
automatically give a right to speak, but may be granted on an informal basis. A  right to vote can 
never be deducted from an observer status. In these cases, the Community has to rely on 
cooperation on the side of the Member States, as was expressed in  former a r t  116 TEC and is 
now drawn from A rt 5 TEC. In some cases the Community could use its competence to also 
become a member, as happened with regard to FAO and WTO. The EU participates in all the 
cases where political declarations in the field of CFSP are at stake. The question of membership 
or observer status does not arise, as the EU acts through the pooling of the Member States, which 
are all members to the relevant organizations. Declarations are all issued on behalf o f  „the 
Union“, see Derision of the Council, 93/591/EU, EG, EGKS, Euratom, 8.11.93. In cases where 
neither Community competences, nor co-ordination in  the second or third pillar are at stake, the 
Member States are free to act individually. For a discussion o f  the role of the Community in 
international organizations see R. Frid (note 106).
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world conferences on human rights (i.e. Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, 
June 1993; Beijing, World Conference on Women, September 1995; Copenhagen 
Conference on Social Development, March 1995).301 Moreover, it participates in the 
Charter-based body, the UN Commission by giving an annual country-by-country 
assessment of the human rights situation under item 12 o f the agenda and tabling 
resolutions. It is in this latter context that the performance o f the European Union in 
April 1997 when a resolution on China was to be tabled gave such a poor picture of 
the capacity to find a common position. And last, but not least, it plays an important 
role in the work o f the General Assembly and its sub-committees.
3. The case of China at the UN Commission
In terms of multilateral dialogue, the UN Commission on Human Rights which meets 
every year in Geneva in the Spring is an interesting fora to discuss with regard to 
Chinese perceptions of human rights and to have a look at EU-policy. Although a 
resolution by the UN Commission is neither accompanied by sanctions or specific 
obligations, it is a curiously potent tool in inter-state relations.302 Targeted countries, 
and especially China, want to be the „good boys“ and fear harm to their international 
image.
a. The EU and the tabling of resolutions in Geneva
A resolution in Geneva allows the states to criticize China and put pressure on it, 
without needing to take recourse to trade and economic conditionalities. Thus, it is in
301 Memorandum to the European Parliament on the Activities of the European Union in the Field 
of Human Rights, 1995, 19.6.1996, p. 2.
Human Rights Watch Asia (note 299), p. 2.302
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harmony with the current „delinking“ o f human rights and trade303 and would likely to 
be preferred by states. Nevertheless, the United States and Europe failed six years 
(1990-1996, except 1995) to even table a resolution at Geneva. In 1997 the 
heterogeneous picture came to its completion with the European States being unable 
to find a consensus about the tabling o f the resolution which, then, in 1998, led to the 
decision already mentioned, to refrain from any support of a resolution. In the 
following section, the last four years of EU engagement in the UN Commission will be 
examined.
aa. 1995
Since the 1989 massacre in Beijing that silenced the Tiananmen Square democracy 
movement the EU has yearly tabled a resolution criticizing China’s human rights 
record.304 In 1995 the proposal for a resolution, sponsored by the US, Europe and 
Japan,305 for the first time surpassed the „no-action“ motion, and China’s human rights 
record was debated in public.306 The resolution, however, was defeated in the end, 
albeit only narrowly, by just 21 votes to 20 with 12 abstentions, Russia having changed 
its attitude in the last minute.307 Intense lobbying by both sides had preceded the down­
voting of the draft resolution and China which had pressed neighbours and Third 
World nations for support took notice o f this result with delight.308 It would remain the 
closest China has ever come to a condemnation at Geneva up to 1998.
303 For example the accession of China to the WTO is not been made conditional on the respect for 
human rights and also the US decided in  1994 not to link the preferential trade to human rights, 
see note 417, ‘presidential remarks’.
304 Agence France Presse, 17.4.96, JEU slams China's human rights policy“.
305 Kyodo News Service Japan Economic Newswire, 24.2.96, „US to join EU in criticizing China's 
human rights“.
306 Human Rights Watch Asia (note 299), p. 3.
307 ibid., p. 3.
308 The Reuter European Community Report, 11.3.96, BC cycle, „China dismisses EU, US human 
rights criticism“.
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bb. 1996
After the defeat o f the last year, EU Foreign Ministers had to decide on their strategy 
towards China for the current year. After an informal meeting o f EU Foreign Ministers 
in Sicily at the beginning o f March309 and a following meeting on 29.3.96 in Turin, the 
EU Foreign Ministers decided to table a resolution which would address the Tibet 
problem and the treatment o f other ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic minorities, 
as well as expressing concern about dissidents, the death penalty and the under­
developed Chinese legal system. The formerly demanded improvements310 had not 
been undertaken by China and the „time of waiting was now over“.311 Due to the 
composition o f the Commission as basically anti-western, the resolution had little 
chance of being passed, but the EU wanted to show its determination, diplomats 
affirmed.312 Nevertheless, the decision for confrontation was not undisputed given the 
rapprochement of the EU and Asia resulting from the Asia-Europe summit313 and 
China’s behaviour towards Taiwan.314 Moreover, the human rights session coincided
309 Reuters Financial Service, 9.3,96, BC cycle, „EU turns up heat on Beijing over human rights“; 
The Reuter European Community Report, 10.3.96, BC cycle, „EU puts pressure on China over 
human rights“, some officials expressed their views in favour of the resolution, whereas 
Finnland’s representative assumed „constructive and critical dialogue“ to be a  good approach 
and, finally, the Italian Presidency after a meeting declared the Chinese to be very sensitive on 
the issue o f human rights and said the EU was intending to use the resolution as „a kind of 
threat“.
310 Improving conditions at its orphanages, releasing dissident Wei Jingsheng and allowing the UN 
access to conduct an analysis of human rights conditions, The Reuter European Community 
Report, 10.3.96, BC cycle, „EU puts pressure on China over hum an rights**.
3U The Reuter European Community Report, 29.3.96, BC cycle, „EU to condemn China on human 
rights“.
312 ibid.
3,3 Agence France Presse, 01.4.96, „European Union to take China to task over human rights“, 
Europe has only just begun to „woo“ the Asian region - long dominated by the United States and 
Japan.
314 The Reuter European Community Report, 29.3.96, BC cycle, „EU to condemn China on human 
rights“.
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with a European tour of Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in early April.313 In this 
context, non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International have accused 
the 15-member EU of sacrificing human rights to economic interests.315 16
The United States decided to join the European Union in proposing a UN resolution 
which criticized China’s poor human rights record.317 The EU, in its general address, 
observed that economic reforms were transforming Chinese society and improving 
living conditions, which could lead to increased freedoms.318 Finally, the draft, which 
was critical o f China, failed and China was able to block the resolution by moving a 
procedural ,,no-action“ vote, which means that there is not even a debate.319
cc. 1997
The reluctance on the side o f the EU to table a resolution this year became already 
visible very early, i.e. in the end of 1996. The different working groups were bouncing 
decisions back and forth thereby delaying any timely statement. In contrast, the 
Chinese side had early started active lobbying to prevent such a motion.320 Human 
Rights Watch suspected that „some countries are not yet convinced, such as France
315 Human Rights Watch Asia (note 299), p. 4 discusses the China-France deal in  March 1996 
about an airbus contract which foresees some signs on the Chinese side in exchange for the 
dropping o f the resolution by the EU. Italy and Germany were said to be in favour of the deal as 
well which, though, in the end was not finalized because of C hina's rejection to agree to a 
timetable for ratification of the two covenants.
316 Agence France Presse, 01.4.96, „European Union to take China to task over human rights“.
317 Kyodo News Service Japan Economic Newswire, 24.2.96, „US to jo in  EU in criticizing China's 
human rights“ .
318 Agence France Presse, 17.4.96, „EU slams China's hum an rights policy“.
319 South China M orning Post, 27.1.97, „Beijing set to escape hum an rights action; EU divided and 
US reluctant to take initiative“; M ing W an (note 147), p. 244, The Western states were not 
strong enough to defeat the Asian and African developing countries in  this respect supporting 
China.
320 Japan Economic Newswire, 22.1.97, „EU urged to condemn China at UN human rights 
forum“.
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and Italy, probably for business reasons.“321 Just as the Human Rights Working Group 
was about to convene again on 23.1.97, being the fourth attempt of the EU to come to 
a common conclusion, China proposed a human rights dialogue meeting for the 
14.2.97 in the framework of the ASEM-summit322, which again prevented a decision to 
be taken. France and Italy were reportedly still opposed to tabling a resolution that 
year.323 The February two-day General Affairs Council meeting came to the conclusion 
to intensify dialogue between the EU and China on human rights and Ministers said the 
EU will first monitor the Chinese reaction before it decides whether to submit a 
resolution. Hope was expressed that the situation would change rapidly.324
The United States were also hesitant to take the lead in 1997 and an American 
diplomat said that the US preferred what they called „constructive dialogue and 
engagement“ in guiding China to improve its human rights record instead of 
confrontation.325
In the end, the draft resolution was supported by Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom; France, Germany, Italy and Spain opting out.326 For the first time 
since 1990 the EU was prevented from acting in a bloc due to the French-led revolt,
321 ibid., Human Rights Watch Asia (note 299), p. 4s, the aiibus contract between China and France 
was finalized in  April 1996 and seen as on offense o f the US being the former main supplier of 
aircraft (Boing) to China. During Jiang Zemin’s Europe trip in July 1996, farther business deals 
were to be done.
322 Human Rights Watch Asia (note 299), p. 12.
323 South China Morning Post, 27.1.97, „Beijing set to escape hum an rights action; EU divided 
and US reluctant to take initiative".
324 Japan Economic Newswire, 25.2.97, ,,EU urges continued dialogue on human rights in 
China".
325 South China Morning Post, 27.1.97, „Beijing set to escape hum an rights action; EU divided 
and US reluctant to take initiative".
326 European Report, No. 2226,24.5.97, p. V-4; The European Parliament welcomed these efforts in  
a resolution and condemned the subsequent Chinese practice o f discriminatory measures. It 
asked Member States, Council and Commission to protest against these measures and the 
Council to find a common stand in  hum an rights towards China, Bull. EU, No.5, 1997, Vol.30, 
pt. 1.4.85, p. 76.
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backed by the above mentioned countries.327 A similar split has apparently opened 
between the United States and Canada.328 Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen said 
that Denmark would not alter its decision because of Chinese warnings o f retaliation or 
Beijing’s sudden announcement to sign the UN covenant on economic, social and 
cultural rights as soon as possible.329 Finally, the UN vote was again blocked by China 
and did not come for discussion.330
dd. 1998
In order to restart the EU-China dialogue on human rights, China had tried to get the 
promise of the EU not to table a resolution this year at Geneva. In September 1997, 
however, the EU and China agreed to re-commence dialogue without any 
preconditions.331 In commenting on this move, Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques 
Poos said that the tabling o f the resolution „remains an open question. But if we see 
sustained progress and a new dynamic and a development of co-operative agreements 
in human rights ... we must take advantage of this new atmosphere. Results are more 
important than rhetoric“.332 In February, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng toured 
Europe with a delegation o f 50 people and had economic and political talks in 
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands.333
327 Agence France Presse, 9.4.97, „China gleeful over EU split on human rights“.
328 ibid.
329 ibid.
330 European Report, No. 2226, 24.5.97, p. V-4.
331 Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau English News Bulletin, 24.9.97, ,,EU, China restart dialogue 
on human rights“; Agence France Presse, 25.9.97, ,,EU to discuss human rights with China“.
332 Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau English News Bulletin, 24.9.97, ,,EU, China restart dialogue 
on human rights“; see also Economist, „How America sees China“, 25.10.1997, p. 30, China 
shows a greater willingness to adhere to the relevant international rules.
333 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11.2.98, „Vice-Premier Li Lanqing discusses human 
rights, Asia- EU ties during talks in  Belgium“; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18.2.98, 
„Chinese, Dutch premiers exchange views on Sino- EU ties, human rights, Iraq“, Li Peng 
spoke positively of the dialogue, already been held for the fourth time between China and the EU
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The final decision to drop condemnation at the UN Commission in Geneva was taken 
on Monday, 23rd February at the General Affairs Council meeting in Brussels.* 334 35It 
will be the first time since 1989 that the EU is abstaining from the tabling o f a 
resolution and the decision appeared well-timed, just before a four-day visit to China 
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Andrews. The UK was holding the presidency 
at that time and would have been in charge of tabling the resolution.333 345What was 
furthermore decided was that the EU would vote against a ,,no-action“ motion, deliver 
a criticizing speech at the opening session of China’s human rights record and continue 
to raise individual cases o f concern bi- and multilaterally,* 34536 In March, also the US 
decided not to propose a resolution at Geneva that year.337 Although, in the overall 
context, little change has been made on the Chinese side,338 the results o f the dialogue 
were seen as „encouraging“ by the Union and good relations must not be 
endangered.339 Several reasons can be listed to have influenced the EU Foreign 
Ministers’ decision: the first is purely pragmatic. It would be difficult for the EU to 
reach consensus given the complicated constellations last year before and after the
(January 1995, February 1996 (interruption after April 1996, informal meeting March 1997), 
October 1997 and December 1997); At the same time, Sir L. Brittan held a speech in China and 
talked about the future partnership between the EU and China, „The EU and China: building a 
partnership for the future, http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg01/0216.peki.htm.
334 Xinhua News Agency, 23,2.98, ,,eu agrees on human rights move over china“; SZ, 23.2.96, 
„EU aendert China-Politik“, p.6, European Report No.2300, 18.3.98, p. V-7, European Report 
No.2294, 25.2.98, p. V -l; the derision was already pre-announced by Western diplomats in 
Beijing, The Irish Times, 21.2.98, ,,EU likely to stop censuring China over human rights“.
335 The Irish Times, 21.2.98, JEU likely to stop censuring China over human rights“; This is 
particularly interesting with regard to the „ethical“ foreign policy proposed by Britain this year, 
Agence France Presse, 23.2.98, JEU abandons US over human rights in China“.
336 Japan Economic Newswire, 23.2.98, „EU rules out UN resolution on human rights in China“, 
European Report No.2294, 25.2.98, p.V-1, the derision also included the prohibition of any 
Member States action alone. This is, from a human rights point o f view a dangerous issue and 
should be regarded at very critically. It was not clear, how the EU should vote i f  the US tabled a 
resolution.
337 European Report No.2301, 21.3.98, p.V-3; The Independent, 16.3.98, „Peking escapes censure 
from the UN; China is not under attack for human rights as it prepares for a new PM“ the US 
announced its decision only on the weekend before the opening session of the Commission.
338 The Irish Times, 21.2.98, „EU likely to stop censuring China over human rights“.
339 Japan Economic Newswire, 23.2.98, „EU rules out UN resolution on human rights in China“
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resolution finally had been tabled.340 Secondly, the political dialogue, resumed in 
December 1997, was set for another round two days later in form of a seminar in 
Beijing.341 Thirdly, China released the dissident Wei Jingsheng and allowed him to 
travel to the US for medical treatment, and in the field o f law it has made changes in its 
criminal code to transform China into a more law-based society342 and signed 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights in October 1997.343 345A 
British diplomat stressed that the EU now had to focus on the implementation of 
international obligations as China has signed the the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and promised to sign the one on Civil and 
Political Rights as well.344 345The move of China to allow the UN group on arbitrary 
detention343 345and UN Human Rights Commissioner, Mrs Mary Robinson, to visit China 
this year was also mentioned.346 Finally, several countries are not interested in difficult 
relations with China: for the United Kingdom it is important to get the relations going 
which were difficult after the handover of Hong Kong, but have since become warmer. 
Denmark, bruised by its experience last year, has no intention of becoming Beijing's 
whipping boy again, diplomats in Beijing say. Ireland, as well, does not seem keen on 
any confrontation over the issue347, and neither is the Netherlands whose Company 
Royal Dutch/Shell has just signed the biggest foreign funding joint-venture in China - a
4.1. billion petrochemical plant.348
340 The Irish Times, 21.2.98, „EU likely to stop censuring China over human rights“.
341 ibid.
342 ibid.
343 Agence France Presse, 24.2.98, „China welcomes EU decision on human rights“.
344 Agence France Presse, 23.2.98, ,,EU abandons US over human rights in China“.
345 ibid.
346 The Irish Times, 21,2.98, „EU likely to stop censuring China over human rights“.
347 ibid.; Agence France Presse, 31.3.98,,»Danish MPs criticize softer approach to China“, Denmark 
even decided a cooperation programme for China and was accused of following a zig-zag human 
rights policy towards Beijing.
348 Europe Information Service, European Report, 18.3.98, „EU/CHINA: Brittan defends EU human 
rights policy“, moreover, there were many other high profile visits o f Europeans in China“.
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The decision was a sign of the priority the Council attached to developing relations 
with China and it introduced a plan for a high-level EU-China meeting at the next 
Asia-Europe summit meeting (ASEM 2) to be held in April 1998 in London.349 
Dialogue should be stepped up for at least one meeting every six months.350 EU 
Foreign Ministers voiced expectations for an early and fruitful visit to China by the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights351 and for positive results in the new 
programmes o f practical co-operation.
At the opening session,352 the EU Humanitarian Aid Commissioner, Emma Bonino, 
made no explicit reference to China when talking about human rights1 abuses353 and 
Mr. Lloyd on Tuesday 17.3.98 was simply asserting that the EU is not tabling a 
resolution because o f the dialogue taking place. He later told journalists, „We are not 
saying to the Chinese there is no (human rights) problem. Rather the opposite, but the 
question is one o f tactics. The point is to make an assessment as to how best we take 
human rights in China forward.“354 Because of the EU and US decisions, the this yearly 
session was „conspiciously silent“ about China’s human rights abuses.355
With a view to next year, the willingness of the EU to abstain from the tabling of a 
resolution, according to British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Robin Cook, depended on
349 European Commission, DG I, „Reinforcing the partnership o f equals between Asia and Europe“, 
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg01/asem21.htm, one of the three dimensions of ASEM was the 
strengthening o f the political dialogue, p. 2s; Deutsche Presse Agentur, 2.4.98, „EU and China 
pledge WTO push, human rights talks“.
350 Xinhua News Agency, 23.2.98, „eu agrees on human rights move over china“.
351 Japan Economic Newswire, 23.2.98, ,,EU rules out UN resolution on human rights in  China“.
352 Session was held from 16.3.-24.4.98 in  Geneva.
353 Europe Information Service, European Report, 18.3.98, JEU/CHINA: Brittan defends EU human 
rights policy“.
354 Agence France Presse, 17.3.98, „EU defends China hum an rights approach at hum an rights 
commission“; M2 PRESSWIRE, 17.3.98, „FCO Tony Lloyd to visit Geneva“; M2 PRESSWIRE, 
18.3.98, „FCO UN Commission on Human Rights“; speech available at 
(http://www.fco.gov.uk/).
Agence France Presse, 24.4.98, ,Am nesty slams UN Human Rights Commission for lack of 
action on abuse“.
355
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several factors which demonstrate the good faith o f China. They were: a successful 
visit by Mrs Robinson; Red Cross access to prisons; further releases of dissidents; and 
access for the EU Troika to Tibet.336
b. The Chinese response
In general, China is more active and, furthermore, more sophisticated in using 
diplomacy and propaganda for its own aims. On the one hand, this can clearly be seen 
in the UN Commission in 1997 (see below), but also in bilateral relations, China 
adopted a strategy how to deal with America and the West, which the US and EU 
apparently did not do. China, for example, started an immense media campaign to 
tackle the human rights’ issue: other countries were criticized and China’s performance 
was praised, given the different and difficult historical, cultural and social peculiarities 
of China.337 Additionally, it puts more effort in isolating the United States and 
integrating itself in the world community by establishing closer links with the other 
Asian countries; by doing so, the common values were stressed and resulted in the 
Bangkok Declaration.338 Last, but not least, the strategy of emphasizing the economic 
development o f the Chinese market had two major effects: the first was that western 
donors seemed to believe that democracy would spread through the country as a result 
of the increased wealth o f the population; and secondly, that China acquired a better 3567
356 The Irish Times, 24.2.98, ,,EU ministers agree not to put motion on human rights“; Agence 
France Presse, 24.2.98, „China welcomes EU decision on human rights“ at the round o f the 
dialogue on human rights, experts warned that the decision for 1999 would be taken according to 
the progress made; Future relations with China are to be laid down in a Commission document, 
European Report No. 2301, 21.3.98, p. V-3; COM (98) 181 final; Europe Information Service, 
European Report, 18.3.98, „EU/CHINA: Brittan defends EU hum an rights policy“.
357 Ming W an (note 147), p. 241. 
ibid., p. 241.358
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bargaining position because o f the keenness o f the Western industrialized nations to 
get to grasp with the immense Chinese market.359
aa. 1995 and  1996
In the 1995 session of the UN Commission, China has seen an erosion of its ability to 
block potentially embarrassing resolutions at the Human Rights Commission,360 
because the participating states not only blocked the Chinese „no-action“ motion, but 
almost succeeded in passing the resolution (see above). This hard stance of the US, the 
EU and Japan had provoked China’s rancor considerably, despite the defeat of the 
resolution in the end.361 It was therefore likely that China’s lobbying efforts would 
increase in 1996 to prevent a resolution to be tabled. The deal China proposed to 
France in 1996 not to table a resolution was already mentioned above,362 but obviously 
did not succeed. Nevertheless, Li Peng finalized the Airbus contract with France in 
April 1996, 10 days before the UN Commission’s vote on 23.4.9Ó.363
The US decision to propose a resolution in Geneva, resulted in recent Chinese 
crackdowns on pro-democracy activists, including Wei Jingsheng who had been 
arrested a short while ago, and on those in the Tibet Autonomous Region.364 
Moreover, Beijing has warned the US against repeating such a „plot“ as in 1995 and 
was expected to „ruffle at the move, putting a damper on already frayed US-China“
359 ibid., p .2 4 1 .
360 The Reuter European Community Report, 11.3.96, BC cycle, „China dismisses EU, US human 
rights criticism“.
361 Kyodo News Service Japan Economic Newswire, 24.2.96, „US to join EU in criticizing China's 
human rights“.
362 see  n o te  3 1 5 .
363 Human Rights Watch Asia (note 299), p. 4.
364 Kyodo News Service Japan Economic Newswire, 24.2.96, „US to join EU in criticizing China's 
human rights“.
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relations.365 According to Beijing, the overseas criticism by the US and the EU of its 
human rights record constitutes an interference in the internal affairs o f a state and the 
planned UN resolution against China is bound to fail. It is not new for China to attack 
Western scrutiny and claim that it is motivated by the aim to split China, to subvert 
socialism366 and to transform the Commission into a forum for levelling accusations at 
the South.367 Despite the „wrong“ approach o f the EU, Beijing was still willing to talk 
to Europe and Washington: „On the question of human rights, we have always called 
for dialogue, not for confrontation,“ Qian said.368 Nevertheless, dialogue was 
interrupted after the EU had tabled the resolution.369
b b .1997
Human Rights Watch said China has started a stepped-up campaign over the last six 
months to arrest dissidents and hand out extraordinarily harsh sentences especially with 
regard to Tibetan activists.370 Qian Qichen, the Chinese Foreign Minister saw little 
chance for an EU sponsored resolution to succeed in 1997, as former resolutions since 
1990 had all had the same end: defeat. Instead of confrontation, China’s position on 
the question of human rights was one of dialogue on the basis of equality and mutual 
respect.371 The split o f the EU over the matter gave confidence and satisfaction to 
China and is a major diplomatic coup for it, which sees its strategy of threat and
365 ibid.
366 The Reuter European Community Report, 11.3.96, BC cycle, „China dismisses EU, US human 
rights criticism“.
367 Agence France Presse, 01.4.96, „European Union to take China to task over human rights“.
368 The Reuter European Community Report, 11.3.96, BC cycle, „China dismisses EU, US human 
rights criticism“.
369 It was resumed in September 1997, European Report No.2294,25.2.98, p. V -l.
370 Japan Economic Newswire, 22.1.97, „EU urged to condemn China at UN hum an rights 
forum“.
371 Agence France Presse, 6.3.97, „EU certain to lose anti-China human rights resolution: Chinese 
Foreign Minister said“.
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commercial bribery as being effective in watering down Western criticism of its human 
rights record.372 Again, China warned that all countries supporting the resolution 
would damage their relations with the Asian giant. „Supporting this resolution will not 
be beneficial to any nation's ties with China,“ Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen 
Guofang said. With regard to France and Italy, China has been effusive in praising their 
conduct.373 3745
The Dutch representative's speech criticizing China in human rights, was called by a 
representative o f the Chinese delegation as „unwarranted accusations“. Only the 
Chinese people themselves would be able to judge China’s human rights situation. It is 
moreover nothing more than „wishful thinking“ to expect China to accept the EU’s 
political and value system.374 375 After the resolution had been tabled by Denmark 
supported by the Dutch, China started to apply discriminatory measures against these 
two countries ranging from disrupting economic contacts373 3745to the suspension of 
diplomatic relations. Ireland was also punished by the cancellation o f a visit by the 
economic czar, Mr Zhu Ronghi.376
372 Agence France Presse, 9.4.97, „China gleeful over EU split on human rights“; Human Rights 
Watch Asia (note 299), p. 5, President Jian Zemin toured Europe in July 1996 with the aim of 
closing business deals. Before, in June 1996, China had threatened Germany to impose economic 
sanctions because of a  planned conference on Tibet sponsored by the Friedrich-Naumann 
Stiftung and subsidized by the German government The German Government finally withdrew 
its money, but the conference was held which led to the closure of the foundation’s office in 
Beijing. As a response, the German Bundestag discussed C hina’s appaling human rights record 
and China, in  its turn, canceled an invitation to Foreign M inister KinkeL Bowing to Chinese 
economic threats, relations were normalized in September 1996 and big commercial deals were 
signed. Similar action was taken in  Italy, the Netherlands and Britain.
373 Agence France Presse, 9.4.97, „China gleeful over EU split on human rights“.
374 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, 11.4.97, Source: X inhua news agency, Beijing, 9.4.97, 
„UN official refutes Dutch-EU accusations on hum an rights, Hong Kong“.
375 European Report No. 2226,24.5.97, p. V-4.
376 The Irish Times, 21.2.98, „EU likely to stop censuring China over human rights“; SZ, 
19720.4.97 „China sagt Europa Besuch Zhus ab“.
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cc. 1998
On the day o f the decision, China’s vice Foreign Minister, Wang Yingfan, said despite 
disagreement over human rights China and the EU had „found a way to settle their 
differences“ through dialogue.377 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao 
rejected any connection of the EU decision and concessions on the Chinese side. 
„Whatever decision the EU makes,“ he went on, „China promotes and safeguards 
human rights and will be unwavering in doing so.“378 Nevertheless, just some days 
before the opening session, China had announced that it would sign the UN covenant 
on civil and political rights, although, it has not given a timeframe. Apparently, it was 
concerned to escape scrutiny this year379 despite the EU decision. On 19.4.98, 
dissident Wang Dan was released on medical terms and now lives in the US China 
denied any connection with this deal and the US decision in Geneva.380
Having been successful in the end due to the EU and the US decision and the general 
improbability of a resolution passing anyway, the Chinese reaction to the outcome of 
the session of the UN Commission was, naturally, purely positive.
c. Evaluation
The outcome o f the 1998 session has been defended by European diplomats and has 
provoked the anger of human rights NGOs and dissidents in and outside o f China.
377 Agence France Presse, 23.2.98, „EU abandons US over hum an rights in China“; Agence 
France Presse, 24.2.98, „China welcomes EU decision on hum an rights“; China reacted in the 
same way after the US decision to drop a resolution, Agence France Presse, 16.3.98, „China 
welcomes US decision on rights resolution“.
378 The Straits Times (Singapore), 25.2.98, „China- EU accord on human-rights issue“.
379 The Independent, 13.3.98, „China makes rights pledge“; The New York Times, 13.3.98, „On 
Eve of Geneva Rights Talks, China Agrees to Sign UN Pact“.
380 International Herald Tribune, 23.4.98, „U. S. offers to ease sanctions on China“, p.7 Mr. Wang* 
release is seen as part of a deal between the Chinese and the Americans; But China denied any 
deal with the US over the resolution, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21.4.98, „China denies W. Dan's 
release was deal with US“; International Herald Tribune, 22.4.98, „Wang Hopes to Go Home“,
p. 6.
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Where Sir Leon Brittan, France and England spoke all positively of the „wise“ decision 
of the EU and the positive results o f the new orientation o f human rights policy,381 the 
„other voices“ were much more critical. The multilateral human rights protection has 
this year been defeated by the need for a common performance of the EU in order to 
avoid another „1997“. Every form o f pressure, even the more lenient diplomatic one 
has been given up with regard to China.
These „other voices“ pled for a comprehensive approach in human rights including 
positive measures and multilateral critique and rejected the approach of the West as 
lacking political will.382 The current tactics shed a negative light on the EU human 
rights policy and exposes it as „pure rhetoric“.383 3845Amnesty International has accused 
the EU o f sacrificing human rights for trade deals and expressed deep concern about 
the possibility of powerful countries escaping scrutiny in Geneva. The arguments 
brought forward could not justify the EU decision, because in „practice very little has 
changed“.384 385With regard to the UN Commission, Amnesty accused it of choosing a 
compromise rather than action to protect the victims.383
381 In a national discussion, Robin Cook, defended its human rights policy by saying that the U.K. 
had found the „third way“, not to ignore, not to lecture, but to seek discussion; France, as well, 
saw its policy of constructive engagement affirmed by the release of Wan Dang, Agence France 
Presse, 20.4.98, „France hails Chinese dissident release“; Sir L. highlighted a number of areas 
where China had improved its policy, "not least because o f the pressure brought to bear by the 
EU", he claimed. "I stress that the ongoing EU-China dialogue fully and frankly addresses the 
most sensitive issues concerning hum an rights, such as the death penalty, prison conditions and 
ethnic and minority groups", Sir L. Brittan said. He added that the ED'S policy of political and 
economic engagement with China was more likely to produce results than one o f isolation, 
Europe Information Service, European Report, 18.3.98, „EU/CHTNA: Brittan defends EU human 
rights policy**.
382 Agence France Presse, 23.2.98, JEU abandons US over hum an rights in China“; Agence 
France Presse, 23.4.98, „UN rights commission wraps up session amid pledge o f deep reforms“.
383 Agence France Presse, 23.2.98, ,,EU abandons US over hum an rights in China“.
384 Agence France Presse, 24.2.98, „Amnesty attacks EU "disappointment" over human rights in 
China“ ; The New York Times, 13.3.98, „On Eve o f  Geneva Rights Talks, China Agrees to Sign 
UN Pact“ in  a  report AI stated that despite some concessions not much has changed.
385 Agence France Presse, 24.4.98, »Amnesty slams UN Human Rights Commission for lack of 
action on abuse“.
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Wei Jinsheng, China’s most prominent dissident, was very unsatisfied with the EU 
decision and asserted that the proclaimed approach o f constructive engagement was 
not the right way to deal with China in human rights. He also does not believe the 
arguments advanced by the EU: one, China had already announced to sign the 
Covenant on civil and political rights one year ago; two, the other Covenant has only 
been signed and not ratified yet; three, there are thousands of political prisoners who 
remain without trial; four, torture is still widespread; and lastly, any dissent is firmly 
suppressed.386 Wei had also the opportunity, against the disapproval of China, to 
address the UN Commission this year. He accused the West of not supporting the 
peaceful activities of the Chinese people and leaving them alone in their fight for 
human rights in their country. Additionally, Wei said, the West had an erroneous 
picture of China due to the Media which „portray a China of cellular phones, Mercedes 
Benz and McDonalds. They intend to convince the world that China is a new land of 
opportunities. Yet they forget that there are 1.3 billion Chinese, 1.2 billion o f whom 
are poor“ 387
All in all, from a human rights point o f view, the result o f the UN Commission in 1998 
was very disappointing. Even more striking was the difference between the lobbying 
efforts made by China and by the Western world.
386 Europe Information Service, European Report, 18.3.98, „EU/CHINA: Brittan defends EU human 
rights policy“ ; Wei said that the decision was based on distorted facts Agence France Presse, 
5.3.98, „Wei slams Europe as US mulls China rights resolution“; Wei voiced disappointment 
with the new approach, and stressed that the Chinese government „has not shown any intention 
to improve the human rights situation“, Agence France Presse, 30.3.98, „Denmark backs 
cooperation with China over human rights“.
Agence France Presse, 9.4.98, „China's Wei accuses West of abandoning human rights efforts“.387
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4. Can C hina afford this confrontation?
China’s strategy obviously was to use its important economic position in the world 
economy to lobby and bargain as regards the decision at Geneva. If lobbying efforts 
did not produce the desired results, it did not hesitate to apply diplomatic and 
economic sanctions vis-à-vis the target country afterwards. It is extremely interesting, 
how the Western world plays this game of intimidation and is unable to find a hard 
stance towards China and to condemn these practices. The only EU organ which did 
so was the European Parliament in a resolution asking the Member States to act and 
express their discontent with such behaviour and to lodge official protests.388 
Obviously, nothing really happened, and the protest was only expressed by the EU’s 
representative in Beijing.389 The first step in asking whether China can afford 
confrontation is to have a quick look at China’s economy and its likely development in 
the future, in order to then assess the economic relations with the US and the EU and 
ask why China can be so powerful in the context of world power.
As regards China’s economy, Xiaming Liu and Haiyan Song390 have given an 
interesting account of the status-quo and the likely evolution of China’s economy. The 
high competitive advantage of China, which means the competitiveness of products in 
international markets and which is measured in growth rates and world market shares 
of a country’s products, is based on products being all labour-intensive goods.391 This 
competitive advantage is related to the outcome of its „national diamond“392 and the
388
389
390
391
392
European Parliament Resolution on discriminatory measures taken by China against certain 
member states, 15.5.97, Bull. EU, No.5, 1997, Vol. 30, pt. 1.4.85, p. 76.
European Report 2226, 24.5.97, p. V-4.
X. Liu, H. Song, „China and the Multinationals -A winning Combination“, in: L o n g  R ang e  
P la n n in g , February 1997, Vol.30, pp. 74-83.
ibid., p. 75.
Factor conditions (f.ex.: natural resources, climate, labour forces, infrastructure, research 
institutes), Demand conditions (f. ex.: home demand, growth of it, transmission o f nation’s KpEO 
domestic preferences to foreign markets), Related and supporting industries, Firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry, ibid., p, 74s.
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combination o f it with multinational business activity, first and foremost in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. According to them, China’s competitive advantage is not seen to be 
sustainable. It should therefore build on extending its four national factors and not 
mainly rely on labour-intensive products, but also capital-intensive manufactures.393 3945All 
in all, they classify China as „the largest potential market in the world“.394 395
The current competitiveness o f China is not only based on labour intensive goods, but 
also on the combination with foreign investment and import o f technology, an 
evolution that had been generated by the Chinese Government after the opening-up in 
1978.393 It derives from this second component and the analysis given above that 
China, in order to remain competitive, needs foreign investment and technology. The 
US, for example, still is the largest market and a very crucial supplier o f  high 
technology in the world. With regard to the US China would clearly lose more than it 
would win if it cut economic ties.396 Secondly, the trade surplus of China with regard 
to Europe is high397 and cannot be only compensated by turning to America, Japan or 
Russia. Europe provides China mainly with machinery, and imports textiles and 
clothing, toys, electrical material, leather goods and footwear.398 China needs the 
preferential access to the Western markets and the hard currency to sustain its 
economic growth. Moreover, China’s desired accession to the WTO will not be 
possible without support from these two regions. The EU has just decided to regard
393 ibid., p. 78.
394 ibid., p. 81.
395 ibid., p. 82; H. Weiss (note 230), p. 48.
396 M ing Wan (note 147), p. 241; International Herald Tribune, 28.4.98, the American consumer is 
still seen as the main driver of Chinese growth.
397 European Commission Delegation in China, „The EU and China“,
http://www.ecd.or.cn:Ahost/ecd/pamphlet/pam972.html, 15.344 million ECU.
398 European Commission Delegation in  China, „The European Union and China“,
http://www.ecd.or.cn:Ahost/ecd/pamphlet/eeu2.htm, p. 2.

101
China as a „market-economy“ which will facilitate, inter alia, accession to the WTO. 
The fact that Europe and the US do not prevent China from playing with them cannot 
accordingly be explained by the potential independence of China from these two 
markets, but from the fact that none of the two wants to lose share of this immense 
market with regard to the other, supported by multinational firms and their lobbying. In 
the sphere o f  geo-politics, it is hard to assess in a few words, whether the EU and US 
have to fear China and should avoid confrontation for that reason. Two points are 
certain: China is modernizing its military and aiming at elevating the resources of the 
National army39 400 and nobody wants an unstable China that poses threat to the whole 
world. China is already a nuclear power and one of the world’s biggest arms producers 
and exporters Additionally, it must not be forgotten that it holds a seat in the UN 
Security Council.401
In conclusion for this chapter, it may be said that little use o f CFSP instruments in the 
field of human rights was made, particularly with regard to China. The UN 
Commission provides an interesting example o f the attitude o f the Western states, and 
especially the EU, towards China and leads to the next question: as to the explanation 
and consequences of the insubstantial engagement of the EU in human rights.
399 International Herald Tribune, 28.4.98, „EU Overture to China and Russia“, the Trade Ministers 
o f  the EU agreed on 27.4.98 to remove China as well as Russia from the list of nonmarket 
countries. This decision has also implications for the anti-dumping policy of the Union.
400 X. Gu, „Militärische Aufholjagd. Die Modernisierung der chinesischen Streitkräfte“, in: 
In te rn a tio n a le  P o lit ik , No.6, 1997, Vol.52, pp. 11-16, p. II; Die Zeit, 24.20.97, „Einbinden statt 
Eindaemmen“; The Economist, 3.1.1998, „The Next Balance o f Power. A geopolitical detective 
story“, pp. 17-19.
„A Long Term  Policy for China-EU Relations“, COM (95) 279 final, p. 1.401
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Chapter 4: The insubstantial human rights engagement of the European
Union under scrutiny
This chapter seeks to explore some of the possible explanations for the limited use of 
CFSP means by the EU for human rights aims and the insubstantial engagement of the 
Union as a whole towards China. It also asks whether the CFSP is an adequate means 
to conduct a foreign policy which is efficient, credible, consistent and coherent and 
whether the tailoring o f the instruments as decided in the most recent Commission 
Communication, COM (98) 181 final corresponds to the specific needs of China.
I. Reasons for insubstantial engagement
In general, EC  engagement in human rights has been more visible than EU  engagement 
so far. The acquis communautaire o f positive and negative measures in human rights 
can claim a considerable evolution and is based on a good footing within the EC 
structure o f decision-making and implementation. With regard to China, the EC can 
use the means of the ALA-regulation 443/92402, the framework of the 1985 
Cooperation Agreement (although it does not include a human rights clause) and the 
new programme of „practical co-operation“403 to further human rights. Unfortunately, 
China has too often been the „human rights exception“.404 The EU, by virtue of the 
CFSP, is even more torn between economic interests and ethical principles of 
international relations. It has not made use of the possibilities at hand, i.e. common 
positions and joint actions, but has instead withdrawn to the invisible tools of the EPC, 
declarations, démarches and political dialogue towards China. In the framework o f the
402 O JL  52, 27.2.1992. 
see COM (98) 181 final.
see R. Cohen, „People’s Republic of China: the human rights exception*4, in: H R Q , No. 4, 1987, 
Vol,9,
pp. 447-549.
404
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UN Commission a negative trend can be observed from 1989 to 1998 ranging from the 
undisputed tabling of a resolution after the Tiananmen massacre to the abstaining from 
any engagement (even excluding Member States single action) in 1998.
1. Economic interests prevail
The China case has shown that economic interests place human rights in third position 
after stability and trade. The Union thus is more driven by its economic interests than 
by its commitments to human rights. The question could therefore be asked whether an 
economic institution like the Union should not even try to have a human rights policy 
because any conflict would be solved in favour o f commercial aspects anyway.
a. An economic institution
The history o f the European integration is one o f economic integration.403 The 
Community was designed to achieve closer economic ties between the Member States 
according to the objectives set out in Art. 3 TEC. The old Art. 8 TEEC provided for 
completion o f the internal market in 12 years time, i.e. 31.12.69.405 06 The EC was 
conceived to lead to prosperous economic growth and by co-ordinating the economies 
of the Member States contribute to peace and stability in the world (see Preamble and 
Art. 3 TEC). The founding fathers did not think o f fundamental rights, including social 
welfare rights, and abstained from including them in the treaty because they all had 
national constitutions protecting the rights o f the citizens, they, secondly, had just 
recently signed the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
405 The absence of any reference to human rights in  the treaties establishing the European 
Communities reflects the „economic substance“ o f the treaties and the reluctance on the side of
the Member States to transfer sovereignty in other fields than economic, D. Napoli, „The 
European Union’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights“, in: N. A  Neuwahl, A  Rosas (eds.), The  
E u ro p e a n  U n io n  and  H u m a n  R ig h ts , Kluwer, The Hague 1995, pp. 297-312, p. 299.
406 F. Emmert (note 78), p. 17.
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Fundamental Freedoms, and, finally, supported the tradition of international law that 
international treaties would not have direct effect in the national sphere.407 
Additionally, the European project was not envisaged to become a state-like feature 
and specific protection o f  the citizens was thus not deemed necessary. With Maastricht 
and the transformation o f the EC into a political Union - a constant process o f closer 
co-ordination - the political element o f respect for human rights and democratic 
principles has become central for the conduct o f activities, as demonstrated in several 
articles of the treaty (Art. F II, J .l.II TEU, Art. 130 u TEC).408 With regard to the 
external dimension, even without an explicit reference in the treaty, the fact that all 
members o f the Union are liberal democracies, obligates them to advocate these values 
in their relations with third states as well,409 enhanced by the fact that the respect for 
human rights in the external relations does not impede internal economic development 
(but of course influences the competitiveness in the international arena). Still, the 
Union has not become a nation state and is not intended to become one in the near 
future,410 but it has acquired more and more features o f a nation state and has not 
always been able to make the necessary internal developments (democracy deficit, 
transparency, regional policy, citizen’s protection). Prevalence of economic interests 
can not justify the neglect of human rights, be it internal or external, and the (initial) 
focus on economic integration does certainly not impede an institution from pursuing 
an active human rights policy at the same time. Such a policy could even be very
407 ibid., p. 293; D. Napoli, „The European Union’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights“, in: N. A  
Neuwahl, A  Rosas (eds.) (note 405), pp. 297-312, p. 299.
408 see also COM (95) 567 final.
409 see preamble o f the SEA which introduced the first mentioning of respect for human rights in 
the internal and external dimension o f European law. Recital 5 states: ...“in particular to display 
the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights to which they 
are attached, so that together they may make their own contribution to the preservation of 
international peace and security in  accordance with the undertaking entered into by them within 
the framework of the United Nations Charter“ .
410 M. Pechstein, „Das Kohaerenzgebot als entscheidende Integrationsdimension der Europaeischen 
Union“, in: E u ro p a re c h t, No.3, 1995, Vol.29, pp. 246-258, p. 248.
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effective if backed by economic potential. It is the balancing of economic interests and 
‘soft issues’ that determines the game.411
b. The role of enterprises in the m arket 
aa. Their influence on the China strategy
China is the largest potential market in the world. By exploiting its natural competitive 
advantage and by cleverly using the contacts with multinationals, the already existing 
advantage can be maintained and even improved.412 The open-door policy o f Deng 
Xiaoping after 1978 has paved the way for this policy and the Chinese government 
today has acknowledged the fact that China has to collaborate in order to compete. 
The preferential policies towards foreign investors have to be pursued and even 
enhanced. However, firms still complain that there is no open market, no market 
economy in China and that their investments do not rest on firm foundations as regards 
sustainability and confidence.413 The lobby of the multinationals is strong and usually 
not in favour o f human rights. One only has to think of the Airbus contract with France 
or the Shanghai underground envisaged by German firms. Kinkel has explained the 
German position towards China by saying: „China is a big, important power that is on 
the way to broader, greater importance. Therefore, you cannot balance the relationship 
with a country like that only on the needletip o f the human rights question“.414 On the
411 Because o f this bias, it could also be proposed that the Union increases its engagement in the 
Council o f Europe instead of trying to combine issues that partly contradict each other.
412 X  Liu, H. Song (note 390), p.8Is.
413 Funabashi, Y.; Oksenberg, M,; Weiss, H. (note 163), p.54; T. Heller, guest lecture in  the 
seminar on „Globalization and International Trade Law“, held by Prof. Snyder at the European 
University Institute in Winter 1997; International Herald Tribune, 25726.4.98, „China Bans 
the Door-to-Door Seller“ , the bans threatens hundreds of dollar o f investment of multinational 
firms; In July 1998 China has backtacked from this blanket ban and allowed Amway Corp. to 
resume operations, Herald Tribune, 22.7,98, p.15. This shows again how unpredictable China’s 
policy for foreign traders is.
414 International Herald Tribune, 13.7.1995, p. 1.
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occasion o f  signing a major automobile contract with the Chinese government, 
Chancellor Kohl claimed that differences in conceptions o f citizen rights need to be 
respected when dealing with China, even if in principle the universality of basic human 
rights forms the framework o f action. Different degrees or stages of economic 
development, as well as distinct historical traditions need to be taken into account.415 
With a view to America, the same influential role is played by American firms. They 
have even established a closer web of relationships with the Chinese side than exist 
between the Chinese and American governments, and Clinton has to beware to keep 
pace with these „foreign policies“.416 The United States’ policy towards China would 
give enough room for another extensive survey. It should just be mentioned here that 
the yearly granting of the MFN status to China is a highly controversial issue and Bill 
Clinton, for example, ran its election campaign in 1992 by, besides others, proclaiming 
a policy of criticism towards China, which, in the end, proven very shortlived.417 The 
prospects for a common strategy of the EU and the US towards China are mixed,
415 International Herald Tribune, 21.7.1995, p. 6.
416 International Herald Tribune, 29.10.1997.
417 See J. A. Dorn, „Trade and Human Rights in  China“, http://www.cat0.0rg/dailys/l l-15-96.html, 
p. Is for the Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1974 and J. Haacke, „Chinas Mitwirkung an 
mulitlateralen Foren der Zusammenarbeit im Pazifik“, in: A  ussenpolitik, No. 2, 1997, Vol. 48, 
pp. 166-176, p. 170; I.M. Destler, A m e ric a n  Trade P o litic s , Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC 1995, p. 230, for the election campaign; Ming Wan (note 147), p. 
240ss, critical o f the US policy, Presidential remarks on 26.5.94, New York Times, 26.5.94 „(...) 
I am moving, therefore, to delink human rights from the annual extension o f Most Favoured 
Nation trading status for China, „we have reached the end of the usefulness of that policy“;
The ups and downs of the US policy towards China were announced as coming to an end with 
the historical visit of Jiang Zemin to the United States in October 1997. Foreign policy experts 
have figured out the new policy to be followed into the next millennium: ‘Criticism o f the 
Chinese hum an rights record whilst simultaneously maintaining trade*. The leading ideology 
behind this is that economic development and liberalization will automatically lead to the 
emergence o f democratic values as happened in the US, SZ, 29.10.97, „Ritterschlag fuer einen 
Bittsteller“ ; SZ, 31.10.97, „Die zweite chinesische Offensive“, Jian Zemin and Bill Clinton have 
a  big task in  front of them to find a  way through the jungle of different views, diverging theories 
and realities o f trade and globalization; I.M. Destler (above), p.235, Market freedom, economic 
development and international engagement are more likely to promote democracy and human 
rights.
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given the competition for markets and the different approaches as regards reaction to 
human rights violations in the w orld.418
The tension between multinational firms and Union policy lies in the fact that despite 
the exclusive competence of the EC for commercial policy (Art. 113 TEC), economic 
policy is still national419 Moreover, even in the field o f Art. 113 TEC, the EC sets only 
the framework for action, which is then filled in by national contracts about the transfer 
of goods. Services and intellectual property issues remained within national 
competence even after Amsterdam. Due to Member States reluctance to cede power in 
these areas,. only a last minute amendment could be included in the treaty which 
foresees extension of paragraphs one to four to services and intellectual property if the 
Council unanimously so wishes.420
The interest o f many international firms does not concord with a progressive human 
rights policy, but aims at exploiting the cheap labour, good investment opportunities
418 In a speech to students at Leiden University, Van Mierlo said that „The EU and the US are 
natural partners when it comes to promoting democracy and hum an rights. They need each other 
and have to work together to book results“, Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau English News 
Bulletin, 13.12.96, „V. Mierlo calls for closer EU/US cooperation on human rights“; 
Nevertheless, there have been differences in view about how to proceed, namely with regard to 
Cuba and Iran, International Herald Tribune, 28.4.98, „Shell to Test US On Iran Sanctions“, the 
main point of disagreement is about the extraterritorial nature o f  the US legislation;
Sir Leon Brittan, as well, in his speech at Washington one year later was very optimistic about 
the good prospects for a firm relationship between Europe and the US He stressed the common 
values such as human rights, political freedoms and free speech, alongside with the interest in 
peace and stability and in  fostering open trade, speech o f Sir L. Brittan on 21.11.97 at the 
Europe Institute in Washington, „Europe and America: staying together“,
http://europe.eu.int/en/comm/dg01/spslb5.htm, p.2s; see also Sir L. Brittan in a  speech to the 
Capital Hill Club in Washington, 19.3.96, „Europe, the US and Asia: Facing up to global 
challenges“, http://europe.eu.int/en/comm/dg01/sp 1903 96.htm.
419 Ch. Joerges, „European Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty“, in: Renaud 
Dehousse (ed.), E u rop e  A fte r  M a a s tr ic h t. A n  e v e r c lo se r U n io n ? “ , Law Books in  Europe, 
Muenchen 1994, pp. 29-62, p. 32.
420 European Policy Centre, „Legal Analysis“ (note 55), p. 97; M. Petite, „The Treaty of 
Amsterdam: Ambition and Realism", unpublished paper, p.20s, translation of the text published 
in R evue  du  M a rc h é  U n iq ue  E u ro p è e n , No. 3, 1997, pp. 17-52; The European Parliament in a 
resolution on the Treaty o f Amsterdam pledges the Member States to quickly take a decision on 
the transfer of competences to the Community which, according to its view, has to be competent 
in  all the areas covered by the WTO, Agence Europe, Documents, No.2060, 3.12.1997, p. 3, 
par.9.
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and at securing a competitive advantage. In an interview, Hang Dongfan, a well-known 
Chinese Unionist and human rights activist, explained that the human rights situation of 
workers is the worst in those areas in China, where a lot o f foreign investment is spent. 
This usually are the Special Economic Zones along the coast. Multinational firms do 
not respect workers rights, but aim at exploiting their labour force. When asked about 
the usefulness of German import restrictions for Chinese products produced under 
violation o f  basic labour rights, he answered that such a policy was not realistic. The 
German market, for example, relies to strongly on the cheap Chinese products that it 
would agree to impede trade with them. The better solution would be to introduce the 
social" clause in international agreements and to set up a code of conduct for 
investment o f international firms.421
bb. The enterprises’ self-restraint
How far have efforts gone to set up code of conducts for multinational firms? The 
European Parliament in a resolution in 1996, demanded such a code be set up.422 In 
lack o f concrete standards so far, it referred to an OECD proposal for the procedure of 
controls and sanctions. Thus far, such initiatives have not led to the establishment of a 
code as international firms are usually reluctant to agree to norms which restrict their 
economic freedom. But, there are also different trends to be observed. For example, 
there is a growing awareness that human rights considerations play a role in investment 
and business programmes, because sustainability is dependent on social surroundings423 
and due to consumer pressure at home, trade cannot be completely de-linked from
421 Bass, H.; Wauschkuhn, M ; Wohlmuth, K., Menschenrechte, Arbeitsverhältnisse und 
Gewerkschaften in China - internationale Perspektiven, Berichte des Arbeitsbereiches 
Chinaforschung im  Institut für Weltwirtschaft und internationales Management, Nr. 6, Mai 
1996, Universität Bremen. Interview mit Hang Dongfang, p.47-62, p. 58ss.
422 EP Doc. A4-400/96.
423 Comparison is made with the discussion about sustainable development in development policy.
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these aspects. In this context, Fresenius Medical Care AG decided to end a joint 
venture with a Chinese hospital, because of the possibility o f trade in organs by the 
partner firm.424 425Levi Strauss & Co. decided to withdraw from China in 1993 after it 
learnt that child and prison labour was used at its factories and that there was military 
presence. Its guidelines prohibit it from using factories where such exploitation occurs. 
Yet, it never fully abandoned China, but reduced production from 3 million to 800.000 
units and stopped selling clothes there. No other American firm has followed the 
example o f Levis. In 1998, a time o f increasing political and commercial friendliness 
between the US and China, the company decided to resume its ties with China. Its 
hope is to find producers who will adhere to the company’s guidelines.423
c. trade figures
Admittedly, China is too big a temptation for international firms to abandon. Trade 
between the EU and China is governed by the 1985 Trade and Co-operation 
Agreement which is revised constantly by the EC-China Joint Committee. China has 
become the EU’s fourth largest supplier in the world (3rd position counting Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan) and the 7th (3rd if one includes Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan) largest export market. The trade surplus of China in 1996 was 15,344 billion 
ECU42 526 and 20 billion ECU in 1997 which reflects China’s potential as well as its 
remaining market barriers.427 China mainly imports goods, machinery and advanced 
technology from the EU alongside with EU investment in China.428 According to the
424 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5.3.98 „FMC kuendigt in China Joint-venture auf*.
425 International Herald Tribune, 9,4.98, „Jeans Maker to Resume Its China Business“, p. 1 ,4 .
426 European Commission Delegation (note 397), p. Is.
427 European Commission, ,.Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China“, COM (98) 181 
final, http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg01/chincom.htm, p. 9.
European Commission (note 397), p. Is.428
I*4 , i
110
World Bank, in 2020, China will become one of the top three traders429 and Sir Leon 
Brittan has said it will have surmounted the economy o f the US by then.430
Despite trade and economic integration being one o f  the main pillars of the European 
project towards an ever closer Union, it is no solution to give up any active human 
rights policy with regard to one country. On the one hand, such a policy would become 
awfully arbitrary, and on the other hand, would lead to a loss of credibility for the 
whole enterprise.
2. Is the positive approach not the right way to promote human rights?
The positive approach of the Union as it was sketched out above, includes first and 
second pillar measures although it was developed with regard to the Community alone. 
It will be mentioned here, because China is a striking, not necessarily positive, example 
o f this approach.
One important drawback of the positive approach is the danger o f hypocrisy. How can 
an organization like the Union, which proclaims human rights to be one of the 
„cornerstones of European co-operation“431 and has further expressed this will in the 
Maastricht Treaty432 deal with a country that constantly violates internationally 
accepted rules without losing credibility? Moreover, the arbitrary side of such a policy 
must not be forgotten: smaller states can get away with little, whilst China has a big 
margin as to its behaviour before action is taken.433 Additionally, the political message,
429 European Commission (note 427), p. 9.
430 European Report N o.2288,4.2.98, p. V-4.
431 Statement on human rights (note 90), pt. 2.4.4., p. 100.
432 European Commission, „The European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights 
Policy: From Rome to M aastricht and Beyond“, COM (95) 567 final, especially p. 21.
433 M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 318ss in  this respect compares China and Haiti. The Joint Assembly 
under the Lomé convention noted that China is granted a more lenient attitude than most of the 
ACP countries, K. Tomasevski, Between Sanctions and Elections, 1997, p. 43s, see also the 
discussion on a procedure for the implementation o f Art. 366s of the Lomé convention,
f
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demanding internal change, which is proclaimed towards China, is unlikely to reach the 
Chinese Government, if all economic advantages stay in force and political relations 
remain untouched. In such a constellation, there is no need for change. Last, but not 
least, suspicion has been raised that an EU labour law policy in third countries and the 
inclusion o f the human rights clause in trade agreements is mainly driven by 
protectionist ambitions and not so much by concern for the rights of the workers and 
people.* 434 435Implemented in this way, human rights policy becomes empty rhetoric.
On the other hand, the big advantage of positive measures, i.e. prevention, should not 
be dismissed either. The Commission m its Communication on the External 
Dimension of human rights policy436 437, explained some of the correlations between an 
active human rights policy and conflict prevention by saying that many of the 
international conflicts are rooted in a deep disregard o f human rights. Those violations 
lead to upheaval which then generates further violations. In sum, a vicious circle is 
created. An active human rights policy aims at diminishing reasons for conflict and at 
creating an environment, conducive to human rights. An important factor o f this policy 
is the realization that change can only come from the inside and cannot be imposed. 
That explains why election-monitoring and support for NGOs are such crucial factors 
in EU policy.
In conclusion, the positive approach surely is in danger of becoming a policy of 
hypocrisy and arbitrariness. However, if applied comprehensively, negative measures 
might either not be necessary or can be applied with caution as ultima ratio, which, in *43567
European Parliament, Committee on development and Cooperation, In te r im  R ep o rt, EP doc. A4- 
0175/97, especially p. 10.
434 Ch. Muzaffar (note 228), p. 72s; P. Alston, „Linking Trade and Human Rights“, in: G erm an  
Y e a rb ook  o f  In te rn a t io n a l Law , 1980, Vol.23, pp. 126-158, p. 132, 149.
435 see also P. Alston (note 40), for the advantages o f a positive linkage of trade and human rights.
436 COM (95) 567 final.
437 P. Alston (note 40), p. 169; M. Marin, Democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, in: The  
C o u r ie r , 128, 1991, pp. 50-51.
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return, gives credibility to such an approach. The policy of constructive engagement 
with China, where negative measures are completely excluded, does not have the 
possibility to gain credibility by reference to this „last resort“. Section II is an attempt 
to shed further light on a possible justification for the purely positive approach of co­
operation with China. It asks whether China indeed might be a „human rights 
exception“ and has to be treated like one for good reasons. In that case, this attitude 
should be made public to prevent criticism from smaller states about arbitrariness.
3. The CFSP - too weak a procedure
Much has been written about the poor image Europe projected in recent regional or 
international crises and in international fora.438 Much o f this criticism can be explained 
by the „capability-expectations gap“439 that has plagued European foreign policy from 
its beginning and means that there are serious differences between the role Europe is 
expected by in- and outsiders to play in the world and the internal ability to do so: 
decision-making, resources and instruments.440 Since 1954, when the European 
Defence initiative failed due to France’s veto, and with the Fouchet-plan in the 1970s, 
a concept has taken possession of the European foreign policy and is still the main 
reason for a rather reactive policy: intergovemmentalism.441 It is reflected in the
438 For example in September 1996, the EU could not find a  common stand as to how to react to the 
Iraqian violations o f the protected zones and the US attack in response, in  April 1997 the EU 
was unable to cooperate whether to table a resolution on China at the UN-Commission, an EU- 
ASEAN agreement in  February 1997 was cancelled because o f differences between Portugal and 
Indonesia, M. Dembinski (note 70), p. 8s; For Yugoslavia and the EPC see P. von Jagow, „Das 
Krisenmanagement der EG/EPZ im Jugoslawienkrieg • Eine gemischte Bilanz, in: E. 
Regelsberger (ed.) (note 47), pp. 85-93.
439 Ch. Hill, „The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role“, 
in: J o u r n a l o f  C om m on  M a rk e t S tud ies , No.3, 1993, Völ.31, pp. 305-328.
440 ibid., p. 315.
441 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe (note 252), p. 3s; The CFSP is an intergovernmental procedure, K. W. 
Lange, „Die Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europaeischen Union“, in: JZ , 
No.9, 1996, Vol.51, pp. 442-448, p. 442; J. Janning, „Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach 
Maastricht“, in: Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), M a a s t r ic h t  in  d e r A na ly se . M aterialien zur
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unanimity principle and the limited role o f the supranational Commission and the 
European Parliament in the CFSP. Moreover, because of the exclusion of jurisdiction 
by the ECJ in the field o f the CFSP, the established obligations for the Member States 
to co-ordinate their action and to speak with one voice (see above) cannot be legally 
enforced and thus remain rather limited.
The next part will discuss the unanimity principle as a main impediment to progress 
and as too weak a procedure to combine the divergent interests o f the Member States 
in an area traditionally at the core o f national sovereignty: the foreign policy.* 442 The 
instruments o f the CFSP require unanimity (or at least consensus as an alternative form 
of unanimity443) and only very restricted possibilities for majority vote exist. Maastricht 
introduced them for the first time in Art. J.8 IITEU  and this can be regarded as a „saut 
qualitatif ‘ compared with the EPC.444 Often, however, the very limited opening-up to 
majority voting is seen as too small a change to improve the efficiency of the CFSP.445 
Art. J.8 II TEU provides for majority vote in two cases: administrative questions446 
and Art. J.3 II TEU. The latter concerns the implementation of joint actions, but the 
areas in which measures can be decided by majority vote have to be defined before by
Europaeischen Union. Strategien und Optionen fuer Europa, Bertelsmann, Guetersloh 1994, pp. 
55-69, p. 63.
442 M. Dembinski (note 70), p. 8, 14,18.
443 W. Wessels, „Von der EPZ zur GASP - Therorienpluralismus mit begrenzter Aussagekraft“, in: 
E. Regelsberger (ed.) (note 47), pp. 9-29, p. 19; An abstention can already prevent a decision to 
be taken as Art. 148 III TEC is not mentioned in  A rt J . l l  I TEU, K. W. Lange (note 441), p. 
444; This changed after Amsterdam, Art. J.13 I TEU, E. Regelsberger, M. Jopp, „Und sie 
bewegt sich doch! Die Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach den Bestimmungen des 
Amsterdamer Vertrages“, in: In te g ra t io n , No.4, 1997, Vol.20, pp. 255-263, p. 260,
444 E. Regelsberger, „EPZ und GASP - attraktiver Verbund mit Schlupfloechem“, in: E. 
Regelsberger (ed.) (note 47), pp. 179-192, p. 188, for the external observer, the introduction of 
majority voting may seem more than due, but for some diplomat it might still seem as a quasi 
revolutionary act in  the field o f „high politics“; N. Petersen, „The European Union and Foreign 
and Security Policy“, in: Ole Noergaard, Thomas Pedersen, N. Petersen (ed.) (note 256), pp. 9- 
30, p. 22 „majority voting was one of the toughest issues concerning the CFSP“ at the IGC for 
Maastricht.
445 see M. Dembinski (note 70).
446 Administrative questions are, according to the Council’s rules of procedure, decided by simple 
majority, I. Macleod, I. D. Henry, S. Hyett (note 52), p. 421.
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the Council unanimously according to Art. J.8 II TEU.447 All in all, one Member State 
can still prevent the Union from going ahead by blocking decisions448 and the 
complicated procedure of Art. J.3 II TEU is reflected in the fact that it has not been 
used so far.449 The declaration No.27 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty does not 
introduce another form of majority voting, but only reflects the political intention of 
the Member States not to block a decision with the veto right if a qualified majority 
exists; it is not a legally binding provision.450
During the negotiations for the Treaty of Amsterdam, the reform of the unanimity vote 
was only favoured by Germany, Benelux, the Commission and the Parliament, whereas 
England, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Ireland opposed the 
introduction o f further majority voting.451 After hard discussions, a new Art. J. 13 TEU 
was included in the Treaty whose structure Elfriede Regelsberger describes as „late 
baroque“.452 It introduces two significant changes to the decision-making procedure. 
One regards ‘common strategies’ and the other, the possibility of constructive 
abstention.
Common strategies are a new instrument in the CFSP procedure, which have the 
particularity that they are decided by the European Council by unanimity, but that 
common positions, joint actions or any other decision implementing („on the basis o f‘)
447 This compromise was finally found, because the United Kingdom opposed any automatic 
majority vote, G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.) 
(note 33), Art. J.3, No. 12; K. W. Lange (note 441), p. 444 the decision concerns  only the 
„HOW“ and not the „ IF 4 of a jo in t action.
448 J. Monar, ,JDas duale System von EG und EPZ/GASP im Test - vorprogrammierte 
Konfliktszenarien44, in: E. Regelsberger (ed.) (note 47), pp. 75-84, p. 83.
449 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), 
Ait. J.3, No. 12; „The Debate44, in: A. A  Dashwood (ed.) (note 31), p.263 the reason why the 
provision has not been invoked so far is not that Member States have blocked it, bu t that they 
didn’t think it was necessary.
450 G. Burghardt, G. Tebbe, in: H. v. d. Groeben, J. Thiesing, C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.) (note 33), 
Art. J.3, No. 13.
451 M. Dembinski (note 70), p. 45.
452 E. Regelsberger, M. Jopp (note 443), p. 260.
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the common strategy shall be decided by majority vote (Art. 23 TEU (CV)). The 
problem with the common strategies is that it is very unlikely that the Heads o f State in 
the European Council at their tense meetings will be able to decide on such precise 
common strategies that lay the ground for majority vote by the Foreign Ministers in the 
CFSP. Moreover, the ‘security clause* enables the Member States to prevent decisions 
from being taken as soon as national interests are at stake.433 If the other Member 
States in this latter case can find a qualified majority, then the decision to invoke 
national interests is regarded as merely postponed and transferred to the European 
Council for resolution by unanimity (Art. 23 II TEU). It becomes clear from these 
provisions, though, that the use o f the veto is discouraged and would be deemed a 
„serious step ;
The second innovation concerns a more flexible procedure in decision-making. The 
idea was taken up after the negotiating partners had realized that an improvement in 
majority voting would be very hard to reach.453 45The new procedure resembles the 
flexibility provisions introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty in the first and third pillar, 
but does not belong to flexibility „strictu senso“.453 56 It is no closer co-operation 
between two or more states (as for example regulated in the field of defence, Art. 
J.4. V TEU), but allows one third of the Member States to abstain constructively from 
a decision without preventing the others from acting together in the name o f the Union 
(Art. 23 TEU (CV)). The question remains, however, how credible a joint measure 
will be when it is not supported by one or two (the limit being one third o f the votes) 
o f the big Member States437 or when an embargo is imposed by 10 states only, but the
453 M. Dembinski (note 70), p. 50; E. Regelsberger, M. Jopp (note 443), p. 260s.
454 ibid., p. 261 they see it as being doubtful whether the veto will only be used in rare cases or 
whether it will become the rule for putting pressure on the decision-making process.
455 M. Dembinski (note 70), p. 46.
456 European Policy Centre, „Legal Analysis“ (note 55), p. 119; T. Dodd; R. Ware; A. Weston (note 
31), p. 28.
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other 5 states continue trade with the target state even though the „spirit o f mutual 
solidarity“ prohibits them to do that.458
All in all, the structure and procedures of the CFSP are not always respected by the 
Member States in the conduct o f their foreign policies despite their legal nature. The 
conflicting views as to how best to implement a foreign policy and which objectives to 
pursue make it very hard to agree on common objectives, such as human rights, to be 
pursued commonly in the global arena.
4. Internal structure with a view to human rights issues
ii
f
| It was already mentioned in Chapter 3 that certain institutional arrangements had been
i made to ensure the coherence of the Union’s external activities. This part will
i
investigate the „case o f human rights“ and the internal organizational structure set up 
1 to ensure that human rights play a role in the policy-formulation process of the CFSP.
All the bodies involved in the CFSP, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, 
have, since the 1980s, created special institutions to prepare their respective human 
rights initiatives.459 Most human rights issues that are discussed in the Parliament are 
prepared by the Subcommittee on Human Rights in conjunction with the Committee 
on Development and Cooperation and the Committee on External Economic 
Relations.460 As regards the Commission, a Unit on Human Rights and 
Democratization acts under the auspices of DG I A. In 1988, when it was installed, it 
formed a unit o f the General Secretariat of the Commission, but was transferred to DG
457 E. Regelsbergcr, „EPZ und GASP - attraktiver Veibund mit Schlupfloechem“, in: E. 
Regelsberger (ed.) (note 47), pp. 179-192, p. 189.
458 M. Dembinski (note 70), p. 46.
459 M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 316.
460 E. Boumans, M. Norbait, „The European Parliament and Human Rights“, in: N Q H R , No.l, 
1989, Vol. 7, pp. 37-55, p. 39.
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IA in 1993.461 Its task is to inform the different Directorate-Generals about human 
rights issues and to co-ordinate their action.462 Within the Council structure, there are 
several working groups established to provide the political committee and the 
COREPER with the relevant information on current issues and to prepare the issues 
for consideration. In 1994, the working groups o f the political committee and the 
COREPER were fused because o f the common institutional structure introduced at 
Maastricht.463 In practice, this co-ordination lacks efficiency and led the Council in 
1995 to introduce a unified process for the preparation of the decisions.464 A human 
rights working group within the Council has been given the task of co-ordination 
among the different working groups instead o f preparing issues for decision-making 
(as do the other working groups) 465
The general battle for competences between the Commission and the Council, the 
different committees of the Council and the working groups raises doubts as to the 
conviction to pursue one common aim - human rights, for example - jointly. As long as 
these institutions are more interested in securing their power, efficiency will be lost and 
rapid co-operation will be impossible.466 According to Fouwels,467 the human rights 
working groups of the Council and of the Commission lack resources and respect in 
the institutional arrangements and are therefore not capable really to influence human 
rights decisions. She sees the situation in the Parliament to be slightly better, although
461 Annual Mémorandum on the activities of the Twelve in  the field of human rights, 15.5.1991, 
E u ro p e a n  P o li t ic a l  C o o p é ra t io n  B u lle t in  1991, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications 
1994, Vol.7, pp. 236-237.
462 M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 316.
463 P. W illaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des 
lieux“, in: A. Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 266.
464 ibid., p. 266.
465 M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 316.
466 P. Willaert, C. Marquéz-Ruiz, „Vers une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: état des 
lieux“ , in: A. Mattera (ed.) (note 48), pp. 253-314, p. 304.
467 M. Fouwels (note 56), p. 317.
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improvement is still needed. One important change would certainly be to re-transfer 
the Commission’s human rights working group to the General Secretariat of the 
Commission and to extend the powers of the Council’s human rights working group 
beyond mere co-ordinating functions.
This section has examined some o f the reasons for the insubstantial engagement of the 
EU in human rights and the sometimes disappointing results. These results do not 
mean, however, that improvements are impossible, but on the contrary should incite 
strategies for action. The next big section (II.) focuses on the ‘China-case’ and tries to 
give points o f reference for future action of the Union.
n .  Guidelines for action
In this part, the focus will be exclusively on China and the investigation centers around 
the question of the right way to deal with this economically and strategically important 
country. Certainly, the tailoring of a strategy for one target country does not resolve 
the problem that an overall strategy has not yet been developed. The intention, 
however, is to start with a particular case and develop more comprehensive 
conclusions on another occasion.
1. Assessing the human rights situation of a country
If the Union wants to build up a strategy for China including CFSP and Community 
tools, it has to have some information as to the human rights situation in the country 
and some reference points for assessment as to whether a human rights violation has 
taken place and whether an immediate response is needed. As regards monitoring of
li
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the situation, the EU, according to Martine Fouwels,468 has been mainly inspired by the 
joint reports of the heads of mission in Beijing, and thus not by international NGOs. 
The scope o f the paper does not allow an own assessment of the real human rights 
situation in China which would require a far deeper analysis of country and population, 
but restricts itself to considering theoretical indicators of the general human rights 
situation with the aim o f contributing to the elaboration of a China strategy. Inspiration 
is taken from the well-elaborated evaluation of EC positive measures by Wolfgang 
Heinz, Hildegard Lingnau and Peter Waller469, as well as the draft evaluation of the 
Phare and Tacis democracy programmes.470 Indicators of a bad human rights 
performance and substantive lack o f democratic institutions are:
- one-party rule or dictatorial regime. No democratic elections.
- only limited competition for political power, for example no regular elections or 
manipulations of the elections.
- restriction of the political participation o f the citizens.
- no functioning opposition.
- the parliament is not in charge of drafting or authorizing laws.
- No investigation in cases of human rights abuses and no penalties for the culprits.
- no possibilities for the citizens to pursue their rights either through institutions at 
communal level or through national courts.
468 „The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Human Rights“, in: N Q H R , 
Vol. 15/3, 1997, pp. 291-324, p. 319.
469 W, Heinz, H. Lingnau, P. Waller, E v a lu ie ru n g  von  P o s i tivm assnahm en  d e r E u ro p a e isc h en  
K o m m is s io n  z u r  F o e rd e ru n g  v o n  M enschen rech ten  u n d  D e m o k ra t ie  (1 9 91 -1993 ), Deutsches 
Insitut fuer Entwicklungspolitik, Berlin Mai 1995, p 24ss.
470 „Final Report. Draft. Evaluation of the Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme. 1992-1997“, 
unpublished paper, p. 14 main criteria of formal democracy, p. 17 main features o f substantive 
democracy.
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- human rights violations by public authorities such as police forces or armed forces.
- discrimination of NGOs working in the fields of human rights.
- press censorship and discrimination or press monopoly.
- intoleration o f religious or ethnic groups, oppression.
These indicators basically describe the political system of an authoritarian regime. 
They do not tell the policy-makers when to take action. Certainly, no economic 
interest should prevail in the case o f gross and persistent violations of basic human 
rights by the state authority, such as the use o f force towards the peaceful activities 
of the population, economic policies that lead to massive starvation, disappearances 
and ethnic cleansing. But what should be done in relation to political prisoners, 
labour camps, child labour, the death penalty, press censorship, restrictions o f the 
freedom o f expression and the absence of a right to political participation?
Almost everyone of the above listed indicators is satisfied with respect to China and 
the above mentioned human rights violations occur there frequently. How can the 
Union make use of its instruments without imposing its Western system on a 
„cultural relativist“ China and without capitulating to economic interests? The 
action to be taken with regard to China will be discussed in the following part. 
Here, a general analysis as to how the target country might develop in the next 
years, which o f course also belongs to a comprehensive strategy, should be given 
first. What are the most likely developments in China? Dieter Senghaas471 assumes 
that China still lacks a civil society that can be addressed by external programmes.
He thus regards the support for its establishment as a first step and as a condition 
for change. According to him, economic actors can become „quasi groups“ which
471 „Wie geht es mit China weiter?“, B e ric h te  des A rb e its b e re ic h e s  C h in a fo rsc hung  im  In s t i t u t  f ü r  
Weltwirtschaß und  in te rn a t io n a le s  M anagem en t, Nr. 7, Juli 1996, Universität Bremen.
B
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build interest groups which then openly articulate their opinions and finally exercise 
influence in the political process. He states that the monopoly of the Communist 
Party cannot be sustained for long, as it is forced to enter into competition with 
these new actors. In the next years, China will display a mixture of authoritarian 
system and a growing civil society. It will be crucial, he asserts, how the Communist 
Party reacts to these internal developments. In the economic sphere, the 
development o f China is likely to persist and even increase (see above, trade 
figures). The IMF's forecast for China's growth in 1998 was 7 percent, but they are 
now pessimistic about that prediction.472 China's population of 1.2 billion will 
continue to increase to 1.6 billion, but will be trumped by India with 1.64 billion by 
2050.473 The armament o f China has already been mentioned elsewhere.474 In terms 
of energy, China is already the second largest consumer and third largest producer 
worldwide.475
2. The range of measures applicable to China in theory and practice
Before assessing the type of measures suitable to deal with China as regards human 
rights, the Chinese arguments against any active human rights policy discussed in 
Chapter 2 will be examined to provide the theoretical base for future action.
472 International Herald Tribune, 28.4.98, „IMF Is Cautious on China Growth“.
473 Statistisches Bundesamt, »Mitteilung filer die Presse“, http://www.statistik- 
bund.de/presse/deutsch/pm/p6260220.htm, p.3.
474 note 400.
475 S ir  L . B r i t ta n  in  a  sp e e ch , E u ro p e a n  R e p o rt N o .2 2 8 8 ,4 .2 .9 8 , p . V -4 .

I 122
a. How can the Chinese position be constructively criticized? 
aa. Confucianism and Human Rights
Confucius relied to a large extent on order and discipline, but according to Amartya 
Sen476 he was no more authoritarian than Plato or Augustine. The question is, he 
states, not whether these tendencies are very strong in Chinese or Asian societies, but 
whether other, more liberal elements are absent from them. Buddhist thought, for 
example, is also widespread in Asian countries and is much more egalitarian and admits 
liberal ideas. Moreover, according to Sen, the authoritarian rulers of some Asian 
countries champion Confucianism in a way that might support their arguments but is 
not always faithful to Confucian. Certainly, he was not a democrat, but it is too easy to 
equate him with the authoritarian ruler who does not respect freedom or allow 
dissent.477 Confucian, for example, was not a supporter of the tight regulation as 
regards the freedom of the people to organize, discuss, meet express themselves which 
exists in many Asian states. He recognized the importance of virtue and believed that 
law or coercion was not the right way to organize society.478 Thus the freedom of 
speech was a significant feature o f the Analects. It included „expression“, „careful 
speech“ and „silence“. The first component meant the act of speaking out and 
scrutinizing the government, whereas the second mainly referred to the rulers and 
warned them not to lay down arbitrary orders; the third, finally, concerned the right to 
abstain from expression if so wished.479 If consensus-finding is such an important 
element o f Confucian thought, why do Asian governments then need such extensive 
regulation with many types of prohibitive laws? Another weak point in the current
476 A  Sen (note 11), p. 36.
477 ibid., p. 36.
478 Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 18.
479 D. Gangjian, S. Gang, „Relating Human Rights to Chinese Culture. The Four Paths o f the 
Confucian Analects and the Four Principles o f a New Theoiy of Benevolence“, in: M. C. Davis 
(ed.) (note 18), pp. 35-56, p. 42.
JIJ
123
championing of Confucianism for political ends is that elements of individualism were, 
for example, present in the notion of benevolence which the Analects proclaimed. 
Every person was said to have his own ability to reach benevolence, liberty was 
inherent in the human person and co-ordination of internal and external elements could 
only be achieved through a centering on the human being.480 These liberal ideas have 
recently gained firmer ground in China as expressed in conferences and intellectual 
discussions 481 Moreover, rulers in Confiician times were meant to be benevolent and 
to act according to moral codes. John F. Copper482 in this context talks about the 
„well-developed concept o f humanism“ in Chinese history and compares it to the 
modern ideology of human rights. According to him political freedoms, in the sense of 
individual freedoms and protection from unrestrained rulers, as well as economic rights 
can be discerned. The crucial question for him is whether and how these concepts of 
traditional China have survived communism. Further, there also was resistance against 
political authority in Confiician thought based on the idea of seeking justice. According 
to the Analects one could refuse to serve non-benevolent rulers and choose not to co­
operate with them. Confucius even attacked despotic actions by rulers and advocated a 
right o f active resistance against non-benevolent rulers, albeit on the condition that 
such resistance was non-violent.483
481 International Herald Tribune, „Liberal Thought Blooms In a New Beijing Spring“, 20.4.98, p. 1 
and 11. Mr, Mao, the economist, said at a forum on a book review of one of the harshest critics 
of socialism that respect for individual’s rights, including the right to pursue one’s self-interest 
are very important elements o f a society.
482 J. F. Copper, „Defining Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China“, in; Wu, Yuan-li; M., 
Franz; Copper, J. F.; Lee, Ta-ling; Chang, Maria Hsia; Gregor, A.James (eds.) (note 170), pp. 9- 
17, p. 9.
483 H, H. Sunoo, C h in a  o f  C o n fu c iu s : A  C r i t ic a l In te rp re ta t io n , Heritage Research House, Inc., 
Virginia Beach 1985, p. 23; Mencius later suggested to also use violent means to resist 
oppressive rule, D. Gangjian, S. Gang, „Relating Human Rights to Chinese Culture. The Four 
Paths o f the Confiician Analects and the Four Principles o f a New Theory of Benevolence“, in: 
M. C. Davis (ed.) (note 18), pp. 35-56, p. 49, 47ss.
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It was mentioned above that in the Coniucian order, there was no place for rights, 
because the ruler had the duty to be benevolent towards his citizens, and the citizen the 
duty to pursue social order. This agenda is said to lead to harmony, stability and honor, 
whereas rights lead to the collapse of community.484 48567Despite the humanistic aspects of 
duties their emphasis also perpetuates an unequal social setting as the subordinated has 
the obligation to accept these social distinctions.485 4867Rather than imposing duties on 
every person, they serve to deny the lower classes their rights and to maintain the 
privileges o f the ruling classes. This inversion of the concept of duties can be rather
i Q /
dangerous if used to maintain intolerant rule.
To conclude, Coniucian was authoritarian, but did not praise unthinking obedience to 
authority. Through the concept of justice, benevolence and duties of the rulers, 
humanistic elements can be discerned in his philosophy provided the necessary will to 
see these elements prevails.
The feu d a l system in China basically relied on Coniucian thought to maintain order and 
social class distinctions by enforcing the laws. It is not surprising that the notion of 
human rights was not included in its legal texts (one monolithic code), but that, on the 
contrary, the legal rules mainly relied on criminal law, i.e. on prohibitions and 
punishments. The law was not made to protect individuals, but to suppress. 
Additionally, the way in which the economy was organized as agriculturally 
autonomous could not promote freedom and equality.488 Even though, as has been 
shown above, humanist elements can be found in traditional China within the concept
484 Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 19.
485 ibid., p. 18s.
486 M. Ng, „Are Rights Culture-bound?“, in: M. C. Davis (ed.) (note 18), pp. 59-71, p. 66, she even 
advocates that moral rules were first and foremost imposed on the rulers.
487 Chenguang, W., „Introduction: A n Emerging Legal System“, in: Chenguang, W .t Xianchu, Z.
(eds.) (note 21), pp. 1-30, p. 5s.
ib id ., p . 6 .488
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of ,,li“, the law or „fa“ did not include significant humanist elements. The socialist rule 
after 1949 established a completely new legal system, breaking with the traditional 
Chinese law. The reason for this move was the realization by the end of the 19th 
century (already), that the old law despite its merits (emphasis on the educational 
function o f law, mixed system o f codification and precedents, stabilizing function of 
law), represented too big an obstacle for modernization in the 20th century.489
bb. Socialism
In Chapter 2 the emergence of a socialist understanding of human rights was 
discussed. Among the first features was that the main alleged advantage of the socialist 
system is that the ruling classes determine the content of politics and law and thus 
respect the rights of the poor. This ruling class, in the struggle for democratic 
dictatorship, is assisted by the State and the Party in achieving this aim. The State and 
the Party are even the vanguard o f the proletariat, and only they know and have the 
power to implement what is good for the people to lead them to socialism. 
Nevertheless, the ruling class is not the class that determines how the power in the 
country is exercised, nor what the content o f  politics is. The system of the socialist 
state does not allow real participation o f the people in Government. As already 
discussed, the Chinese state consists o f the NPC, elected in „democratic“ vote and 
based on a one-party system. The government (and the Courts) are organs o f the 
Congress and directly accountable to it. If, in a socialist country, the world is better 
because the ruling class is the working class and determines the content of politics, the 
question raised is HOW they can determine it when the government is not representing 
the people’s will, but is governed by Party politics.
489 ibid., p. 8.
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Secondly, the individual has to subordinate himself or herself to the community. This 
high value given to the community can be criticized in various ways. First o f all, when 
the community argument is used to oppose Western liberal and individualistic concepts 
o f human rights by Asian states including socialist China, they do not take into account 
that Western liberalism embodies notions of communitarianism in the sense that public 
interest plays a role in the limitation of a right or that liberal thought admits variations 
from one country to another. In a second place, their argument is dangerous because 
they seem inclined to assert that that the state is the community and that individuals 
consequently have to serve the interest of the state (instead of the community).490
Thirdly, the insistence on the economic and social situation of the country is 
unconvincing for several reasons. It is submitted by China that the right to subsistence 
as the prime economic right enjoys precedence over all other rights. The 
„achievements“ in attaining the right to life for everybody during Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward, when millions of people starved to death, are not considered by the Chinese 
government,491 and the Chinese government seems to judge its progress in satisfying 
the right to subsistance by the fact o f the regime’s survival. Additionally, the right to 
life should also concern a person’s well-being. But how can the Chinese government 
justify the inhumane treatment o f its political prisoners kept for many years without 
formal trial and subject to torture?
Fourthly, the right to life is equated by China with the need to obtain stability at all 
costs492 thus an individual right is transmuted into a right of the nation. However, the 
Chinese argument in this respect is unconvincing. It is championing stability, but a 
stability at any costs and as a prerequisite for human rights.493 But why are human
490 Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 18.
491 Institute o f Current China Studies, ,,CCP Sets Its Own Standards o f Human Rights“, Inside 
China Mainland, No.3, March 1995, Vol.17, Taipei, Taiwan R.O.C., p. 26.
492 ibid., p. 25.
493 ib id ., p . 2 4 .
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rights and stability mutually exclusive and why does stability trump human rights? No 
convincing argument can be found for that assumption except that it is in line with the 
Communist Party’s concern to remain in power. On the other hand, the „democratic 
mission“ o f the US seems to include strategies whereby political turmoil is accepted by 
supporting anti-government forces in order to reach the aim o f democratization.494 495
However, it is questionable whether it would not be better if such engagement took 
into account the consequences for the population and the global economy and either 
abstained from such policies or at least offered aid in the transition phase from „turmoil 
to democracy“. It is doubted whether the American Government is ready for that, and 
furthermore, whether it is the right approach.
Finally, Anne Bayefsky, in her article,493 challenges the affirmation of „cultural 
sovereignty“ and o f  human rights being a domestic issue made by Asian governments. 
She sees it as being „new excuses for old strategies1' because cultural sovereignty is 
nothing more than the old principle o f non-interference whose goal is to be intolerant 
without being subject to international scrutiny. China itself gave rise ^  • cvr 
in its own argumentation when it stated in its White paper that Chinese human rights 
stand up well to international comparisons, although it had previously rejected any 
international standards being applied to China because of its.49 596 Yash Ghai,497 explains 
that the result o f the modem approach to human rights, i.e. linking them to global 
^sues, was that it highlighted the achievements o f the UN system in the field c 
international protection o f human rights. One of these achievements is the fact that 
human rights are no longer seen as being exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states, but are viewed as being subject to international scrutiny, and, in the case of
494 D. K. Mauzy (note 185), p. 220, 214.
495 „Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old 
Strategies“, in: R a tio  J u ris , N o.l, 1996, Vol. 9, pp. 42-59.
496 G. Luoji (note 176), p. 4.
(n o te  193), p . 3 .497
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some fundamental rights, also a legitimate condition for bilateral negative action. The 
legitimacy o f the interest in another state’s human rights performance, he goes on, has 
also been pushed by the acceptance by third states as to the role of external aid in the 
establishment of human rights and democracy and the public support of such 
activities.498 Nevertheless, he acknowledges, the assertion that human rights are a 
matter o f international concern is not uncontested among, especially, some Asian 
states. They argue that state sovereignty is a paramount principle of international law 
and, thus, that it has to be respected also in the field of human rights.499 All in all, 
through the development o f international human rights law, individuals have also 
become (partial) subjects of international law. Thus regulated, state-individual relations 
might concern one part o f state sovereignty (the internal one), but the 
internationalization o f human rights has had the result o f legitimizing this 
„infringement“.
cc. The universality debate
One unfortunate point about the value dispute which dominates the universality debate 
is that it only really started or revived by ASEAN in regional conferences in 
preparation for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. The Asian countries 
realized they had more force when they spoke together, that they shared the common 
idea o f  blocking aid conditionality and trade sanctions (aiming at the ‘export of 
Western values’) and finally had assumed more relative global power through their 
undeniable economic success.500 Even if it is accepted that Asian values are different,
498 ibid., p. 4.
499 White paper 1991, p. 84; A. Kent (note 10), p. 48, individuals are seen as only subject to 
municipal law.
500 G. Robinson, „Human rights in  Southeast Asia: rhetoric and reality“, in: D. Wurful and Bruce 
Burton (eds.), S o u th e a s t A s ia  in  the  „N e w  W o rld  O rd e r” :  T he  P o lit ic a l E c on om y o f  a  D yn am ic  
R e g io n ", Sl Martins Press, New York 1996, pp. 74-99, p. 84-92; D. K. Mauzy (note 185), p. 
220, 217; Despite their common approach the proponents of cultural relativism, especially

129
does it forcibly mean that international human rights are not applicable in Asia or, less 
strongly, necessarily subject to different interpretations? According to Sen301, the thesis 
that Asian values are less supportive of freedom and that thereby claims for respect of 
civil and political rights are not appropriate in Asian countries, cannot be upheld. 
Political freedom and democracy, he states, are certainly not ancient features of 
Chinese culture and political life, but this does not mean that components of the 
concept o f liberty are absent in Asian countries, even if ideas and doctrines contrary to 
liberty are supported. Last but not least, Sen says, the argument that the enforcement 
o f civil and political rights in Asia is a form of Western hegemony is unconvincing 
because the people of Asia can demand liberty themselves, even if it was first 
championed in the West. The interpretation of human rights by Asian governments is 
based on their interest in authoritarian rule, but not on the fact that the Asian society 
does not know of, support or desire human rights.302 The official view of Asian 
countries that is expressed on international conferences or bilateral debates reflects the 
view of the ruling elite which alone has the power to get the international attention. 
The expediency of their rule and the need to justify authoritarian regimes makes this 
ideology necessary for the leaders.303 Richard Robison304 argues that, „Asian values 
have been manufactured by leaders“. The background to this manufacturing is that the 
opening up of China in the 1980s was a move of necessity in order to get China out of 
an economic crisis, but made it unavoidable that China’s human rights record was put 
under international scrutiny as well. The problem of the Chinese Communists then was 
that if they really responded to the international claims for respect of human rights, *501234
China, Singopore, Malaysia and Indonesia, never specified what their common values were, A. 
Pollis, „Towards a  New Universalism; Reconstruction and Dialogue“, in: N Q H R , N o.l, 1989, 
Vol. 16, pp. 5-23, p. 18.
501 A  Sen (note 11).
502 A  Bayefsky (note 187), p. 43.
503 Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 6.
504 R. Robison, „The politics o f Asian values“, in: The P a c ific  R e v iew , No.3, 1996, Vol. 9, pp. 309- 
327, p. 312.
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they would lose their hold on power.305 The question of course remains, how the 
Chinese government can claim to represent the values of its people if they do not have 
the possibility to express their opinions in freedom either through public statements or 
through elections?50 06
Last, but not least, it must not be forgotten that Chinese socialism is founded on 
Western (Marxist) values and in full support of Western values in this respect.507 It can 
therefore be called into question that Asian countries reject all Western values as being 
hegemonic and not applicable to their societies.
It was assumed that after Vienna the consensus found concerned the universal nature 
of human rights, but that their implementation depends on the social, cultural and 
economic situation o f every country. The task o f any human rights policy is now to 
promote human rights in a way that a common core interpretation can be found which 
preserves the „universal nature“ of the human right in question against the politics of 
an authoritarian regime. It should be realized that a common formulation of the 
universal nature does not solve the practical problems, but in a way is only a symbolic 
(and terminological) improvement. A challenging interpretation of universal human 
rights can in fact lead to the result that no universal values truly remain.
dd. Economic, social and cultural rights
Above, Chanda Muzaffar was cited to support the argument that economic and social 
rights must have precedence over civil and political rights, but he does not stop at that 
point. He argues that, despite the importance of economic and social rights in Asian
505 Institute of Current China Studies, „CCP Sets Its Own Standards of Human Rights“, Inside 
China Mainland, No.3, March 1995, Vol.17, Taipei, Taiwan R.O.C., p. 23s.
506 According to D. K. Mauzy (note 185), p. 218 it is „a thorny question in the Asian values 
debate.“
507 J. Donnelly, R. E. Howard, „Introduction“, in: J. Donnelly, R, E. Howard (eds.) (note 9), pp. 1-
28, p. 1.
1
131
countries, civil and political rights should not be disregarded, as some Asian 
governments tend to do. On the contrary, the people must have the right to ask for the 
accomplishment o f social and economic rights in using their freedom of expression. 
Only in this way can the right to development, which Asian governments constantly 
claim, be achieved.508 In line with the accusations of many Asian NGOs, the main 
reason for this behaviour is that Asian governments spare no expense in order to 
maintain their authoritarian rule509 or evade possibilities to be held accountable for 
respect o f human rights. What they really want is economic development in the sense 
o f the right to development for developing states, but not for their people. This is 
„understandable“ to the extent that it increases their resources, but intolerable in the 
context o f the human rights ideology.510
The Asian assumption that economic and social rights have precedence over civil and 
political rights can also be challenged from another perspective. What is the reason that 
a communitarian approach must prefer economic and social rights? Are the 
foundations of this set of rights more firmly established in Asian society than (missing) 
liberal elements? Yash Ghai511 argues that there is no ground for the assertion of a 
close (historical) link between Asian society and economic development. Should 
governments, he states, argue that the community element of Asian societies requires 
economic development, this is mistaken, because economic rights are rights of the 
individual and not o f the community (see above).
As concerns socialist argumentation, the fact that Marx emphasized economic and 
social rights to reach emancipation of the people did not mean that civil and political 
rights cannot play an important role for self-realization.512 It is interesting to note that
508 Ch. Muzaffar (note 228), p. 69.
509 see note 503.
510 Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 20.
5,1 ibid.,p. 19s.
SI2 A. Kent (note 10), p. 12.
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socialist China incorporated civil and political, as well as economic and social rights,
i.e. the majority o f the rights o f the UDHR, in all its Constitutions since 1954, even if, 
at that time, Red China was not a member o f the UN.513 5146
ee. No possibility for citizens to pursue their rights
On the one hand, the preamble514 516of the current Constitution is progressive in its 
inclusion o f the Communist Party in the enumeration of addressees. On the other hand 
it becomes clear that the Constitution is designed to provide duties but not rights, even 
if a whole section on the fundamental rights (and duties) of citizens can be found in its 
basic provisions. For a Chinese to pursue his „legal“ rights encounters the slight 
problem that, first, the Constitution cannot be invoked before courts313, and, second, 
that there is no institution for overseeing the Constitution. The NPC is the official 
organ for doing so, but it only convenes once a year and does not have the power to 
cancel unconstitutional acts.316 Moreover, in contrast to the official position, the 
provisions of the Constitution have not always been transferred into domestic laws on 
which citizens can rely; or worse, if there is domestic law, it sometimes even seems to 
contradict the constitutional provisions.317 When domestic law exists which concords 
with the constitutional provisions, the legal infrastructure is in most cases not sufficient 
to support a legal claim by an ordinary citizen. Thus, law is ignored and the citizen is
513 ibid., p. 45.
514 „The people of all nationalities, all State organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public 
organizations and all enterprises and institutions in the country must take the Constitution as the 
basic standard of conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the dignity of the Constitution and 
ensure its implementation/1
515 Wan Chenguang, „Introduction: An Emerging Legal System“, in: Wan Chenguang, Zhan 
Xianchu (eds.) (note 21), pp. 1*30, p. 18; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 30.3.98, „China's civil rights 
promises do not save dissident from labour camp“.
516 G. Luoji (note 176), p. 10.
ibid., p. 9.517
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deprived o f its rights. Last, but not least, Ait. 51 of the Constitution provides for 
extensive limitation o f the individual freedoms once national interest are at stake.518 *520
The judicial system o f China is very confusing as it is based on a mixture o f courts, 
procuratorates and public security organs as has been described above. In theory, the 
courts are bound by the constitutional principles such as equality before the law, 
independence, open trials, presumption of innocence.519 520In practice, there is much 
internal and external interference in the process of adjudication. Internally, it is the 
presidents and the division chiefs who have an influence on the outcome o f the final 
judgments. Externally, the Party, governmental organs and officials, corruption and 
other organizations influence the outcome o f the judgment. Even lawyers sometimes 
use the way of corruption to influence the judge’s ruling and by that contribute to the 
ongoing violation of the independence of the judiciary.320
ff. „In China, there are no human rights violations“
External critique can be blocked by simply referring to the national sovereignty and the 
illegitimacy o f those acts, no matter what the actual situation in the country is. Another 
possibility is to say that the values proclaimed by such a critique are not applicable in 
the country under scrutiny, regardless of the internal situation. Yet another approach is 
to counter the critique by saying that the internal situation might not concord with the
518 It declares: „when exercising their freedoms and rights, citizens should not violate the interest of 
the state, society and the collective and the lawful freedoms and rights o f other citizens.“, The 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, in: A. P. Blaustein, G. H. Flanz (eds.) (note 
178).
5,9 Z. Guobin, „Constitutional Law“, in: Chenguang, W.; Xianchu, Z. (eds.) (note 21), pp. 31-74, p. 
59.
520 Chenguang, W., „Introduction: An Emerging Legal System“, in: Chenguang, W., Xianchu, Z. 
(eds.) (note 21), pp. 1-30, p. 25s; International Herald Tribune, 28.4.98, „Increasingly, Chinese 
Are Telling It to the Judge“, p. 2 the courts are seen as corrupt, exposed to interference from 
local governments and staffed with poorly equipped judges. One outcome is that the courts are 
very undpredictable. Nevertheless, the new Chinese generation more and more tries to pursue its 
rights trough the court system.

134
view o f the external critic, but perfectly concords with the socialist view of human 
rights. Or, last but not least, that the internal respect o f human rights is at its fullest 
completion, there simply are no violations. The criticized country gradually accepts 
more and more of the international system of human rights, the closer it gets towards 
last assumption. One could say, it has „walked into the trap“ of human rights 
argumentation because the last two arguments require a comparison with the 
international system of human rights and in using the system as an external 
comparison, it must as a first step accept it. In this sense, the argument put forward by 
Chinese officials that there are no human rights violations could be seen as less 
threatening.
Chinese officials often state that there is no press censorship in China, but this is for 
the simple reason that the Chinese government owns all newspapers and publishing 
houses and there is therefore no need for censorship.321 The assertion that prison 
conditions are good and prisoners held in a satisfactory environment is constantly 
expressed by Chinese officials. The 1991 White paper does not mention, though, the 
high amount of simple administrative detention with little chance for appeal, and the 
little possibilities for the individual of legal defence. Prisoners are still often held in 
labour camps and their work serves as a source o f revenue. It is not clear whether the 
formal adherence to the Torture Convention in 1988 showed practical results as it is 
claimed by NGOs that torture is still common practice in many prisons, not to mention 
the use of the death penalty. Chinese territory is inhabited by 1.2 billion people out of 
which 10% belong to different minorities split in 56 nationalities. The Tibetan, 
Mongolian and East Turkistan minorities still pose problems of integration.322 Another 
example of ongoing human rights violations despite different assertions is the area of 
religious freedom in China. The Human Rights Watch/Asia report on state control of 521
521 G. Luoji (note 176), p. 7.
522 Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (note 227), p. 1 lss.
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religion in China523 affirms that state control over religious organizations has increased 
in the last years, but that systematic imprisonments combined with violence appear to 
be less frequent. The conditions for registration o f  an religious organization, which is 
necessary for the organization to conduct its activities are constantly narrowed down 
and made more difficult to satisfy. In doing so, China is in violation of Art. 18, 19 and 
20 of the UDHR.
In terms o f national laws, some improvements have been made, but severe violations of 
human rights are still to be found according to Amnesty International.524 For example 
the law on „re-education through labour“ has still not been abrogated and several new 
laws are even designed to limit fundamental freedoms. The amendments to the 
Criminal Law have changed some provisions on „counter-revolution“, but enhanced 
the range o f offences against national security.325
gg. Evaluation
It is submitted that all the arguments brought to the fore by China can be encountered 
in a constructive way by investigating their real aims, but one contradiction in all 
Western engagement in human rights remains, and that is hypocrisy. As long as 
Western governments do not implement a coherent human rights policy in their internal 
boarders, they cannot expect others to do so. As regards the Union, it is essential to 
create an internal legal base for it to conduct a comprehensive human rights policy. 
This could comprise the long-demanded adherence to the European Convention or a 
general legal basis for the conduct of its policy. Again in the external sphere, the
523 „China. State Control of Religion“, Vol.9, No. 10 (C), October 1997.
524 AI, „China. Concerns and Recommendations Asia-Europe Meeting 3-4 April 1998, London“, 
International Secretariat, February 1998, p. 2. 52
525 see also European Parliament, „Resolution on the Commission communication on a long term 
policy for China-Europe relations“, (A4-0198/97), OJ C 200/158ss, p. 160, par. O.
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attempt to issue a Regulation for the Community as concerns the management of aid is 
a first step in that direction, although it still only has to do with the external dimension. 
The current decline of morality and order in Western states does not speak in favour of 
their system either. Additionally, as long as Western governments and the Union base 
their conditionality only on violations of civil and political rights, and thus show a 
preference for this set of rights, it will be hard to explain why other countries should 
not have preference for the other set of rights.
If it is agreed, which in a way is the only realistic possibility, that there is scope for the 
interpretation o f rights (limited by the core meaning o f the right), but not for 
discussion about the nature of human rights (universal), nor the objective of the human 
rights movement, the social and economic context o f China has to be defined before 
the policy is implemented.526 As was said above, China sees human rights discourse as 
impacting on the very foundations o f its political system. The question is not how to 
decrease state power in a special constellation as in Western states, but how to 
introduce a human rights component to the whole execution of authoritarian state 
power. Moreover, even if the human rights record of most Western states is not as 
laudable as often assumed, severe violations of basic human rights occur infrequently 
in the West, as opposed to the situation in China. The Chinese state is a main violator 
of human rights, but certain powers o f civil society should not be underestimated as 
well. They distinguish the part o f  the civil society which has not even become aware of 
its rights from the part which uses the loopholes in human rights protection for its own 
purposes. The economic situation of the Chinese people differs a lot from the 
countryside to the cities and within the cities from normal cities to those within the 
Special Economic Zones. Under the pressure of economic reform, the formerly 
guaranteed right to work could no longer be maintained in modem China and poverty 
has spread throughout the country. As the system moves more towards a (socialist)
526 see Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 21s.
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market economy, the previous forms of social security (the iron rice bowl) have also to 
be modernized and some new form of social security has to be introduced.527 528China has 
to recognize that the right to life has got two equally important pillars: the economic 
right to subsistence and the right to physical security.328 The first seems to be 
threatened because of the pressure of market forces and the second has not yet taken 
hold, because political reform was always intended to come after economic reform and 
stability.
b. The type of action the EU should take with regard to China
From the previous section the conclusion can be suggested that China is different, 
Chinese people are different; values diverge and political realities are distinct. 
Nevertheless, the Western and Asian sides are not irreconcilable. But HOW should 
Western governments deal with these distinctions?
Dijk proposes to take universal value patterns as a starting point, instead of the 
(political) attitudes of certain single states, in order to measure conformity with the 
international rules.329 This certainly addresses the root of much arbitrary action in the 
field of human rights as regards small and big, strategically important and unimportant, 
trading and non-trading states and so on. But it does not help to overcome the inherent 
tendency of states to act selectively in their external political relations and nor does it 
provide the missing catalogue of such value patterns. One solution could be to favour 
initiatives under the auspices of the United Nations and to object to single actions by 
states towards third countries. Given the not always active role of the UN, this might 
not be the best solution for human rights. Moreover, also the UN Commission, 5278
527 A. Kent (note 10), p. 235.
528 ibid., p. 231.
P. van Dijk (note 105), p. 120.529
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because of its political composition, does not always provide independence and 
impartiality530, whilst the Treaty bodies come closer to this aim. Unfortunately, China 
has not yet ratified  either o f the two Covenants and thus is not subject to scrutiny by 
either o f the bodies. Human rights law has entered the stage of many states’ foreign 
policies in the international sphere. The Economist has noted531 that many states have 
turned „liberals“ and are optimistic about „humanitarian“ interventions in third states. 
These states should not end their involvement in human rights protection abroad. They 
should apply human rights law as forming universal values, but respect variations in the 
implementation process.
The EU faces a big challenge in implementing an effective CFSP and in promoting 
human rights beyond the year 2000 whilst, at the same time, maintaining and increasing 
the economic links with China. After having taken into account the various arguments 
of the Chinese side and their counter-arguments, the EU, has to act in defence of 
human rights in some way or other. One point is important in this respect, and that is 
that even if the proponents of human rights do not agree with the Asian or Chinese 
standpoint expressed, they will achieve little if they push for their conception o f human 
rights without paying respect to the fact that the different ideology has evolved over 
years in a more or less self-contained regime and cannot be changed over mght. As 
regards the EU however, the problem centers around the limited action in the field of 
human rights as soon as economic interests are at stake. The Union as a whole should 
find a way to develop a strategy towards China that covers all its instruments, first and 
second pillar, with the aim of best serving the human rights protection in China. The 
next part asks whether the policy o f engagement through dialogue and economic 
contacts has so far merely been a pretext for economic interests or whether some
530 ib id ., p .1 2 0 .
331 T h e  E c o n o m is t,  „ A  su ita b le  ta rg e t  fo r  fo re ig n  policy**, 1 2 .4 .1 9 9 7 , p . 15-25.
332 T a k e  C h in a  a s  i t  is  a n d  d o  n o t a s s u m e  i t  h a s  to  b e c o m e  l ik e  th e  W est. R e a li tie s  in  C h in a  a re  
d if fe re n t th a n  th e  U S m ig h t a s su m e , M in g  W a n  (n o te  147), p . 2 5 0 s .
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convincing arguments can be found to support the thesis that China is the ‘human 
rights exception’.
aa. Engagem ent or disengagement?
Human rights activists plea for a coercive human rights policy towards China. This 
certainly is understandable given the disastrous human rights record of the country and 
the few substantive changes for the people in the last few years.
It has been shown that the China policy of the EU in 1998 has taken a unfavourable 
turn towards abstention from the last negative action applied towards China: a 
resolution at the UN Commission in Geneva. „Constructive engagement“ and the 
„Comprehensive Partnership“ are the new rhetoric, which proclaim that dialogue is 
important and has already shown considerable progress in human rights, as is the 
further integration of China in the world community through increased bilateral and 
multilateral economic contacts. Cooperation instead of confrontation is the rule.533 534The 
only laudable innovation is that the EU also decided to step up co-operation in the 
human rights field and to look for niches for such an engagement.
Negative measures of the Union are declarations and démarches, a common position, a 
criticizing resolution, dialogue about contentious issues, deferment of meetings, 
withdrawing o f the political dialogue, suspension of aid and trade relations.534 53They are 
deemed adequate in the event o f grave and persistent human rights violations or 
serious interruptions of democratic processes.335 Sanctions in the case o f violations of 
human rights can range from the suspension o f preferential treatment (trade, aid) to the 
reduction o f exchange processes (commercial or financial) to the total ban on imports
533 T h e re  a r e  tw o  fo rm s  o f  c o n fro n ta t io n , a  p o li tic a l o n e  a n d  a n  e c o n o m ic  o n e  a p p ly in g  e c o n o m ic  
s a n c tio n s , M . B re n n e r  (n o te  3 ) ,  p . 8 ; N o n e  o f  th e m  is  a d v o c a te d  to w a rd s  C h in a .
534 T h e  la s t  tw o  b e lo n g  to  th e  te rm  „ p u n it iv e  c o n d it io n a lity “ , K . T o m a se v sk i (see  n o te  75).
535 R e so lu tio n  o f  th e  C o u n c il a n d  o f  th e  M e m b e r S ta te s  (n o te  1 0 8 ), p . 122, p a r. 6 .

140
and/or exports o f some or all goods and services.536 537The suspension of non-preferential 
economic relations by the Union proceeds according to Art. 228a TEC, and so far Art. 
228a TEC has mainly been used in relation to UN resolutions.337 According to Jan 
Schroeder338 539Art. 228a TEC refers to an „Embargo“ which he defines as being a 
„peace time intervention by a sovereign entity in the external economic relations of its 
subjects. The adopted measures are motivated by foreign and security policy 
considerations and of discriminatory character regarding the respective target 
country“. On the other hand, he defines „economic sanctions“ as measures taken „in 
reaction to actual or presumed violation of international law“ and thus narrower in 
scope. In the field of aid, according to the relevant procedures, the Union can modify 
aid programmes, postpone the signature of a co-operation agreement or suspend co­
operation altogether.339
Second pillar negative measures have been applied towards China on a small scale. 
Five of the only eight démarches issued towards China condemned specific human 
rights violations, whilst the other three concerned religious freedom, Tibet and the 
general human rights situation. The two declarations concerned the general human 
rights situation and a dissident, Jing Sheng.536 78940 The situation at the UN Commission and 
the political dialogue have already been discussed. The dialogue has so far only been
536 P . W il la e r t ,  C . M a rq u é z -R u iz , „ V e rs  u n e  p o li tiq u e  é tr a n g è re  e t  d e  sécu rité  c o m m u n e : é ta t  des 
lie u x “ , in :  A . M a tte ra  (e d .)  (n o te  4 8 ), p p . 2 5 3 -3 1 4 , p . 2 5 8 ;  I . E la n d , „ E c o n o m ic  S a n c tio n s  a s  
T o o ls  o f  F o re ig n  Policy**, in : G . A  L o p ez , D . C o r tr ig h t  (e d s .)  (n o te  7 5 ), pp . 2 9 -4 2 , p . 3 9 ss .
537 P . G ils d o rf , P . J a n  K u ip e r, in : H . v . d . G ro eb en , J . T h ie s in g , C .-D . E h le rm a n n  (ed s .)  (n o te  3 3 ), 
A r t.2 2 8 a , N o .8 ; see  a lso  P .J . K u y p e r , „ T ra d e  S a n c tio n s , S e c u r i ty  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h ts“ , in :  M a rc  
M a re s c e a u  (ed .) , The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal 
Dimension, N ijh o ff, D o rd re c h t 1 9 9 3 , p p . 3 8 8 -4 2 2 .
538 Community Embargoes and Liability for Embargo Damages, M a s te r  o f  L a w  th e s is , E u ro p e a n  
U n iv e rs ity  In s titu te , F lo re n c e  S e p te m b e r  1996, p. 1 0 ,6 .
539 F o r  th e  p ra c t ic e  in  th e  y e a rs  a f te r  th e  T re a ty  o f  M a a s tr ic h t ,  E u ro p e a n  C o m m iss io n  (n o te  35), 
p .2 7 , p t .4 0 ;  E u ro p e a n  C o m m iss io n , General Report on the activities o f  the European Union 
1995, L u x e m b o u rg , O ffice  fo r  o ff ic ia l p u b lic a tio n s  o f  th e  E C  1996 , p. 2 1 , p t.1 7 ; E u ro p e a n  
C o m m iss io n  (n o te  68), p . 37 5 , p t .  1099.
540 M . F o u w e ls  (n o te  56), p . 319.
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interrupted once, and that was by the Chinese side in 1996. Would negative first pillar 
measures, as sketched out above, be of use towards China?
The unchallenged advantage of negative measures (economic sanctions) is the ability 
to exert pressure on governments at the right moment and in the right sector and the 
ability to set limits to state behaviour in the international context. But negative 
measures have not been criticized without due reason. It is exactly the aforementioned 
component o f them which leads to the first drawback o f them: the infringement of 
sovereignty. Authoritarian states, and especially China, are extremely reluctant to 
accept any interference from the outside world in their internal affairs. The area of 
domestic policy is seen as out o f concern o f other states (White paper, Bangkok 
Declaration, reaction to the Resolution of the EP in June 1997). Even if international 
human rights law has come to the tentative conclusion that appeals to human rights as 
well as cut off o f aid is not a forbidden interference in the internal affairs of a state, this 
is not shared by all states of the world community. Strong interference, therefore, takes 
the risk that contact with the accused state as a whole will be lost.341 Another 
disadvantage of negative measures is that they do not address the real causes of human 
rights violations, but only touch a small part of the bigger problem and are rarely 
effective to achieve the given aim.342 The cut-off of aid in response to violations of 
human rights endangers long term projects and risks penalizing the population instead 
of the government541 243 54as does the suspension o f preferential trade relations. Such a 
suspension would be more relevant towards China as aid programmes are only in the 
first stage o f being developed,344 but also more unlikely as trade forms the most 54123
541 W h a t w o u ld , o f  co u rse , c o u n te ra c t th e  a im  o f  th e  E U  to  r a i s e  i ts  p ro f ile  in  A s ia  in  g e n e ra l ,  an d  
C h in a  e sp e c ia lly . See C o m m u n ic a tio n s  C O M  (9 4 )  314  f in a l ;  C O M  (95) 2 7 9  fin a l; C O M  (98) 
181 f in a l.
542 P . A ls to n  (n o te  40 ), p. 155 fo r th e  c a se  o f  trad e  sa n c tio n s .
543 D . J. M a r a n t is  (n o te  8 9 ), n o te  58 .
544 U n d e r  th e  A L A  re g u la tio n  4 4 3 /9 2 , O J  L  52, 2 7 .2 .1 9 9 2 , te c h n ic a l  a ss is ta n c e  is  g iv e n  to  A s ia  an d  
th e  L a t in  A m e ric a n  c o u n tr ie s . A r t. 1 s ta tes  th a t  th e  C o m m u n ity  „ sh a ll a tta c h  th e  u tm o s t 
im p o r ta n c e  to  th e  p ro m o tio n  o f  h u m a n  r ig h ts , s u p p o r t  fo r th e  e le c to ra l p ro c e s s  o f

important pillar of EU-China relations (see above). This is, o f course, one o f the 
reasons, why human rights have always come after stability and trade in discussions. 
Due to the negative effects on the population, a possible result of sanctions can be that 
the affected people unite in a common front against the imposing state and support is 
then mobilized for the suppressing regime contrary to the aim of the negative 
measure.* 545 5467As long as there is no support from the Chinese society, it does not make 
sense to push for human rights and intervene, and Ming Wan546 547assumes that until now 
there has not been enough support from Chinese civil society for coercive action 
because o f fear o f chaos and anarchy. The often criticized direction of negative 
measures, as applied by Western donors, against the disrespect of civil and political 
rights, instead of economic, social and cultural rights, indeed addresses the current 
situation in China, as these rights are hardly respected and Chinese politicians officially 
declare civil and political rights to come after a certain standard of economic and social 
rights has been acquired. It is however debatable to what extent the social and 
economic situation of the Chinese people is better than that concerning civil and 
political rights. No matter what the economic situation o f a country, it cannot use 
arguments o f this type in order to neglect civil and political rights.347 Another 
important factor against the use o f negative measures is that they are closely related to 
foreign policy considerations which opens the way for arbitrary action towards certain 
countries low on the „foreign policy scale** (like Nigeria, Haiti) or high on the
d e m o c ra tiz a tio n  (an d ) o f  go o d  g o v e rn a n c e “ . C iv il so c ie ty  a n d  G o v e rn an ce , a s  w e ll a s  th e  socia l 
In f ra s tru c tu re  p ro jec ts  o n ly  c o v e re d  11 m io  E C U  o u t  o f  th e  to ta l  o f  2 5 0 4  m io  E C U  in  1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 5  
g iv e n  to  A s ia . T h e  d isb u rse m e n ts  w e re  ev en  low er, see , C O M  (9 8 )  4 0  f in a l, p. 37s.
A  n e w  b u d g e t  l in e  is  b e in g  d is c u s se d  u n d e r  B 7 -7  to  s u p p o r t  h u m a n  r ig h ts  a n d  d e m o c ra c y  
a c tiv it ie s  i n  A s ia , b u t h a s  so  fa r  n o t  b e e n  ad o p ted , In te rv ie w  w i th  a n  E U  o ff ic ia l o f  D G I B .
545 J. G a ltu n g , O n  th e  E ffe c ts  o f  I n te rn a tio n a l E c o n o m ic  S a n c tio n s :  W ith  E x a m p le s  f ro m  th e  C ase  
o f  R h o d e s ia , in : World Politics, N o .3 , A p ril 1967 , V o l.1 9 , p p . 3 7 8 -4 1 6 , h e  w a s  th e  f i r s t  to  ta lk  
a b o u t th e  „ ra l ly  a ro u n d  th e  f lag  e ffe c t“ .
546 M in g  W a n  (n o te  147), p . 251s.
547 V ie n n a  D e c la ra t io n  a n d  P ro g ra m m e  o f  A ction , U N  D oc. A /4 9 /6 6 8 , 2 5 .6 .1 9 9 3 , p a ra . 5 .
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„economic scale“ (like China).548 5490As states’ external relations are driven by self- 
interest, a decision to apply economic sanctions can be a sign of minimal interest in the 
given country.549 50Given the lack o f criteria, action in the field of negative measures will 
never become just.530 Finally, sanctions only show their intended effect if the 
government is willing and capable to respond to pressure. Sanctions have little effect 
on strong undemocratic regimes and no effect on countries without suitable institutions 
which can react to and improve the situation.551 To sum up, negative measures, 
especially trade sanctions, may be o f help in a very narrow range of situations, but the 
use o f negative measures is a sign of the previous failure of preventive measures to 
promote human rights and democratic institutions.552
As regards China, negative measures were applied after the Tiananmen massacre in 
1989: a considerable range of economic agreements and technology transfer was 
interrupted through action within multilateral fora and important future agreements 
were placed on hold, but important diplomatic relations were in most places kept in 
place. Individual governments also condemned the Chinese government’s behaviour.553 
The Group o f Seven issued a Declaration on 15th July in which it announced to 
suspend bilateral ministerial and high-level contacts, arms trade, to request the
548 G. A . L o p e z , D . C o rtr ig h t, „ E c o n o m ic  S a n c tio n s  i n  C o n te m p o ra ry  G lobal R e la t io n s“ , in : G . A . 
L o p ez , D . C o r tr ig h t (ed s .) (n o te  7 5 ) , p p . 3 -1 6 , p . 12 th ey  ta lk  a b o u t a rb i tra r in e s s  in  th e  f ie ld  o f  
e c o n o m ic  s a n c tio n s  a n d  b ig  p o w e r  c o e rc io n ; A s  a  d e c is io n  to  a p p ly  ec o n o m ic  s a n c tio n s  re q u ire s  
u n a n im ity , a l l  M em b er S ta tes h a v e  to  f in d  a  c o m m o n  s ta n d , K . T o m asev sk i (n o te  4 3 3 ) ,  p . 49 ; 
A rt. 2 2 8 s  T E C .
549 P. A ls to n  (n o te  4 0 ), q u estio n s  th is  a s s u m p tio n , p . 169 .
550 T o  r e a c h  th i s  a im , h u m a n  r ig h ts  sh o u ld  b e  d e -p o lit ic iz e d , b u t  so  fa r  no  d o c u m e n t h a s  re a c h e d  
th is  a im , K . T o m a se v sk i (no te  4 3 3 ) , p . 48 .
551 D , J. M a r a n t is  (n o te  8 9 ), p. 13.
552 K . T o m a s e v s k i (n o te  4 3 3 ), p. 9; o n  p . 12 s h e  a s k s  th e  q u e s t io n  w h y  a  c o u n try  th a t  fu l lf i l ls  a l l  th e  
c o n d it io n s  a tta c h e d  to  a id  sh o u ld  n e e d  a id ?  B u t a id  th e n  se rv e s  to  re a c h  th e  c o n d it io n s , i f  it  is 
a p p lie d  a s  a  „p o sitiv e  san c tio n “ . P o s i tiv e  s a n c t io n s  a re  th e  c o m b in a tio n  o f  th re a t  o f  ec o n o m ic  
s a n c tio n s , h ig h -le v e l d ip lo m acy  a n d  a  se r ie s  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l a n d  ec o n o m ic  in c e n tiv e s , G . A . 
L o p ez , D . C o rtr ig h t , „E co n o m ic  S a n c tio n s  in  C o n te m p o ra ry  G lo b a l R e la tio n s“ , in : G . A . L opez , 
D . C o r t r ig h t  (ed s .) (n o te  75), p p . 3 -1 6 , p . 4,
553 K. T o m a s e v s k i (n o te  1), p. 115.
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postponement of loans by the World Bank, and to grant Chinese students an extension 
of their visas if they so wished.534 The US continued to discuss China’s Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) status, the UN Human Rights Commission took China under scrutiny 
and international NGOs also exercised their influence.535 The EU responded to the 
brutal repression by decreasing ministerial and other contacts on a high level, the 
postponement o f co-operation programmes, the reduction of cultural exchanges and 
initiatives* 556 and the Member States imposed an embargo on trade in arms which is still 
in force.557 589 Multilateral economic sanctions were already gradually lifted from 
December 1990, but this development was followed by an increase in moral sanctions 
on a governmental basis.558 59The European Council decided already in October 1990 to 
normalize slowly relations, despite the ongoing human rights violations, and the 
European Parliament issued a resolution in 1992 on the eligibility of China for co-
. <<Q
operation programmes.
During the first 12 months o f negative measures, China reacted with counterattacks 
towards the international community and stressed the principle of non-interference in 
internal affairs, till it agreed on entering into discussion about the events.560 In this 
stage, Chinese reaction took multiple forms: it released prisoners o f conscience who
5SA A . K e n t (n o te  10), p. 190; N e s s , P . v a n , Analysing the impact o f international sanctions on 
China, W o rk in g  P a p e r  1 9 8 9 /4 , C a n b e r ra ,  d e p a rtm e n t o f  In te rn a t io n a l  R e la tio n s , T h e  A u s tr a l ia n  
N a tio n a l  U n iv ers ity , p . 2 -1 1 .
555 A . K e n t  (n o te  10), p . 2 1 3 s .
556 see  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  b y  th e  E u r o p e a n  C ouncil, B u ll. E C , N o .6 , 1989, V o l.2 2 , pt. 1 .1 .2 4 , p . 17 
a n d  p t .2 .3 .2  s ta tem en t o f  th e  tw e lv e ; M . F o u w els  (n o te  5 6 ), p . 3 1 8 .
557 F o r  1 9 9 7 , see  E u ro p ean  P a r l ia m e n t  (n o te  525), p . 15 9 , p a r .F .
558 A . K e n t (n o te  10), p. 2 1 7 , 2 1 6 : b y  J u n e  1991 m o s t e c o n o m ic  san c tio n s  h a d  b e e n  li f te d ; Ja p a n  
w as  th e  f i r s t  d o n o r, th e  W o rld  B a n k  th e  second  to  li f t  th e  s u s p e n s io n  o f  a id , K , T o m a se v s k i (n o te  
l ) . p .  115.
559 M . F o u w e ls  (n o te  56), p . 3 1 8 .
560 A . K e n t (n o te  10), p . 2 1 3 ; S a n c tio n s  a re  u su a lly  d ee m e d  to  r e a c h  th e ir  in te n d e d  e ffec t a f t e r  th re e  
y ea rs , a l th o u g h  in  th e  f i r s t  y e a r  t h e  ta r g e t’s  re sp o n se  is th e  h ig h e s t ,  G . A . L o p ez , D . C o r tr ig h t , 
„ E c o n o m ic  S an c tio n s  in  C o n te m p o ra ry  G lobal R e la t io n s“ , in :  G . A . L opez , D . C o r tr ig h t  (ed s .) 
(n o te  7 5 ) , p p . 3 -1 6 ,9 .
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had been detained after 1989 or altered the sentence o f others, invited human rights 
delegations from foreign countries, and seemed to develop a sense of obligation to 
respond to the critics and to elaborate a theoretical foundation for its human rights 
policy, which finally led to the White paper.361 It might seem as if the sanctions have 
shown considerable result in China, but the content o f the White paper reveals serious 
shortcomings in China’s human rights performance. Its implications were discussed 
above, it may be remembered that the White paper affirmed human rights to lie within 
the internal affairs and that China had a different understanding of human rights. 
Violations o f human rights were still taking place in China after the release of the 
sanctions, and still are, and the internal effects on the population must not be 
underestimated as well.362
In conclusion, the drawbacks o f negative measures, discussed in theory above, have 
proved to be present in practice with regard to China. However, the graveness of the 
brutal repression of the democracy movement demanded a rapid and strong response 
by governments having adhered to the international bill o f rights and supporting the 
idea of an international human rights regime. A weak response was not among the 
possible solutions, perhaps sanctions were even lifted too soon and replaced by 
„bilateral moral“ initiatives, which, too often bow to economic interests. It is 
impossible to assess fully the impact of sanctions in this paper. Taking account of the 
often negative assessments o f the results o f sanctions,363 it is proposed to agree 
basically with the positive approach of the Union in practice. Long-term political 
change in China will presumably not be achieved with a purely coercive policy in trade 
and aid. In theory, though, the concept of negative measures should be upheld towards
561 A. K e n t  (n o te  10), p . 221s.
562 see ib id ., p . 186ss.
563 G. A . L o p e z , D . C o rtr ig h t, „ E c o n o m ic  S a n c tio n s  in  C o n te m p o ra ry  G lo b a l R e la tio n s“ , in :  G . A. 
L o p ez , D . C o rtr ig h t (ed s .) (n o te  7 5 ), pp . 3 -1 6 , p .6 s s  a n d  o th e r  c o n tr ib u tio n s  in  t h a t  b o o k ; K . 
T o m a se v s k i (n o te  4 3 3 ) , p . 2 2 1 ; C u b a  1962 an d  I r a q  1990  a r e  u su a lly  c ited  a s  n e g a tiv e  ex a m p le s .
nun ii m  ii p m
—  J
B O S
146
China. In the diplomatic field they are a potentially effective way o f exerting pressure 
on China and exposing it to the outside world as „the bad man“.564 The approach of 
the Union in 1998 does not convince in this respect. With regard to economic 
sanctions in trade and aid, they should be announced as the last option, because any 
other policy cannot get rid o f the accusation of arbitrariness. Last, but not least, the 
practical positive approach through continuation o f economic contacts and creating a 
closer network has one important limit: trade and aid must not be used in areas, where 
human rights violations of the Chinese government are indirectly supported as for 
example buying goods made with child or prison labour565 or directing aid to sectors 
where the corrupt political apparatus profits and in the field o f exportation of 
hazardous goods.566 To appear credible abroad and at home, the pursued policy must 
be congruent in this respect.
The ultimate argument for a positive approach is stability in China as none o f the 
Western donors’ would be prepared to act in a Chinese internal crisis and nobody is 
able to predict what would happen in such a case. Moreover, it is more than doubtful 
that the Western world would be prepared to open its gates to 1.2 billion Chinese 
immigrants.
564 C h in a  is  v e iy  k e e n  o n  N O T  b e in g  ex p o sed  a s  th e  b a d  m a n  a n d  re sp o n d s  to  p re s s u re  in  th is  
re sp e c t, le c tu re  o f  D r. Ju e rg e n  W ic k e r t  o f  th e  F r ie d r ic h  N a u m a n n  S tif tu n g  a t  th e  E U I „  4 .5 .9 8 , 
„ T h e  ro le  o f  N G O s in  d e m o c ra c y  p ro m o tio n “ .
565 P . A ls to n  (n o te  4 3 4 ), p . 155, th e  lik e ly n ess o f  c o m p lic ity  sh o u ld  h e a v ily  o u tw e ig h  p ra g m a tic  
a rg u m e n ts  a g a in s t th e  c e ssa tio n  o f  tra d e . In  s u c h  cases  th e  e th ic a l re sp o n s ib ili ty  o f  th e  ex p o rtin g  
s ta te  p re v a ils . T h e  G S P  co u ld  b e  u se d  a s  a  m e a n s  to  in v e s tig a te  in  th e  fo rc e d  la b o u r  an d  
e v e n tu a lly  su sp en d  tr a d e  b e n e fits . I t  has h a p p e n e d  to  B u rm a  (M y a n m a r) in  1 9 9 7 , E u ro p e a n  
R e p o rt N o .2 2 2 8 , 3 1 .5 .9 7 , p .V -1 0 .
566 K . T o m a se v s k i (n o te  1), p. 7 9 , tra d e  m u s t n o t b e  u s e d  in  a  w ay  to  c a u se  d a m a g e  to  th e  
p o p u la tio n .
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bb. A positive policy, especially development and economic co-operation
Positive measures in development co-operation include: the holding of elections, the 
setting-up of new democratic institutions and the strengthening of the rule o f law; the 
strengthening of the judiciary and the administration o f justice; promoting the role of 
NGOs and other institutions which are necessary for a pluralist society.367 Economic 
co-operation aims at creating and reinforcing a network of business and other 
economic links between the EU and its partners and building an environment more 
favourable to investment and development.
Positive measures show important advantages in the conduct of state-to-state relations. 
Having the example o f the Tiananmen massacre in mind, human rights promotion in a 
positive „system“ of measures follows a preventive approach, addressing the roots of 
the problem instead o f waiting for unwanted results and „repairing“ the afterwards.567 68 569
They tend to include the needs o f the people among their primary objectives as since 
Lomé IV, Art. 5, positive measures are „centered on man“ and are not first and 
foremost targeted on governments.369 This focus on man pays account to the situation 
of the population and implies the fact that change can only come from the inside570 571and 
cannot be imposed from the outside solely through coercive measures. Rather, support 
from the civil society is needed for measures to become effective. Alongside the 
emphasis on man, the development towards more consensus and co-operation in the 
execution o f the project through policy dialogue371 between the two partners is to be 
observed. The persons who know their country and deal with its administration every 5678901
567 R e so lu tio n  o f  th e  C o u n c il a n d  o f  th e  M em b er S ta te s  (n o te  108), p . 122.
568 M in is te r  S p ra n g e r , „ E n tw ic k lu n g sp o li t ik  im  Z e ic h e n  d e r  Z e ite n w e n d e “ , F ra n k fu r te r
A llg e m e in e n  Z e itu n g  v o m  1 9 .4 .97 ,
h ttp :/ /w w w .b u n d e s re g ie ru n g .d e /b m z /a k tu e liy z e ite n w e n d e .h tm l, p . 5.
569 D . J, M a r a n tis  (n o te  8 9 ), p. 14.
570 P. A ls to n  (n o te  4 0 ), p . 169.
571 T h e  f le x ib le  m e c h a n ism  to  id e n t ify  a re a s  fo r fu n d in g  a n d  p r io r i t ie s  fo r im p le m e n ta t io n .
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day should be included in the policy formulation.572 Due to their character as 
supporting measures and the outcome of policy-dialogue, positive measures in 
development co-operation generally do not infringe upon the sovereignty o f the given 
state as do negative measures.573 Finally, positive measures are, as a matter o f fact, 
more distinct from foreign policy considerations and enable the donor governments to 
act more rationally and inarbitrarily.
However, positive measures to integrate China in the world community, leaving apart 
the highly praised constructive dialogue on human rights for now, also show 
considerable limits in dealing with an authoritarian state. W. Heinz, H. Lingnau, P. 
Waller574 distinguish between four types of political systems which are subdivided in 8 
categories. On the top end are authoritarian regimes and on the low end functioning 
democracies. China would fall under the first type and its first sub-category of a 
„closed system“. Typical features are the complete control of social, political and 
cultural life by one political party and the low respect o f human rights. The possibilities 
and limits of positive measures aimed at promoting democracy and human rights in a 
third county depend on this over-all political context. The fields of action and the 
measures to take are determined by the political situation, that means that positive 
measures are most likely to succeed in those countries with governments committed to 
an improvement of human rights, such as countries in transition to democracy or, of 
course, established democracies. If the political will is lacking, as in China, the 
usefulness of positive measures in the field o f human rights and democracy promotion
572 M a r a n t is  (n o te  8 9 ), p . 21 .
573 T h is ,  o f  co u rse , is d e b a ta b le  b e c a u s e  th e  w h o le  f ie ld  o f  d e c e n tra lise d  c o o p e ra t io n  h a s  n o t  b een  
in c lu d e d . C o n s te lla tio n s  c a n  v e r y  w e ll b e  fo u n d  in  w h ic h  th e  su p p o rt o f  a n  a n ti - r e g im e  N G O  
w ith  th e  a im  o f  e n h a n c in g  th e  d e m o c ra tiz a tio n  o f  th e  c o u n try  c a n  h e a v ily  in f r in g e  u p o n  the  
so v e re ig n ty  o f  th e  re c ip ie n t c o u n try . T h is  h a p p e n e d  fo r  e x a m p le  in  M e x ic o , w h e re  th e  EU  
w a n te d  to  su p p o rt a  sp ec ific  N G O  b e fo re  th e  e le c tio n s , b u t  w a s  h o ld  b a c k  b y  re s is ta n c e  o f  the  
M e x ic a n  g o v e rn m e n t w h ic h  s a w  its  so v e re ig n ty  in f r in g e d , In te rv ie w  w ith  a n  E U  o ff ic ia l o f  D G  
IB.
574 W . H e in z , H . L in g n a u , P . W a lle r  (n o te  469), p . 2 0 s: a u th o r i ta r ia n  re g im e , c o u n tr ie s  i n  tra n s it io n  
to  d e m o c ra c y , fo rm a l d e m o c ra c ie s , fu n c tio n in g  d e m o c ra c ie s .
E E
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is doubtful and should be subjected to a careful examination. As long as the Chinese 
government and parts of the population575 reject the notion of human rights as either 
being a Western interference and the imposition of a liberal tradition, or as foreign to 
their structure of society and remain closed in their relations to the outside world, 
positive measures must inevitably have limited effect.
Nevertheless, positive measures to promote human rights and democratic principles 
can be applied in authoritarian systems and be successful if they find the space to enter 
the country. They have to focus on supporting NGOs, independent journalism and 
vulnerable groups.576 To find these niches is difficult in China as the government 
opposes the development of an active civil society. As an example o f the hindrance of 
the development of civil society, which could challenge the Chinese official position, 
the suppression of NGOs can be cited. For example, China has classified reporting by 
independent NGOs as constituting „counterrevolutionary activities“ and as the 
publicizing of „state secrets“. This reaction is in line with the Chinese law, as 
counterrevolutionaries who sabotage the people’s democratic dictatorship or disclose 
state secrets can legally be condemned.577 But acting according to the „rule o f  law“ in 
this case does not necessarily mean that China also respects human rights. The initial 
attempts to co-operate with China through different programmes all aimed at different 
aspects o f commercial and economic life, mainly in the field o f rural and urban 
development.578 The Commission Communication (95) 279 final579 proposes to
575 T h e  C h in e se  so c ie ty  a g re e s  w ith  th e  g o v e rn m e n t th a t  th in g s  a re  im p ro v in g  a n d  th a t  a n y  re fo rm  
h a s  to  p ro c e e d  s lo w ly  fo r  th e  p a ra m o u n t a im  o f  s ta b ility , M in g  W a n  (n o te  1 47), p . 2 5 1 ;  B u t 
p r iv a te  v o ic e s  w h ic h  c h a lle n g e  th e  o ffic ia l p o s i t io n  b e c o m e  s tro n g e r  a n d  s t ro n g e r ,  M . D a v is , 
„ C h in e s e  P e rsp e c tiv e s  o n  H u m a n  R ig h ts“ , in : M . C . D a v is  (e d .)  (n o te  18 ), p p . 3 -2 4 , p .  12 ; Y a sh  
G h a i (n o te  193), p . 13.
576 W . H e in z , H . L in g n a u , P . W a lle r  (n o te  4 78), p . 7 4 .
577 M . P o s n e r , C a n d y  W h itto m e , „ T h e  S ta tu s o f  H u m a n  R ig h ts  N G O s“ , c i te d  in : H . J. S te in e r ,  P . 
A ls to n  (ed s .)  (n o te  5 ), p . 46 8 .
578 E u ro p e a n  C o m m iss io n  D e le g a tio n  in  C h in a , ,,E U -C h in a  C o -o p e ra t io n , R u n n in g  P r o g r a m m e s “ ,
4 .1 0 .9 6 , h ttp :/ /w w w .e c d .o r.c n :/v h o s t/e c d /c o /. I t  li s ts  p ro g r a m s  in  „ H u m a n  R e so u rc e s  
D e v e lo p m e n t“ , „ S u p p o r t to  E c o n o m ic  a n d  S o c ia l R e fo rm s “ , „ B u s in e s s  a n d  In d u s tr ia l  
C o o p e ra tio n “ , „ R u ra l a n d  U rb a n  D ev e lo p m en t“ ; E u ro p e a n  C o m m iss io n  (n o te  3 9 7 ) , a d d s  a  f if th
'!
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improve the human resources development (China-Europe International Business 
School and other initiatives for vocational training), the economic and social reform 
through an exchange programme for lawyers, and business co-operation in order to 
support the business environment in China, to develop new skills, and to give 
incentives for closer ties between Chinese and European firms. Projects in rural and 
urban development should be kept at the same level.580 Projects in the field o f human 
rights and democracy promotion like support for elections, parliamentary support, help 
with constitutions (legislative projects), reform of the police and other state forces to 
improve compliance with human rights (executive projects) and support for the rule of 
law (judicial projects) have not been (fully) exploited yet. The same is true for projects 
in support of civil society (support for NGOs, for independent journalism and 
vulnerable groups). In 1998 it has been decided, though, to start co-operation 
including initiatives to strengthen the rule o f law (seminars and training o f specialized 
personnel like judges, prosecutors and lawyers) and civil and political rights (local 
governance), as well as the promotion of economic and social rights (poverty 
alleviation, with emphasis on women, disabled, aged or children).581 A first legal 
seminar was held in February 1998, the local governance programme is ready for 
signature by the EU and China, and terms o f reference for the third programme are 
expected to be sent to China soon.582
To conclude, a positive policy towards China in the field o f human rights is in the long 
term preferable to negative measures and has good prospects to find more and more *579801
p ro g ra m m e  ca te g o ry  „ p ro te c tio n  o f  th e  e n v iro n m e n t“ ; E u ro p e a n  C o m m iss io n , „ A  S tr a te g y  to  
H e lp  B u ild  a  C iv il S ocie ty“ , h t tp : / /e u ro p a .e u .in t /e n /c o m m /d g 0 1 /p o l4 3 .h tm , th e  in s t r u m e n ts  to  
im p le m e n t th e se  p ro g ra m s  a re  f in a n c ia l an d  te c h n ic a l c o o p e ra t io n , e c o n o m ic  c o o p e r a t io n  a n d  
d e c e n tra liz e d  c o o p e ra tio n  w ith  N G O s.
579 A  lo n g  te r m  p o licy  fo r  C h in a -E u ro p e  re la tio n s, p . 14ss.
580 ib id ., p . 16.
581 B a c k g ro u n d  n o te  o n  C h in a  a n d  H u m a n  R ig h ts , F e b ru a ry  1 9 9 8 , u n p u b lis h e d  p a p e r ,  p .  2 . 
ib id ., p . 3.5S2
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niches to enter Chinese society. This is not to say, however, that negative measures 
should not be included in that approach at all for there are cases where they are the 
only credible solution. Thus, a policy of „positive sanctions“383 would be the best 
approach. Assuming that there is a positive effect as a result o f aid and economic 
measures in the target country, what about the effects o f preferential and free trade 
with a third country, such as China?
cc. Constructive engagem ent: change through increased trade ?
Some, comments on ‘change through trade’ will be cited first to serve as an 
introduction to this subsection:
„It’s time for members of (the US) Congress to stop bashing China and to recognize 
that the best way to promote human rights in China is to promote free trade“.584
The European Parliament585 is convinced that „human rights tend to be better 
understood and better protected in societies open to the free flow o f trade
„Take It From LBJ: China Ought to Be Engaged“.386
„Bashing China Is No Answer: ‘Can One Eat Liberty?’“.587
What is the rationale behind such an argumentation? First and foremost, towards the 
end of the nineties, China, like no other country, is full o f uncertainties. Parallel with 
the immense economic growth, China invests a lot of money in military armament and 
displays its determination to conduct a „policy of power“ towards Taiwan and the
see note 552.
J. A Dom (note 417).
585 „Resolution on the Commission communication on a long terni policy for China-Europe 
relations“ (note 525), p. 160, par.U.
586 International Herald Tribune, 172.11.97, éditorials.
587 International Herald Tribune, 11.11.97, p. 9.
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Southeast Chinese sea.588 58901The emergence o f China as a regional power and Chinese 
aggression in some fields is said to be best encountered through co-operation.389 
Despite the further link o f global trade and finance, geo-political strategies still have an 
important role to play in inter-state relations.390
Secondly, the recognition that the structure o f the world economy is one o f the main 
reasons for the underdevelopment of third world countries has led to an enhanced 
emphasis on trade besides aid and on creating a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO).391 Simultaneosly, the focus of foreign policy has moved from sanctions to 
commercial aspects in the 1990s, and generally away from aid to trade and 
investment.58 90192 5934The debate centres around the proponents o f the market who claim that 
a free market leads to political change in China, and the sceptics or human rights 
activist who highlight the costs of free trade. First, in tying China to the Western 
world, trade will make it more difficult for China to follow its hard line in human rights 
and democracy and its harsh stand will slowly be watered down.593 594This view is based 
on the assumption that international free trade brings advantages for all participants394 
and in doing so leads to wealth and peace for all states.395 Secondly, international
588 J. Haacke, p. 166.
589 The Economist, 25.10.97, „Greeting the Dragon“, p. 15; Zeit, 24.10.97, „Einbinden statt 
Eindaemmen“, America has already fought three wars to prevent regional hegemony in Asia 
(World War, Korean, Vietnam). Proponents of containment and proponents of engagement fight 
a war of arguments against each other. None of them are able to predict how China will develop 
in the next years.
590 The Economist, 25.10.97, „How America Sees China. Friend or Foe?*, p. 30; K. Tomasevski
(note 433),
p. 50 with regard to Eastern European countries.
591 K. Tomasevski (note 1), p. 77; P. Alston (note 40), p. 157.
592 K. Tomasevski (note 433), p. 146s.
593 The Economist, 25.10.97, „How America Sees China. Friend or Foe?1, p. 23.
594 M. Brenner (note 3), p. 10.
595 For theories to explain international cooperation in trade, see S. Strange, State and Markets, An 
Introduction to International Political Economy, Pinters, London 1988, p, 174ss she names 
three main schools on international trade: (neo-) mercantilist (realist), neo-classical or liberal 
(pluralist) and Marxist (structuralist); R, Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  International 
Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1987, p. 12ss three main issues dominate the
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political theory is then concerned with looking at the domestic ramifications of free 
trade and asking what the significance of a world market economy is for domestic 
policies.* 596 Assumed that domestic policies also adhere to the concept of a market 
economy, the discussion consequently centres around the assumption that economic 
liberalization will incite internal forces that push for political change.597 It goes beyond 
the scope o f the paper to offer a solution to the complicated relationship between 
market liberalization and democracy or human rights. Focus will therefore be directed 
towards the main facets of the discussion on the relationship between democracy and 
the market. The supporters o f the market have a logical and a historical explanation at 
hand.598 The logical explanation contends that as in a market economy decision-making 
is decentralized, property is privately owned, and the freedom of contract is established 
by law, these market forces or rights lead to transparency and predictability which 
enhances an independent judiciary and thus the separation of powers. A free market 
also leads to the strengthening o f  civil society which can challenge state authority. 
Both elements are necessary for democracy. The historical argumentation looks at the 
West and submits that the emergence of the market was followed by democracy, 
because the market stimulates social formations such as the emergence o f a middle 
class and the reorganization o f labour that pressure for democracy. Neither o f the two 
explanations is alone capable o f explaining the assumption in question. The market 
does not always generate equal rights for everybody, nor does the historical evidence
discussion within international political economy: first, whether a highly independent world 
economy promotes harmony or causes conflict among states; second, what is the relationship 
betw een economic change and international political change; and third, what is the significance 
of a world market economy for domestic economies.
596 ibid., p. 14.
597 M. Brenner (note 3),p. 11; see also Committee on External Economic Relations, „Opinion on a 
Communication from the Commission concerning a long-term policy for China-Europe 
relations“ (note 525), p. 24, the Union’s engagement in China is based on two pillars: 
integration in the WTO and assistance in its economic and social reforms; Funabashi, Y.;
Oksenberg, M.; Weiss, H. (note 163), p. 87.
Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 31.598
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of the West fit for Asia in all respects, because in Asia the market is shaped by the 
state, whereas the historical pattern was the other way round in the West.399
Another aspect of the same discussion is that trade leads to economic growth and this 
growth on the one hand is linked to economic reforms59 600, and on the other hand will 
lead to the trickling-down of the wealth to the poorer segments of the population.601 
Aristotle’s hypothesis was that democracy could only develop in a relatively wealthy 
society.602 Trickle-down theories o f growth are very promising and of course support 
the theory o f change through trade, but the effects of prosperity on democracy are still 
not well developed.603 It is impossible to go into detail o f this broad discussion here, 
this section only aims at establishing a complete picture of the arguments brought 
forward to support free trade. Growth, its supporters would argue, gives rise to a new 
middle class which wants to preserve and strengthen its rights and thus pushes for 
democracy and human rights to be respected in the country. But such an effect is 
unlikely to occur in China as a whole (except in the Special Economic Zones) because
599 ibid., p. 32; K. Tomasevski (note 433), p. 149, „A  free market is by definition amoral and trade 
regulation is always subject to powerful interest groups.
600 International Herald Tribune, 28.4.98, „China: Gradual Economic Reform Presupposes Growth“ 
growth is seen as a prerequisite for economic reforms; On the other hand, growth is enhanced by 
economic reforms, N. Bajpai, T. Jian, J. D. Sachs, Economic reforms in China and India: 
Selected issues in industrial policy, Development Discussion Paper No. 580, April 1997, Harvard 
Institute for International Development, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Abstract; see also R. L. 
Barsh, „Democratization and Development“, in: H um an  R ig h ts  Q u a rte rly , N o.l, 1992, Vol.14, 
pp. 120-134.
601 R. Gilpin (note 595), p. 23, a consequence of a market economy is that it affects the distribution 
of wealth within the society, K. Tomasevski (note 1), p. 180, 183, she defines the trickle-down 
approach as „growth first, distribution later“. Distribution will occur spontaneously after a 
certain level of development has been reached. Governments seek to gain this economic 
development b e fo re  human rights can be respected. According to her, this approach implicitely 
negates hum an rights as a means o f development.
602 Barro, R. J., Determinants of Economic Growth. A  cross country empirical study, Development 
Discussion Paper No. 579, April 1997, Harvard Institute for International Development, 
Cambridge (Massachusetts), p. 33 the Aristotle hypothesis: ’’From Aristotle down to the present, 
men have argued that only in a  wealthy society in  which relatively few citizens lived in real 
poverty should a situation exist in which the mass o f the population could intelligently 
participate in  politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the 
appeals of irresponsible demagogues”,
603 ibid., p. 33, p. 34ss about the indicators to support that thesis.
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o f China’s internal „immigration“ policy. The big disparities between rural and urban 
wealth as regards income, and the enormous problems with unemployment in the cities 
have incited China to restrict rural migration with tight controls. In doing so, it 
ferments disparities between land and city and prevents the trickle-down effect of 
growth. The policies o f urban interests and state enterprises have thus far prevailed.604 605
Thus, in practice, wealth through trade has often not reached the poor, but enriched 
the already wealthy parts. The hope that economic reforms will eventually lead to 
political reforms is not a proven theory either.603 It may be said, though, that increases 
in various measures of the standard of living tend to generate a gradual rise in 
democracy.604 506 Despite these uncertainties about the effects of trade and economic 
liberalization, the thesis of engagement of China instead of confrontation cannot be 
dismissed easily for the above mentioned geo-political reasons and the historical 
evidence.
Thirdly, the globalization o f  the market and the increasing interlinkage has further 
implications: major powers often claim they have to act like this because globalization 
forces them to follow the pace o f  increasing trade, and consequently, human rights are 
conspiciously missing from the globalization agenda.607
As regards the economic opening-up of China, the last years have shown considerable 
improvement.608 While the „open-door“ policy only really began in I978609 and
604 International Herald Tribune, 28.4.98, „China: Gradual Economic Reform Presupposes 
Growth*.
605 Barro, R. J. (note 602), p. 32ss quoting Friedman, Upset, Toquevillc.
606 ibid., p. 34.
607 P. Alston, „The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization“, in: 
EJIL, No.3, 1997, Vol. 8, pp. 435-448, p. 439, this new agenda and new rules are set by the US 
according to Serge Sur or by bankers, lawyers, businesspeople, public-interest activists and 
criminals according to Anne-M arie Slaughter, p. 440.
608 Funabashi, Y.; Oksenberg, M.; Weiss, H. (note 163), p. 42.
609 Hu Yuanxiang, Legal and Policy Issues o f the Trade and Economic Relations between China 
and the EEC. A Comparative Study, Kluwer, Deventer et al. 1991, p.3s.
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exposed communist China for the first time to external influences, by 1998 it has 
brought about a high level o f international exchanges.610 China’s policy was centered 
on promoting exports and attracting foreign investment.611 The non-state sector is the 
main driving force of China’s impressive growth whose successes can be explained by 
the fact that it largely operates under market conditions.612 The big disagreement is 
between the sequence of reforms: are economic or political ones to come first? One 
could also talk of the China-Russia debate in this respect. Deng followed a strategy of 
economic opening but maintaining the strict rule o f the Party. Through this, according 
to Heinrich Weiss, he has elevated the living conditions of the Chinese people to a big 
extent and promoted the evolution of a middle class.613 In view of these economic 
reforms taking place in China, a strong case could be made in favour o f ‘change 
through trade’. However, economic reforms do not automatically lead to political 
reforms and as long as the Chinese state shapes the market through tight control, a 
policy that alone promotes free trade will not necessarily help build the forces in the 
whole country needed for democracy and human rights. Such internal forces are, for 
example, decentralization of decision-making, respect of private property, a range of 
choices for the competitors and freedom of contract.614 Democracy, then, has 
elements, such as free and fair elections, freedom of expression and public debate, the 
rule of law and the accountability of elected officials, that restrain state power and 
prevent it from following harmful economic policies.615 All in all, there is room for 6
6 0 see trade with EU, European Commission (note 397); An open door policy is the only way for 
developing countries to catch up with the developed world. It not only allows the country to 
specialize and use its comparative advantages, it also benefits the country through increased 
access to foreign capital, information, and advanced technology, Baijpai, N.; Jian, Tianlun; 
Sachs, J. D. (note 600), p. 20.
611 H. Weiss (note 230), p. 48.
612 N. Bajpai, T. Jian, J.D. Sachs (note 600), Abstract., p. 22 Differing from the rest o f China, the 
economies o f the SEZs depend on market forces rather than the plan.
6,3 H. Weiss (note 230) , p. 49.
6H Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 31.
615 International Herald Tribune, 29.4.98, „Asia Needs Social Protections“; „Final Report“ (note 
470), p. 14, 17.
»* r* ,  ;  v* fe 74 K  74 T<TVTV7*1
k
157
hope that the new Premier Zhu Rongji will continue with reforms and also let them 
expand to the political field.616 However, whilst a policy of free trade might be able to 
ensure that China’s economic growth continues, it is not sufficient to enhance leaders 
to introduce political reforms. Economic liberalization is one possibility to induce 
political change, but it is certainly not the panacea.617 It always bears the risk of 
adhering to double standards with regard to weaker countries61* and trade is 
conceptually hostile to human rights and development policies in disregarding the 
rights and interests of the people while protecting the economic interests of the 
international actors at stake.619
dd. Dialogue
In February 1998, the Foreign Ministers of the EU declared not to table or support a 
Resolution on China, but to rely on the political dialogue established (see above) 
between the two sides. In the language of development co-operation this positive 
measure to promote human rights runs simultaneously with other positive EC 
initiatives.620 In the case of China, dialogue is the main (and only) focus and leaves 
little room for any other attempts to promote democracy and human rights.
It is not clear from the rhetoric whether this dialogue is effectively used or only taken 
as a means by the Chinese side to dissipate concerns of the Western world, and has to 
be seen as a sign of the limited readiness of the EU to engage in an argument over
616 International Herald Tribune, 28.4.98, „China: Gradual Economic Reform Presupposes 
Growth“ .
617 see M. Brenner (note 3).
618 R  B. Lillich, F. C. Newman, „The Carter Administration’s Human Rights Initiatives“, in: R. B. 
Lillich, F. C. Newman (eds.) (note 39), pp. 824-871, p. 869.
619 K. Tomasevski (note 1), p. 77s.
620 Resolution of the Council and of the Member States (note 108), p. 122, an „open and 
constructive dialogue between (the Community and its Member States) and the governments of 
dev eloping countries“.
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human rights with the Chinese authorities. However, the declared intention is to make 
it possible for China to become a member o f the world community. Political dialogue 
can encourage trust on the Chinese side and create surroundings in which human rights 
issues can be addressed. According to Chandra Muzaffar, the positive elements of a 
dialogue outweigh the imposition of human rights via the human rights clause and thus 
the EU should develop a variety of dialogue options instead of insisting upon 
conditionality. It must not be forgotten that the West can also learn from the Asian 
countries.621 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, a promoter o f cross cultural dialogue as well 
a internal cultural discourse, believes strongly in the Western doctrine of universalism 
but sees the appropriate method to incorporate it in non-Westem societies as dialogue 
and discourse.622 However, as long as irreconcilable views, such as „Asian values are 
no more than an excuse for a authoritarian government to retain power“ (from a 
human rights advocate), and „Western views and values do not suit the Asian society 
and are a modem form of hegemony“ (from the Eastern side) are supported by the 
opposing sides, a useful exchange is hardly imaginable.623 It is submitted that dialogue 
is important, but should be used with other methods in a complementary instead of an 
exclusive way.
3. Outlook
a. Concrete action towards China
Visible action by the EU in human rights towards China requires the quick 
implementation of the newly designed co-operation programme. This covers initiatives
621 Ch. Muzaffar (note 228), p. 74.
622 see A. A. An-Na’im, „Toward a  Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of
Human Rights“, in: A. A. An-Na’im (ed.), H u m a n  R ig h ts  in  C ro s s -C u ltu ra l P e rsp ec tive s , 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1992.
623 D. J. Marantis (note 89), p. 28, partners should not insist on irreconcilable views.
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to strengthen the rule of law, civil and political rights (local governance), as well as the 
promotion of economic and social rights (poverty alleviation, with emphasis on 
women, disabled, aged or children).624 * In general, positive support for the 
improvement of the human rights and democratic situation in China can follow two 
lines: one is to aim at reform o f the state sector, the other one to foster the emergence 
of an active civil society. Such efforts rely on a long-term positive engagement in 
China. This does not mean, however, that a short-term negative policy cannot be 
applied at all. Even if the EU follows a policy of positive sanctions, negative action 
should include China as it includes any other country in the world violating human 
rights: This implies for the intended co-operation programme that a human rights 
clause should be included in the Financing Agreement that is to be signed by the two 
sides. Additionally, at the next review o f the trade and co-operation agreement 
between China and the EU, the possibility of including the human rights clause should 
be discussed and implemented.623 The next paragraphs are going to highlight the areas 
for positive action first and then refer to situations where trade and its implications for 
democracy cannot be used as a justification to abstain from a negative policy anymore.
As regards the state sector in China, one o f the most urgent areas for reform is the 
Chinese legal system. This concerns the Constitution as well as state laws. The 
Constitution has been discussed above and was criticized because despite mentioning 
most o f the rights o f the human person as laid down in the UDHR, its provisions are 
unenforceable. Guo Luoji624 *26 explains it with regard to the missing body for 
constitutional oversight that should, according to him, be created first. He does not 
deem it useful to improve the provisions of the Constitution first and then look for a
624 Background note on China and Human Rights, February 1998, unpublished paper, p. 2; Agence 
France Presse, 24.2.98, „China welcomes EU decision on human rights“.
623 Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (note 227), p. 6, par.30; European 
Report No. 2228, 31.5.97, p. V-10.
626 G. Luoji (note 176), p. IOss,
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better implementation procedure, but advocates the opposite approach. First the 
existing Constitution should be made enforceable before new provisions are created.627
Secondly, the court system has to be reformed to ensure the independence of the 
judges and free it from external influences. A first step in doing so is to train judges 
and lawyers as proposed by the EU. The respect of the constitutional principles cited 
above has to be ensured to enhance the predictability of judgments and to improve 
access to courts for ordinary citizens. Along similar lines is the reform of the 
parliamentary institutions needed to guarantee a control of administrative action.628
Thirdly, the basic prerequisites for democracy and their foundations have to be 
supported and advanced by the EU. The internal developments that are necessary to 
provide the foundations for the evolution of a market economy which is likely to lead 
to democracy have already been mentioned above. They are the decentralization of 
decision-making, private property, the range of choices, predictability, freedom of 
contract. Moreover, increased economic growth can provide the citizens with the 
material background to fight for their rights and to participate in democracy provided 
the wealth spreads through the country, Basic elements of democracy are: competition 
for state power through regular, free and fair elections; the right and possibility for 
political participation; civil rights and freedoms such as freedom for expression, 
freedom of information, the right to assembly, and the rule of law.629 The EU can 
pursue these aims by trading fairly with China, avoiding prison-labour and child-labour 
goods, pushing for respect o f labour law in the Chinese firms (social clause 
discussion), for the further liberalization of the market and for the decrease o f state 
power, supporting human resources development and teaching programmes, as well as 
local governance programmes.
627 ibid., p. 10.
628 Funabashi, Y.; Oksenberg, M.; Weiss, H. (note 163),p. 89.
629 W. Heinz, H. Lingnau, P. Waller (note 469), p. 17.
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The decision of the Foreign Ministers in 1998 not to table a resolution was commented 
on by an EU diplomat and he admitted that there still are serious shortcomings in the 
prison administration, that there was a need for administrative review and that torture 
has yet to be abandoned. In view of the countless political prisoners still detained in 
China, the prison administration is an important issue and the EU together with the 
international community should push further for permission for prison visits by 
international bodies such as the Committee on Arbitrary Detention or the Red Cross. 
With regard to ‘administrative review’ the diplomat was probably pointing to the case 
of administrative detention ordered by the police or local authorities without any form 
o f judicial review.630 Torture is still widespread in China despite the ratification of the 
Convention against Torture by China in 1988. By law, prison administrators are 
obliged not seriously to mistreat prisoners, but in practice cases are seldom regarded
venous .631
60 offenses carry the death penalty in Chinese law and it is carried out in annual high 
numbers. For example in 1996 Chinese courts imposed the death penalty in 6,100 
cases and 4,367 executions were confirmed. In comparison, Amnesty reported that 
Ukraine had the second highest number of executions with 167.632 Yash Ghai states 
that torture, the right to life and slaveiy are the human rights that obviously belong to 
the core set of rights, but beyond that there is much disagreement.633 At least in view 
of violations of these rights, the Union should also pursue a negative policy of 
sanctions. Moreover, it has to refrain from positive action as soon as this action can be
630 Report of the Mission des Juristes Français, „Justice répressive et droits de Fhomme en RPC“, 
October 1991.
631 Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (note 227), p. 12; J. van der Klaauw, 
„Human Rights News“, in: N Q H R , No.l, 1998, p. 90, criticizes that no concrete programmes
have been developed in this respect.
632 Amnesty International, „China“, 26.8.97, Seminar Materials Professor Alston, International 
Human Rights Law, Autumn Term 1997, p. 1.
633 Yash Ghai (note 193), p. 24.
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regarded as in complicity with the authoritarian regime. This can occur in the field of 
trade as in the field o f aid.634
The emergence of an active civil society should be promoted through, first, poverty 
alleviation and then support o f NGOs active in the field of human rights, as well as of 
an independent media.635
b. Overall strategy
An all-inclusive strategy for the Union and its human rights policy is still missing and 
also the major Commission document „The European Union and the External 
Dimension o f Human Rights Policy“ in this respect remains rather vague on how to 
achieve more consistency, transparency and impact. The chapter on the 
‘multidimensional overall strategy’ including human rights, security, development, the 
environment, conflict prevention and electoral assistance fails to develop criteria for a 
more coherent external face o f the Union.636 This relates to positive as well as to 
negative action. Additionally, the Union still has not solved the problem of a human 
rights catalogue and the amendment o f the treaty to give competence to the 
Community to adhere to the European Convention. Both steps were demanded by the 
European Parliament in its Report on Respect for Human Rights in the European 
Union,637 but they were not taken up by the Intergovernmental Conference 1996. The 
European Parliament, on this occasion, issued a list o f fundamental human rights, 
including civil and political liberties and economic and social rights.
634 J. van der Klaauw (note 631), p. 90, deplores that despite new initiatives to promote human 
rights in China, the issue o f the death penalty is dealt with nowhere.
635 Funabashi, Y.; Oksenberg, M .; Weiss, H. (note 163), p. 89.
636 Commission in its Communication „ The European Union and the External Dimension of 
Human Rights Policy“, COM (95) 567, p. 19ss.
637 EP doc. A4-112/97, 8.4.97; EuZW 1997, p.421.
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Conclusion
The question posed in this paper centres around the crucial issue o f whether the 
current EU human rights policy towards China is a serious attempt to promote human 
rights and democracy as prescribed by the treaty and international obligations, or a 
mere excuse. Was the aim o f Art. F II, J.l TEU, 130u TEC fulfilled and the Union’s 
identity on the international scene asserted? The tension between engagement and 
pressure in human rights will remain important over the next few years. Cooperation 
with China is surely necessary not least in view of the unpredictable geo-political 
situation o f this big country, but also because through co-operation ways can be found 
to enter the Chinese society and to enhance change that comes from within.638 
According to Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im cross-cultural dialogue and internal 
discourse are the means to reach acceptance of the universal doctrine of human rights 
o f the West.639 It seems as if  the Union has adhered to his theory by relying on free 
trade, bilateral dialogue (cross-cultural dialogue) and new aid co-operation in its 
relations to China:
1. Free trade might be a first step to reach the Chinese population and incite internal 
discourse, and thus be an argument for the delinking of human rights and trade, 
although the 7 %  growth o f China is far from spreading throughout the country, but 
likely to remain in the hands o f the few. Only if such a delinking is embedded in an 
overall human rights strategy towards China, can human rights be more than merely 
pure rhetoric in bilateral relations. Still one dubious point remains: how can the EU 
justify that the inclusion of the human rights clause in trade (framework) agreements
638 The word „cooperation“ has been used in the multilateral area (UN system) by some nations to 
refuse criticism of their human rights record and promote non-selectivity. They have done so in 
sponsoring resolutions on „international cooperation“ in human rights, but meaning in  substance 
„non-intervention“ in  the internal affairs of a state. O r cooperation has been inverted to mean 
„don’t release information critical o f a state’s human rights record without state permission“, A. 
F. Bayefsky (note 187), p. 47s, 54.
639 see note 622.
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has become a rule towards third countries, with the fact that the EU-China agreement 
does not contain the clause? Nor are any other trade measures applied to China in 
defence o f human rights. Given the recent Australia case, where the EU and Australia 
could only agree on a political declaration instead o f a binding agreement confirms the 
picture o f a world where big states can get away with more than little states. Thus, free 
trade cannot be the only message delivered to China; It has to be coupled with other 
measures.
2. Bilateral dialogue can promote cross-cultural understanding if it is used for that 
purpose and not subordinated to other foreign and economic policy considerations. It 
is in this latter respect that the multilateral dialogue in treaty, as well as Charter fora, 
will be less likely to be used for national purposes. It is even more deplorable that the 
Union decided not to engage in this form of multilateral dialogue at the UN 
Commission in Geneva in 1998.
3. And finally, aid programmes can be used to support the internal discourse on human 
rights and certainly are an important factor in empowering a civil society.
The human rights situation in China is still very bad and this is no time for euphoria.640 
China is still a one-party power with old men ruling who have not been elected by the 
people in free, democratic elections. Until such an election takes place, the Chinese 
government cannot claim to represent its people. And until the people of China cannot 
express their opinion freely and participate in political and economic life, there is no 
reason to refrain from action in support of the weakest parts of the population and 
their human rights. But changes have occurred in the last years as well and one must 
not close one’s eyes before them. It is the task of the West to maintain the momentum 
of the changes and to support them. It cannot escape from its obligation to make its 
human rights engagement visible. That must include, if necessary, the exertion of
640 see Opinion of EP Foreign Affairs Committee (note 227), pp. 11-12; European Parliament (note 
525).
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pressure, not least for the purpose of remaining credible in the West; always taking 
into account that China is a country in a transition phase that needs a strong 
government to hold internal forces together. No Western nation can prescribe another 
nation how to move from a planned economy to a market economy or from a 
suppressive regime to a more open one. At the moment, the main concern of the 
Communist Party is to retain power and there still are no clear alternatives to one party 
rule in China.641
The implications o f the China-case for the Union are that the CFSP has proven to still 
be a considerably weak procedure which does hardly guarantee the pursuit of a 
common line in controversial cases such as China. That might rationally explain why so 
little use o f the new CFSP instruments has been made so far. With Amsterdam, the EU 
should make use of the new majority vote possibilities in the CFSP and pursue a more 
active human rights policy. But also first pillar measures have not been used 
sufficiently towards China in the field of human rights, not least because o f economic 
interests. Perhaps it is not even desirable that the Member States in the framework of 
the CFSP always act jointly in issues that by nature breed confrontation such as finding 
a consensus on the right policy towards China. It remains to be seen whether the new 
flexibility provisions introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty represent a helpful step in 
the right direction. The Union needs coherent criteria to perform a credible human 
rights policy (that starts at home) and a consistent external face that could be achieved 
by acknowledging legal personality to the Union as a first step and improving co­
ordination between the different procedures o f the pillars.
641 Ming Wan (note 147), p.251.
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